Executive Appointee Reliability under Separated Powers:
Senatorial Constraints on Executive Branch Coordination via Leadership Appointments in U.S. Federal Agencies

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Abstract

This study proposes a theory explaining the Senate's incentives for facilitating executive branch coordination between presidents and political executives through appointments. As Senate policy interests converge towards the president, the Senate will increasingly support executive branch coordination efforts that increase (decrease) the reliability of executive appointees, reflected by the complementarity (substitution) between both an appointee's ideological proximity and fealty to the president. As Senate policy interests diverge from the president, however, the Senate will undermine executive branch coordination efforts by reducing executive appointee reliability that reduces (increases) complementarity (substitution) between these presidential loyalty characteristics. Data on U.S. federal agency leadership appointments display empirical evidence consistent with this logic by finding that lower (higher) executive appointee reliability transpires during times of heightened (reduced) ideological conflict between the president and Senate, particularly under divided government. This study reveals how the Senate can shape executive branch coordination *ex ante* via the appointment process.

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Modern U.S. presidents prefer loyalty from political executives to ensure coordinated executive branch governance (e.g., Moe 1985). Greater appointee loyalty to the president encourages greater functional specialization by increasing grants of both delegation and discretion to federal agencies (e.g., Epstein and O'Halloran 1999; Huber and Shipan 2002, 2006). Yet, presidents do not always maximize loyalty for several reasons. Presidents face limited talent pools to draw upon when selecting appointees (Dewan and Myatt 2010). Alternatively, presidents may place higher premiums on appointees' managerial skills or policy-specific expertise to attain policy objectives (Hollibaugh, Horton, and Lewis 2014; Krause and O'Connell 2016, 2019; Ouyang, Haglund, and Waterman 2017; Waterman and Ouyang 2020) or instead have to offer concessions on loyalty in exchange for the Senate granting greater policy authority, such as larger discretionary budgets (e.g., McCarty 2004).

In this study, we argue presidents seeking to enhance executive branch coordination will want confirmable nominees who will need minimal *ex post* monitoring because their agent type is such that presidents are certain of their level of trustworthiness. Presidents will therefore prefer reliable appointees whose agent type is unambiguous ('pure') versus unreliable appointees whose agent type is ambiguous ('mixed'), ceteris paribus. Reliability is a desirable characteristic of appointees as both information and procedural-based uncertainty inherently limit presidential influence over public agencies, including those issued via unilateral executive action (Provost and Gerber 2019; Rudalevige 2021). Reliable appointees represent the extent to which presidents view appointees' actions as being easily discernible, and *not* necessarily the extent to which appointees are trustworthy agents.

To attain effective executive branch coordination, presidents will prefer appointees whose loyalty characteristics indicate reliability—regardless of whether they represent high loyalty ('good') or low loyalty ('bad') 'pure' appointee types—to unreliable appointees whose combinations of ideological proximity and fealty to the president signify ambiguity (i.e.,

'mixed' appointee types).[1] *Executive appointee reliability* is therefore defined as the extent to which the ideological proximity (loyalty) of the appointee vis-à-vis the president is complementary—i.e., mutually reinforcing—to the appointee's fealty to the president (i.e., non-ideological loyalty). Complementarity between both sources of loyalty reduces ambiguity *ex ante* for presidents since they can better distinguish between 'good' versus 'bad' appointee types. Reducing such ambiguity is critical for ensuring executive branch coordination between presidents and political executives.

Because presidents prefer reliable appointees to foster coordinated executive branch governance, we posit the Senate's willingness to confirm reliable appointees is shaped by the extent these two branches' policy interests align or diverge from one another. As interbranch conflict increases, the Senate will undermine executive branch coordination by ensuring appointed political executives are less reliable for presidents due to divergent policy interests between both political institutions. In the presence of low interbranch conflict, however, the Senate shares the president's incentives for enhancing appointee reliability since executive branch coordination serves their mutual policy interests. Appointee reliability serves an instrumental purpose for presidents by reducing ambiguity surrounding executive administration, though Senate support is contingent upon the extent to which its policy interests align with the president's.

The theory's empirical implications are evaluated on a sample of 558 U.S. federal agency leadership PAS positions covering 38 agencies during a 22-year period spanning the

[1] "Bad" appointee (i.e., unambiguously low loyalists) is defined relative to other confirmed appointees. Presidents are not apt to appoint individuals whom they know will *actively* work against their policy goals. Rather, these appointees are presumed to yield a lower positive contribution towards executive branch coordination relative to other Senate confirmed appointees.

Reagan through Bush II administrations. The evidence reveals that under divided government, complementarity between ideological proximity and fealty to the president declines as ideological conflict expands, while substitution between ideological proximity and fealty expands. Under unified government, however, mixed evidence is observed in favor of the converse pattern, that more *complementary-type* appointees occur under high levels of interbranch conflict—though these estimates are somewhat less precise and more model-dependent than those for divided government.

This study identifies the conditions under which the Senate can exercise advise and consent appointment powers to influence executive branch coordination. In turn, both the theory and evidence offer new insights regarding why presidential efforts to harness the administrative state have been mixed, despite recent presidential efforts to embrace both control and accountability strategies during the administrative presidency era.

The Foundations of Executive Branch Coordination: Ideological Proximity and Fealty Sources of Appointee Loyalty to Presidents

Although presidents seek responsiveness from the federal bureaucracy (Moe 1985), inherent challenges arise from executive branch coordination problems (Krause 2009; Lowande 2018; Rudalevige 2021). Rudalevige (2021) chronicles how presidential efforts at decentralizing executive branch governance through unilateral action generates greater policy uncertainty. Theories of the appointment process suggest presidents wish to avoid policy uncertainty from those nominees with divergent policy preferences (Hollibaugh 2015, 2017). Presidents seeking greater executive branch coordination will have an incentive to dampen such agency costs by preferring reliable political executives.

For purposes of executive branch governance, political executives' loyalty to (appointing) presidents is a critical factor for understanding bureaucratic responsiveness to

presidential goals. Presidential loyalty emanates from two distinct inputs that each help facilitate executive branch coordination: the *ideological proximity* between presidents and political executives, and the latter's *(non-ideological) fealty* to the former. Ideological proximity constitutes shared policy preferences and captures the extent to which an appointee would make *independent* policy decisions congruent with the president's wishes absent direct orders. Ideological proximity is distinct from demonstrated loyalty based on prior shared service in government (Pfiffner 2010: 120), as well as service to prior presidents (Michaels 1997: 40; Pfiffner 1987: 73-74). Further, ideological proximity fails to account for how vested appointees are in the success of the president via prior party service (Krause and O'Connell 2019: 533).

Fealty to the president offers an alternative channel, distinct from ideology, through which appointees can exhibit loyalty. Fealty relates to an appointee's proclivity to serve as a 'team player' on behalf of the administration—an inference derived from prior relevant service through elective office, administrative, or party organizational duties (e.g., Krause and O'Connell 2019: 532-533; see also Akerlof and Kranton 2005: 12-13, 28-29). Fealty reflects non-ideological motivations based on the loyalty an appointee has for a particular president (*personal*), the desire to serve as a 'team member' of an administration (*organizational*)—whether attributable to sincere behavior as a 'team player' acting in accordance with the organizational identity given their assigned role and function (e.g., Akerlof and Kranton 2005; March and Simon 1992)—or strategic considerations involving career concerns (e.g., Adolph 2013). Fealty reflects organizational members' 'buy-in' to a broader mission beyond their own individual interests and goals that is critical for effective performance (Besley and Ghatak 2018).

Executive branch coordination is a function of the degree of political executives' loyalty to the president in terms of both ideological proximity and fealty, and both

contribute to executive branch coordination. In some instances, these loyalty attributes will complement one another, thus enhancing executive branch coordination by serving as 'backstops' to one another, and thereby, increasing appointee reliability. In other instances, presidents are forced to substitute these loyalty attributes for one another, and hence, makings executive branch coordination more difficult since appointee reliability is reduced. Next, the political conditions under which these effects take place in the appointments process is discussed.

Presidential Efforts at Securing Reliable Executive Appointees Within a Separation of Powers System

Because the Senate can limit a president's ability to confirm executive appointees whose policy interests are most aligned with their own (e.g., Jo and Rothenberg 2014; McCarty 2004; Snyder and Weingast 2000), a president's reasonable 'second-best' strategy to ensure executive branch coordination is to distinguish between 'good' versus 'bad' types of appointees. This logic is widely applied to the study of agent selection problems, including the selection of elected representatives which are less costly than *ex post* monitoring options (Fearon 1999; Mansbridge 2009). Applying this logic to appointments, reliable appointees can be either 'good' or 'bad' pure agent types whose contributions towards executive branch coordination are unambiguous (i.e., uniformly 'high' or 'low'); whereas, unreliable appointees are those mixed agent types that increase ambiguity.

Although presidents select appointees exhibiting varying degrees of loyalty, they prefer reliable appointees who offer less ambiguity regarding the level of loyalty displayed once in office. Reliable appointees are individuals whom the president can gauge, with a considerable measure of precision, whether or not political executives will reflect the administration's policy objectives. Presidents seeking greater appointee reliability,

therefore, prefer to select appointees whose propensity for ideological loyalty (*ideological proximity*) is mutually reinforced by their propensity for non-ideological loyalty (*fealty*). This is because executive branch coordination is enhanced when ambiguity relating to administrative policymaking is reduced *ex ante* from the president's perspective when an appointee's ideological proximity and fealty are complements. That is, greater complementarity between these appointee loyalty attributes yields less ambiguity relating to presidential policy goals since 'good' and 'bad' agent types are clearly distinguished.

For example, consider Christine Varney, tapped by President Clinton to serve as a Federal Trade Commissioner and sworn into her post in October of 1994. Varney is an example of a reliable appointee since she exhibited high ideological proximity and high fealty prior to her appointment.[2] Prior to Varney's appointment, she had a long history in Democratic politics in general, and with the Clintons specifically. From 1989 to 1992, she served as General Counsel to the Democratic National Committee, and subsequently served as Chief Counsel to the Clinton/Gore campaign as well as General Counsel to the 1992 Presidential Inaugural Committee. Additionally, just prior to her appointment as FTC commissioner, she served as President Clinton's Secretary to the Cabinet and was responsible for coordination of major policy issues between the Executive Office of the President and cabinet agencies.[3] Similarly, former National Transportation Safety Board member Christopher A. Hart—appointed during the George H. W. Bush administration—is

[2] Based on our measurements of the concepts—which will be described in more detail later—Varney's *Fealty* score is at about the 88th percentile of the empirical range of the OLS-based scores and her *Ideological Divergence* score is at about the 25th percentile; thus indicating relatively high fealty and low levels of ideological divergence between herself and President Clinton.

[3] See https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/biographies/christine-varney.

also a reliable executive appointee since he exhibited low ideological proximity and fealty when he began his term in 1990.[4] Prior to his NTSB appointment, Hart's career had largely been in the private sector.[5] Though he would later serve in various capacities in the Clinton, Bush II, and Obama presidencies, he would not rejoin the NTSB until he was nominated by President Obama to serve as Vice Chairman.

When an appointee's ideological proximity and fealty to the president are less complementary, or possibly even serve as substitutes for one another, executive branch governance becomes more ambiguous, and hence, coordination problems naturally arise. An appointee exhibiting greater fealty at the expense of ideological proximity translates into greater agent ambiguity since while it increases an appointee's willingness to serve as a 'team player' within the administration, it also means their own policy preferences diverge from those of the president. If an appointee's fealty is higher, a president will find it harder to discern whether that appointee will be responsive since they exhibit policy preferences less aligned with those of the president. Similarly, an appointee exhibiting greater ideological proximity to president at the expense of fealty will only be loyal to presidents when their policy positions are compatible with the administration's. Under this scenario, when an appointee's policy views diverge from those of the president in specific instances, the propensity for executive branch coordination will be lower since they lack a strong organizational identity to their subordinate position within the administration. That is,

[4] Hart's *Fealty* score is tied for the lowest value in the dataset among the OLS-based scores, yet his *Ideological Divergence* score is at about the 99th percentile, indicating low fealty to either former President Bush or the Republican Party, and strong ideological disagreement with President Bush.

[5] https://www.ntsb.gov/news/speeches/CHart/Pages/bio_hart.aspx.

substitution between ideological and non-ideological sources of presidential loyalty raises the ambiguity regarding the appointee's agent type.

Notable examples of such appointees include a pair of George W. Bush's appointees during the first year of his presidency. Alex Acosta was appointed to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and exhibited high levels of ideological proximity, coupled with low levels of fealty at the time of appointment.[6] These characteristics were partly a function of Acosta's thin record of service to the Republican Party in general and George W. Bush in particular at the time of this nomination, having mostly focused on his private sector legal career (though he did clerk for future Supreme Court Justice Samuel A. Alito).[7] Conversely, Christine Todd Whitman's appointment as EPA administrator in January 2001 reflected low levels of ideological proximity with the Bush II administration, coupled with high levels of fealty.[8] This classification was rooted in Whitman's extensive involvement in Republican party politics via national committee service and elective office.[9]

Executive branch coordination suffers when presidents are forced to substitute ideological proximity for fealty, or vice versa. This is because substitution between these loyalty attributes hinders presidents' abilities to distinguish between 'good' or 'bad' political

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[6] Acosta's *Fealty* score is tied for the lowest value in the dataset among the OLS-based scores, yet his *Ideological Divergence* score is at about the 8th percentile, indicating extremely low fealty at the time of appointment, but little ideological distance between himself and President Bush.

[7] https://millercenter.org/r-alexander-acosta-2017-2019.

[8] Governor Whitman's *Fealty* scores are at about the 98th percentile of the empirical range of the OLS-based scores and her *Ideological Divergence* score is at about the 79th percentile; collectively, these suggest comparatively high fealty and strong ideological divergence from President Bush.

[9] https://www.nytimes.com/1993/06/09/nyregion/whitman-pursues-family-business.html.

executives, and hence increases ambiguity associated with administrative policymaking. Conversely, executive branch coordination improves when presidents reduce ambiguity by increasing complementarities between the loyalty attributes. The Senate, however, employs advise and consent powers in a strategic manner to shape the prospects for executive branch coordination. The Senate has an incentive to foster executive branch coordination by increasing complementarity—while reducing substitution—between ideological and fealty attributes when its policy interests converge with the president's. Conversely, the Senate seeks to undermine executive branch coordination as its policy interests diverge from the president's by reducing complementarity—while increasing substitutability—between these loyalty attributes. This logic produces the following proposition:

> ***Executive Reliability Proposition***: *Executive appointment reliability will be decreasing in interbranch policy conflict between the president and Senate.*

The following pair of related—yet distinct—theoretical hypotheses are used to test this proposition empirically:

> **H1 (*Complementarity Hypothesis*)**: *Complementarity between president–appointee ideological proximity and appointee fealty* ***declines more rapidly*** *in ideological divergence between the president and Senate under divided partisan control vis-à-vis unified partisan control.*

> **H2 (*Substitution Hypothesis*)**: *Substitution between president–appointee ideological proximity and appointee fealty* ***increases more rapidly*** *in ideological divergence between the president and Senate under divided partisan control vis-à-vis unified partisan control.*

H1 and **H2** represent the distinct pathways the Senate can employ to constrain presidential control of the bureaucracy by reducing appointee reliability. Specifically, the Senate can either reduce mutual reinforcement (i.e., complementarity) or increase tradeoffs (i.e., substitutability) involving ideological and non-ideological sources of presidential loyalty (or both). Importantly, these hypotheses are neither mutually exclusive nor mutually exhaustive, and one does not necessarily imply the other.[10] The next section discusses how these hypotheses are evaluated.

Data and Empirical Strategy

Evaluating these hypotheses requires operationalizing both *Fealty* and *Ideological Proximity* in a manner that can gauge appointee reliability. This study's focus is on *leadership* positions (top agency official and subordinate leadership positions), which are the most valuable subset of PAS appointees, since they offer direction for their agencies, as well as a conduit on behalf of presidents' policy objectives. Given their importance, the Senate should place a premium on exercising advise and consent powers accordingly.

For both substantive and practical purposes, Bonica, Chen, and Johnson's (2015) estimates of appointee ideology (hereafter referred to as *CFScores*) are employed as they include estimates of millions of individuals within the same ideological space, including all recent presidents, key members of the Senate, and the most appointees of any extant data

[10] It is feasible to observe *either* complementarity or substitution. Opposing parties in the Senate might force the president into appointment patterns exhibiting less complementarity but lack the institutional leverage to force increased substitution. Similarly, under divided government, the opposition party in the Senate can force higher degrees of substitutivity and still be able to prevent complementarities from those manifesting under unified government.

source of ideological positions.[11] *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence* (the converse of ideological proximity) is defined as the absolute difference between the *CFScores* of the president and the appointee under analysis.[12]

Appointee fealty is derived using a modification of Krause and O'Connell's (2016) empirical approach, which combines observable biographical indicators with a Bayesian Generalized Latent Trait approach to generate estimates of appointee *loyalty* (along with estimates for *managerial competence* and *policy competence*) for 558 U.S. federal leadership appointees between the Carter and Bush II presidencies. Subsequently, Krause and O'Connell (2019) showed that, of the six indicators used to estimate *loyalty* in the earlier study, two (*Shared Partisan Affiliation* and *Prior Campaign Contributions*) captured

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[11] Bonica, Chen, and Johnson's (2015) set of over 12000 presidential appointees is based on Bonica's (2013, 2014) larger *CFScore* set. To match appointees to *CFScores*, Bonica, Chen, and Johnson (2015) consulted various sources—such as the Plum Book, THOMAS.gov (now congress.gov), whitehouse.gov—that note the organizational affiliations and positions of appointees (to enable as many accurate matches as possible). While imperfect, their approach successfully matches a significant majority (approximately 72%) of individuals nominated to Senate-confirmed positions.

[12] Confirmed appointees in this dataset have similar ideological loyalty to presidents compared to unsuccessful nominees for the same set of agencies and positions. First, t-tests fail to reject the null of no difference in the mean *CFScore* of successful appointees versus unsuccessful nominees ($t \approx -0.171$, $p \approx 0.864$) as well as the null of no difference in the mean ideological distance from the President for both sets of individuals ($t \approx -0.380$, $p \approx 0.704$). Additionally, Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests fail to reject the nulls that the ideological estimates ($D \approx 0.077$, $p \approx 0.369$) and/or distances ($D \approx 0.069$, $p \approx 0.527$) are drawn from different underlying distributions between the two groups. This lack of difference is consistent with the White House and Office of Presidential Personnel engaging in effective pre-nomination vetting and only nominating those they feel can be confirmed.

shared partisan and/or ideological orientations, and the remaining four (*Prior Partisan–Administrative Service*, *Shared Subnational Executive Service*, *Prior Elective Office Service*, and *Prior Major Party Service: Appointing President's Party*) captured non-ideological sources of loyalty.[13] These latter four indicators are the focus when generating the *Fealty* estimates.[14] Specifically, the Krause and O'Connell (2016) estimates are taken as a starting

[13] *Shared Partisan Affiliation* equals 1 if the appointee shared the same party affiliation as the nominating president, and 0 otherwise. *Prior Elective Office Service* equals 1 if the appointee had previous elective office experience at either the federal, state, or local levels, and 0 otherwise. *Prior Major Party Service: Appointing President's Party*, which equals 1 if the appointee had any significant experience working for a national party organization (e.g., leadership role in political campaigns, named positions in party organization structure) or running a state party organization for the party of the appointing president, and 0 otherwise. *Prior Partisan–Administrative Service* equals 1 if a shared partisan affiliation appointee previously served in an appointed (Senate confirmed or not) full-time position in any agency during a preceding administration, and 0 otherwise. *Shared Subnational Executive Service* equals 1 if the appointee served in state government when the nominating president was governor, and 0 otherwise. *Prior Campaign Contributions* equals 1 if the appointee gave any monetary campaign contributions meeting the Federal Election Commission reporting limit to the nominating president *prior* to nomination, and 0 otherwise. The first four factors capture the extent to which appointees have allegiance to the president's party, and the final two capture subordinate service to an appointing president. Fealty is a construct that is of an organizational and/or personal nature, distinct from ideology *per se*.

[14] The *CFscore* measures are employed as measures of ideological alignment between presidents and political executives since they employed in past studies of appointee ideology (Bonica, Chen, and Johnson 2015; Hollibaugh and Rothenberg 2018), and these data exhibit convergent validity to other ideological measures (Bonica 2019), as well as these presidential loyalty scores (Krause and

point to generate *Fealty* estimates in two ways:[15]

1. Regress Krause and O'Connell's (2016) existing *Loyalty* measurements on the four separate *Fealty* indicators identified above; the fitted values from this set of OLS regressions will serve as the *Fealty* estimates going forward;
2. Estimate an Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) model on the six *Fealty* and *Shared Preference* indicators and use the resulting factor scores for the *Fealty* factor (if one exists) as the estimates going forward.

The regression-based approach takes the existing measurements of *Loyalty* and the identified *Fealty* and *Shared Preference* indicators as given à la Krause and O'Connell (2016, 2019). First, the replication code from Krause and O'Connell (2016) is executed to

O'Connell 2019: ***Supporting Information*** document, 18-22). Nonetheless, a limitation of the *CFscores* is that they are not available for all appointees, and the subsample comprised of appointees with *CFscores* reveal that this group of upper-echelon political executives tend to exhibit greater presidential loyalty than counterparts lacking a *CFscore* ($t \approx 4.793$, $p < 0.001$).

[15] A four-factor Generalized Latent Trait Analysis (GLTA) is estimated using the same factors as Krause and O'Connell (2019), replacing their *Loyalty* trait with separate *Fealty* and *Shared Preference* traits and subsequently using the resulting factor scores for the *Fealty* factor as the estimates, as well as a Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) model employing the factor loadings from the EFA model described here. Because both models exhibit subpar fit, they are not discussed here (though the conclusions drawn are substantively identical to those presented here).

generate the trait estimates *as well as the underlying posterior distributions*.[16,17] Then, for the overall estimates, as well as each of the 1,000 saved posterior draws, the estimated *Loyalty* measure is regressed on the four *Fealty* indicators identified by Krause and O'Connell (2019) and described above (*Prior Partisan–Administrative Service*, *Shared Subnational Executive Service*, *Prior Elective Office Service*, and *Prior Major Party Service: Appointing President's Party*).[18] The mean fitted values from the 1,000 posterior draws for each appointee constitute point estimates in the following analyses.[19]

Importantly, one limitation of the original Krause and O'Connell (2016, 2019: ***Supporting Information***, 14-17) estimates for the purposes of this study is that the *Fealty* and *Shared Preference* categories are considered to be mutually exclusive and exhaustive based on analyses of convergent and discriminant validity (Fornell and Larcker 1981). This issue is reconsidered here to allow for a possible indicator tapping into both categories, or some *Loyalty* indicator tapping into neither. To address this matter, an Exploratory Factor Analysis model is estimated using the six *Loyalty* traits. Analysis of the resultant scree plot suggests a two-factor solution is appropriate, with a clear 'elbow' at the

[16] The replication code is found at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/E9UQ0S.

[17] While the results from these replication analyses do not match the original results *exactly*—owing to different machines and Mplus versions—the numerical results are identical to at least three decimal points for almost all recovered statistics, and substantive results are identical.

[18] Missing values are imputed for the *Fealty* and *Shared Preference* indicators.

[19] Results separately replicated for each of the posterior draws are substantively similar to results presented in the manuscript (cf. **Tables A-11** through **A-16, Figures A-1** through **A-5** in the ***Appendix***). This analysis obviates concerns about heteroskedasticity since the standard errors are based on the empirical distributions of the coefficients fit to each of the posterior draws.

second factor (Cattell 1966). Although the six indicators load onto two separate factors in generally expected ways, some differences arise between the EFA and regression-based approaches. Specifically, the EFA approach suggests *Prior Partisan-Administrative Service* loads onto both dimensions, and *Shared Subnational Executive Service* loads onto neither; beyond these distinctions, however, the recovered categories are similar to those defined by Krause and O'Connell (2019).[20] Both sets of estimates are employed below.

Importantly, generating the estimates versus determining whether *Fealty* and *Ideological Proximity* act as substitutes, complements, or neither *at the level of the individual appointment* are distinct statistical tasks. Therefore, *Fealty* and *Ideological Proximity* are analyzed to determine whether they serve as substitutes or complements in two ways—first, a series of Kernel Regularized Least Squares models are estimated to examine continuous variation relating to both complementarity and substitution of these loyalty attributes; second, a series of ordered logistic models is estimated to examine discrete classification of appointee types (i.e., substitute types, appointee types, and "mixed" types who are neither).

The other variables used in both sets of regressions capture theoretically-relevant constructs, as well as other potentially relevant control variables. First, recall the theory denotes the importance of partisan conflict between the president and the Senate. As such,

[20] Such discrepancies between EFA and CFA analyses may be due to EFAs, unlike CFAs, do not account for measurement error and cross-correlations among latent concepts that are jointly determined such as managerial competence and policy competence (e.g., Krause and O'Connell [2019, ***Supporting Information***, 35-36]). This is because these methods yield different parameters from a sample within a population (e.g., Snook and Gorsuch 1989; Widaman 1993). As a result, EFA estimates may arrive at different substantive conclusions from CFA estimates.

a *Divided Government* binary indicator is included, which equals 1 if the president and Senate Majority Leader are of different parties, and 0 otherwise.[21] Second, the theory predicts the importance of *ideological* conflict between the branches; therefore these effects are analyzed in terms of *President-Senate Median Ideological Divergence*, *President-Filibuster Pivot Ideological Divergence*, *President-Committee Median Ideological Divergence*, and *President-Committee Chair Ideological Divergence*, which is the absolute difference in the DW-NOMINATE scores between the president and the indicated pivot (some observations are missing when *Committee Median* and/or *Committee Chair* were used, since some nominations were sent directly to the floor).[22] *Divided Government* is interacted with whichever measure of president-Senate conflict is employed.

The remaining variables include *Senate Polarization*—including an interaction with *Divided Government*—as well as *Supervisory Position, President-Aligned Agency*, *President-Opposed Agency*, *Policy Expertise*, *Priority Agency*, *Presidential Approval*, and *Congress*. *Senate Polarization* is defined as the absolute distance between the ideological estimates for the Democratic and Republican party medians. *Supervisory Position* is an indicator variable equaling 1 if the position for which the appointee was selected is the highest-level official in an agency or subagency and 0 otherwise. *President-Aligned Agency* and *President-Opposed Agency* are based on the agency ideology estimates of Clinton and Lewis (2008). First, agencies are coded as –1 if they are liberal (based on a Bayesian 95% credibility interpretation of Clinton-Lewis agency ideology scores), 0 for moderate agencies based on

[21] Like all other variables, this variable is measured in the year of nomination, since the intent is to capture the president's formal policy agenda for a given annual session of Congress.

[22] We use DW-NOMINATE scores (in lieu of CFScores) since this measure is premised on elected officials' revealed policy preferences, as opposed to the behavior of campaign donors.

the same and 1 for conservative agencies. These scores are then multiplied by –1 for Democratic presidents. The resulting scores equal 0 for moderate agencies, –1 if the president is a Republican [Democrat] and the agency is liberal [conservative], and 1 if the president is a Democrat [Republican] and the agency is liberal [conservative]. *President-Aligned Agency* then equals 1 if the resulting score equals 1, and 0 otherwise, and *President-Opposed Agency* equals 1 if the resulting score equals –1, and 0 otherwise. *Policy Expertise*—which is included to account for possible loyalty-competence tradeoffs (Lewis 2008; Krause and O'Connell 2016, 2019; Lewis 2008; Ouyang, Haglund, and Waterman 2017; Waterman and Ouyang 2020)—is provided by Krause & O'Connell (2016), and—like their measure of loyalty—is estimated using a Bayesian Generalized Latent Trait model applied to five characteristics relevant to the policy area of the appointed position,[23] with the resulting factor scores used as the expertise estimates.[24] *Priority Agency* is the number of times the State of the Union address (or late January/early February addresses to Congress for presidents in their first year of their first term) mentioned policy issues

[23] The traits used by Krause & O'Connell to estimate *Policy Expertise* are "(1) whether the appointee had no bachelor's or graduate degree, a single educational degree, or multiple educational degrees in policy-related fields germane to the appointed position; (2) how many of the appointee's four preceding jobs were related to the policy issues of the agency; (3) whether the appointee had any federal government experience related to the policy areas of the position; (4) whether the appointee had any civil service experience in the federal government; and (5) whether the appointee had any agency-specific civil service experience in the agency" (919). Models are also estimated without the *Policy Expertise* variable and the results remain substantively similar for the main hypotheses.

[24] Bivariate analyses reveal the existence of a loyalty-competence tradeoff between *Loyalty* and *Policy Expertise* (*Fealty* measure: —0.35; *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence* measure: 0.21).

directly relevant to the agency to which the respective appointee was named in the year of nomination and functions as a measure of agency policy salience.[25] *Presidential Approval* is the percentage of respondents approving of the president's job performance in Gallup polls, taken from national surveys during the month in which the appointee was nominated. Finally, *Congress* is operationalized as the session number of Congress (e.g., the 105th Congress is assigned a value of 105) to account for unobserved heterogeneity across Congresses.

Empirical Findings

The first set of analyses evaluates the average relationship between president-appointee ideological divergence (i.e., the inverse of ideological proximity) and fealty using Kernel Regularized Least Squares (KRLS). KRLS is a nonparametric estimation method employing machine learning to allow for nonlinear statistical relationships. This approach avoids imposing a functional form *a priori* and produces coefficient estimates systematically varying across a covariate's observed values (Hainmueller and Hazlett 2014). KRLS models yield average marginal covariate effects varying across the parameter space to capture nonlinearities as well as complex interactions between independent variables without the need to specify them *ex ante*. In the present case, the dependent variable is an appointee's estimated level of *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence*, and the primary independent variables of interest are *Fealty* and the various *President-Senate Ideological Divergence* measures, all of which capture the absolute distance between the President and one of the four aforementioned key Senate actors; separate models are estimated for unified partisan control of the presidency and Senate (*Unified Government*) and divided control (*Divided*

[25] For each policy issue, up to three agencies connected to that issue were coded as relevant, including a sub-agency within an agency (e.g., the Army within the Defense Department).

Government).[26] Eight sets of analyses are reported, one for each combination of Senate pivot and type of *Fealty* score—half are based on the regression-based *Fealty* estimates recovered from the original Krause & O'Connell (2016, 2019) model, and the others based on the two-factor EFA model.[27]

The KRLS models are leveraged to yield marginal effects varying across parameter spaces to examine how the estimated effects of appointee *Fealty* on *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence* might be affected by changes in interbranch ideological and partisan conflict. The results in **Figure 1** are smoothed using LOESS curves to enhance visual presentation (Cleveland and Devlin 1988).[28,29] To ensure comparability across models and observed empirical ranges of the outcome variable, the Y-axis is rescaled as the number of standard deviations of *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence* such changes

[26] Because models are estimated on split samples, explicit interaction terms are not specified between our key independent variables (or *Senate Polarization*) in the KRLS models. However, the lack of explicit interaction terms is not particularly relevant, as KRLS models are able to infer interactions between independent variables from the structure of the data alone without the need for explicit terms (Hainmueller and Hazlett 2014).

[27] All models are re-estimated using the 1,000 individual posterior draws for the *Fealty* estimates. Results, which are in the ***Appendix*** (**Tables A-11** through **A-16** and **Figures A-1** through **A-5),** are substantively similar compared to those models estimated using the posterior means.

[28] All regression coefficient estimates are in the **Appendix**. These coefficient estimates represent *average* effects from the full sample, and thus does not reveal any nonlinearities that can be gleaned only from graphical analysis.

[29] These 90% and 95% confidence intervals are based on LOESS nonparametric smoothing.

represent.[30] Positive-valued estimates (Y-axis > 0) indicate a positive marginal effect of *Fealty*, suggesting president-appointee ideological proximity and fealty are substitutes with one another.[31] Conversely, negative-valued estimates suggest ideological proximity and fealty are complementary since they reinforce each other by either *jointly* rising or falling.[32] The magnitude of these marginal effects are indicative of the relative *aggregate* degree of these substitution and/or complementarity effects.

The KRLS results indicate the strongest complementarities between ideological proximity and fealty occur when ideological conflict between the president and Senate median remains low under both unified and divided partisan control regimes, though the magnitude of the effects depend on the extent of partisan conflict.[33] Under unified government, the relationships between complementarities and interbranch conflict are

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[30] The X−axis represents the empirical distribution of *President-Senate Ideological Divergence*, conditional on governmental regime type (unified versus divided) and Senate pivot under analysis.

[31] Specifically, a positive marginal effect means that *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence* is increasing in *Fealty*, implying that *Fealty* and *Ideological Proximity/Shared Preferences* (the inverse of which is captured with *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence*) are substitutes.

[32] Recall that increasing *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence* is tantamount to reducing the extent of ideological proximity/shared preferences. As such, positive derivatives translate into *Ideological Proximity/Shared Preferences* increasing as *Fealty* decreases, implying the two are substitutes. The opposite logic is true for complements.

[33] These results are more pronounced for *Fealty* measures generated from the EFA model (denoted by the *dashed* lines) versus the regression-based measures (denoted by the *solid* lines). This may be due to the *Shared Subnational Executive Service* variable not being identified as a *Fealty* variable using the EFA approach, or perhaps the relaxed functional form assumptions of the EFA model.

somewhat nonlinear, though the overall trends are roughly flat, with little distinguishing the states of the world under the highest levels of ideological conflict versus those where conflict is lowest. On the other hand, complementarities under divided government reveal much greater sensitivity to conflict as the marginal effects generally increase with respect to presidential conflict, though perhaps not when the filibuster pivot is used to measure ideological conflict. The patterns are directionally similar for both the regression- and EFA-based measures, though are of a reduced magnitude for the former.

Overall, although presidents are generally successful in accruing complementarities between ideological and non-ideological loyalty when making executive appointments in absolute terms (as virtually all predicted marginal effects are negative), the Senate can be successful in exercising their formal advise and consent powers by reducing appointee reliability insofar that these negative marginal effects become attenuated—and, therefore, the strength of complementarities decrease—though the effect is most pronounced under divided government (where, under some parameterizations, the marginal effect of *President-Senate Ideological Divergence* on *Fealty* decreases by around half a standard deviation of the latter as the former increases from its minimum value to its maximum). These patterns support both the *Complementarity Hypothesis* **(H1)** and the *Substitution Hypothesis* **(H2)** —at least under divided government—since interbranch policy conflict reduced appointee reliability as complementarity between ideological and non-ideological sources of appointee loyalty becomes less likely, while substitution becomes more likely.

However, these analyses—while supportive of both hypotheses—are incapable of distinguishing the specific decision rule for selecting different *appointee types* and, as such, the *Complementarity Hypothesis* (**H1)** cannot be distinguished from the *Substitution Hypothesis* (**H2**) for *individual* appointments. To address this limitation, a series of ordered

logistic regressions is estimated to better understand when specific *types* are more likely to be appointed.

Figure 1: Estimated Marginal Effects of President-Appointee Ideological Divergence on Fealty (Kernel Regularized Least Squares Approach)



Granular Analyses of Executive Appointee Reliability via Classification

In this section, a more granular evaluation of executive appointee reliability is offered by estimating a series of ordered logistic regressions, with the appointee type outcome classified accordingly:[34]

[34] Models based on interquartile and quintile ranges yield substantively similar results to those reported here based on tercile estimates. These results can be obtained from the authors.

- **Complement:** An appointee's value for one loyalty attribute appears in the lower tercile, while the other attribute's value appears in the upper tercile.[35]
- **Substitute:** An appointee's value for both attributes jointly appear in either the upper or lower tercile.
- **Neither:** An appointee's value for at least one attribute appears in the middle tercile.[36]

This decision rule is illustrated in **Figure 2**. Adopting this rule, the posterior mean estimates for *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence* and *Fealty* are employed to classify appointees such that the outcome variable is coded +1 for a 'complementary' appointee, −1 for a 'substitution' appointee, and 0 for a 'neither' appointee.[37,38]

The core results from ordered logistic regression models appear in graphical form in **Figure 3**. Changes in predicted category probabilities are plotted between the empirical 25th percentiles of *President-Senate Ideological Divergence* (for all four pivots of interest) and its empirical 75th percentiles.[39] The X-axes in the plots are the empirical distributions of

[35] Complements are denoted in opposing directions since *lower* [*higher*] levels of *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence* will indicate *higher* [*lower*] levels of *Shared Preferences*. The opposite logic is true when examining whether these characteristics are substitutes.

[36] Observations where both attributes are in the middle tercile are classified as *Neither*.

[37] This decision rule classifies N = 154 [82] as substitutes, N = 209 [178] as complements, and N = 217 [320] as neither for OLS [and EFA] based methods, respectively.

[38] **Figure 2** underscores the fact that substitutes and complements (and, by extension, **H1** and **H2**) are not merely the mutually exhaustive converses of one another (see *Note 10*).

[39] The predicted differences in **Figure 3** are calculated by setting *President−Senate Ideological Divergence* and *Divided Government* at their specified values, setting the other variables to their

President-Senate Ideological Divergence, conditional on the type of partisan regime and Senate pivot under analysis; the Y-axes correspond to the predicted differences in probabilities, with the vertical lines denoting 95% confidence intervals and the horizontal dashes corresponding to 90% intervals. Although the estimate magnitudes differ by measurement approach, they reveal strikingly similar patterns for each appointee type.[40]

Figure 2: Executive Appointee Reliability Decision Rule



The top row of **Figure 3** provides support for the *Substitution Hypothesis* (**H2**). As interbranch ideological conflict between the president and Senate increases from its empirical 25th percentile to its 75th percentile, the estimated probability of observing a

means, and simulating the predicted probabilities of each category 10000 times. The point estimated are based on the 50th percentile, while the 2.5th, 5th, 95th, and 97.5th percentile estimates are used to construct the 90% and 95% confidence intervals.

[40] In alternative analyses, the *Substitute* and *Complement* categories are disaggregated and estimated using multinomial logit models. Results, which are available from the authors, suggest similar overall inferences and patterns, albeit with minor differences across categories.

substitute appointee type under divided government rises by between 4 and 15 percentage points, depending on the Senate pivot of interest and the procedure used to estimate *Fealty*; importantly, under all specifications, the 90% confidence intervals never contain zero, and the 95% confidence intervals only contain zero when the committee median is the Senate pivot of interest. Under unified government, the estimated probabilities *decrease* from between 0.5 and 12 percentage points, though the confidence intervals contain zero for half of the pivot-estimator combinations. Taken together, presidents experiencing interbranch policy conflict with the Senate incur noticeably lower levels of appointee reliability when the political branches are split, as opposed to when a single party controls both.

The bottom row in **Figure 3** evaluates the *Complementarity Hypothesis* (**H1**), the results of which offer clear evidence of how interbranch policy conflict shapes executive appointee reliability through complementarities involving *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence* and *Fealty*. The leftmost bottom row panel of **Figure 3** suggests presidents can improve such complementarities under unified government as interbranch policy conflict expands, though the positive conditional marginal effect patterns are estimated with less precision compared to the substitution-related marginal effects observed in leftmost top panel (the null hypothesis cannot be rejected for the models predicated on committee-based pivots). Nonetheless, the positive complementary marginal effects under unified partisan control suggest presidents might have greater incentives for obtaining reliable appointees—with the acquiescence of a Senate controlled by co-partisans—as a means of consolidating executive branch authority in response to the greater collective action obstacles posed by ideological disagreement with the full Senate chamber, if not Senate committees.

Figure 3: Predicted Changes in the Probabilities of Substitutes and Complements



Although complementarities become more likely under unified government as interbranch policy disagreement increases, they fall in response to surging interbranch ideological conflict in times of divided partisan control. The probability of observing a complementary appointee falls by between 9 and 20 percentage points, depending on which estimation approach is used, and no 90% confidence intervals contain zero (and the only 95% confidence intervals containing zero are for when the relevant committee median is used as the Senate pivot of interest). Compelling evidence in favor of the *Complementarity Hypothesis* (**H1**) is evinced as the probability of observing a complementary appointee type is declining at a greater rate under divided partisan control vis-à-vis unified control. That is, executive appointee reliability is more adversely affected under divided government than unified government in response to comparable variation in interbranch conflict.

Figure 4: Predicted Differences in Probabilities of Substitutes and Complements



Figure 4 depicts an alternative view of these ordered logistic regression estimates based on differences between substitute versus complement probabilities when the ideological divergence between the President and the relevant Senate pivot increases by its interquartile range, conditional on divided government status and pivot type. This analysis illustrates how the relative prevalence of substitutes versus complements is affected by both ideological and partisan conflict. Positive values mean substitutes are relatively more common than complements at higher levels of ideological conflict, and negative values indicate the opposite; vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals, and the short horizontal lines mark 90% intervals. As can be seen in the rightmost panel of the figure, substitutes are *always* more common when higher levels of ideological conflict are present under divided government, regardless of Senate pivot choice or how *Fealty* is estimated. The estimated effects range from between 14 and 36 percentage point change in favor of

substitutes under divided government, whereas complements are more common under unified government, with a 2 to 46 percentage point change in favor of that appointee type based on alternative pivots and statistical methods, though such effects under unified government are indistinguishable from zero with a committee-based pivot measure. The unified partisan control estimates predicated on the ideological distance between the president and the filibuster pivot tend to be the largest in magnitude and most supportive of the notion that presidents achieve more complementarities under unified government when ideological conflict is high. This pattern might be attributable to the filibuster pivot nearly always being a member of the opposing party, whereas the Senate median and committee chair/medians are always members of the president's party. These findings further suggest presidents' abilities to make reliable appointments are constrained by Senate opposition. Such constraints under divided government not only affect appointee types—especially when ideological opposition to the president is high—but also shifts the balance of appointees from complementarities between these presidential loyalty attributes towards substitution.[41]

[41] Note that *Priority Agency* is negative and significant in nearly all ordered logistic specifications (see **Appendix**). This suggests agencies responsible for salient aspects of the president's agenda are less likely to receive complementary appointee types. The exact mechanism is unclear and beyond the scope of this analysis; however, two possible explanations are (1) the president is more willing to focus on expertise in these situations and is more willing to trade off loyalty, or (2) the Senate is more willing to use its political capital to constrain the president.

Discussion

U.S. presidents face obstacles for ensuring control over executive branch governance. Although responsive competence is a critical ingredient for facilitating effective coordinated executive action (e.g., Moe 1985), it also requires presidents to distinguish between those appointed officials into whom they can put varying levels of relative trust. This is an important consideration for coordinated executive branch governance since presidents must be able to distinguish between 'good' and 'bad' appointee types when determining how to allocate executive branch authority. Presidents' desire to discriminate between these agent types is the basis for why presidents prefer reliable executive appointees to unreliable counterparts. The theory proposed here posits the Senate will strategically undermine executive branch coherence by not only lowering the complementarity between an appointee's ideological proximity and fealty to the president, but also increasing the substitution between these characteristics. The Senate's efforts are most effective when policy and partisan disagreement with the president is most acute. Because the data in this study span four presidencies (Reagan through Bush II) with consistent rules for filibustering executive appointees, these estimates of the Senate's constraining effects on reducing executive appointee reliability are likely to be *conservative* relative to analyzing such appointees following the relaxation of filibuster rules since 2012.

Although empirical support is obtained for this theory, the effects vary across empirical measures. Nonparametric statistical analyses suggest that, as ideological conflict between the Senate and president expands, declines in the relative complementarities of loyalty attributes are observed, especially under divided government. Further, statistical evidence suggests the probability of observing substitution appointee types increases as ideological policy disagreement increases under divided government compared to more

inconsistent changes under unified government. Specifically, the probability of observing complementary types falls under divided government while modestly rising under unified government. In times of unified control, presidents might seek to centralize executive branch policymaking authority in response to increasing interbranch conflict. The Senate's constraint on executive appointments, however, is more effective under divided control regimes since they can force the president to accept more substitution-type appointees.

The study of executive appointee reliability has broad implications for the study of institutional politics. For instance, how can variations in appointee reliability affect a president's willingness to delegate authority to an agency? Although the willingness to delegate, as well as offer discretion, is thought to be declining in an appointee's shared policy preferences consistent with the ally principle (Epstein and O'Halloran 1999; Huber and Shipan 2006), presidents may prefer to delegate tasks to agencies requiring technical expertise (Gailmard and Patty 2012) or credible commitments to policymaking (Miller and Whitford 2016) to highly reliable low loyalty types of executive appointees whose actions will be less affected by what the president wants compared to appointees exhibiting less consistency in their motivations. Relatedly, career officials can benefit from both types of reliable appointees since information costs are reduced by careerists who better discern the political direction (or lack thereof) emanating from political executives (Aberbach and Rockman 2000; Heclo 1977).

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Supplementary Online Appendix for

"Executive Appointee Reliability under Separated Powers: Senatorial Constraints on Executive Branch Coordination via Leadership Appointments in U.S. Federal Agencies"

(Not intended for print publication)

Contents

This supplementary online appendix contains additional results and robustness checks not reported in the main text. **Tables A-1** through **A-4** report the average marginal effects from the KRLS models reported in the main text, and **Tables A-5** through **A-8** report the estimated quantiles thereof. Significance stars are presented in **Tables A-1** through **A-4**, though these may be somewhat misleading due to the high degrees of nonlinearity inherent in the KRLS estimation procedure; even if the *average* marginal effect is not significant, there may be regions of the parameter space where significance holds. As such, the reader is encouraged to refer to the figures in the manuscript for the specific results of interest. Nonetheless, the consistent significance of *Fealty* in all models (that is, the average marginal effect of *Fealty* on *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence* is significant and negative in all models) indicates negative relationships between appointee ideological divergence and fealty, or positive relationships between ideological proximity and fealty, thus implying consistent complementarities, as discussed in the main paper. However, **Figure 1** also shows that these marginal effects are conditional on both partisan and ideological interbranch conflict, which are not picked up in the tables.

Tables A-11 through **A-14** present results aggregated from KRLS models fit on each of the 1,000 posterior estimates of *Fealty*. The presented point estimates are the mean estimates across all models, and the standard errors presented are the empirical standard errors across all models (conditional on divided government status and *Fealty* estimation procedure). With the exception of the EFA results for divided government, the results are quite comparable to those presented in **Tables A-1** through **A-8** and the main paper. This is further supported by the results in **Figures A-1** through **A-4**, which present the marginal effects of *Fealty* on *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence* for each of the 1,000 models. Though the EFA-based results display much more variance than the OLS-based results, the broader trends are still present—complementarities dominate in all models, but the

strength of the complementarities decrease much more rapidly (in that the marginal effects increase) as *President-Senate Ideological Divergence* (regardless of which pivot is used to capture Senate preferences) increases under divided government than under unified government. That is, under unified government, the relationship between the marginal effect of *Fealty* and *President-Senate Ideological Divergence* is generally stable, albeit estimated with less precision (especially when using committee-based pivots), whereas it is generally positive under divided government. These results support those presented in the main text as well as those in **Tables A-1** through **A-8**.

The ordered logistic results discussed in the main text are presented in **Tables A-9** and **A-10**, and those based on the aggregated results of models presented on each posterior estimate of *Fealty* are presented in **Tables A-15** and **A-16**. As indicated by the shading in the table, the key coefficients are the interaction terms between *President-Senate Ideological Divergence* (depending on which pivot is used) and *Divided Government*. These are negative in *all* models (except for the model in **Table A-10** that is based on the committee median and uses the mean EFA-based score), which suggests that, under divided government, higher degrees of ideological divergence between the president and the Senate are associated with higher probabilities of substitutive-type appointees (and lower probabilities of complementary types), which is entirely consistent with the main hypotheses of interest. Additionally, **Figure A-5** presents a version of **Figure 4** from the main text that is instead based on the 1,000 models estimated on the individual posterior estimates, and the results are substantively similar to those presented in the manuscript.

Finally, **Tables A-17** through **A-20** relax the underlying ordered assumption of the substitute-complement scale and disaggregate appointee into five different types—high fealty/low ideological proximity, low fealty/high ideological proximity, low fealty/low ideological proximity, high fealty/high ideological proximity, and the baseline of "neither

substitute nor complement." While these results show some heterogeneity across appointee types, they are broadly consistent with the ordered logit results reported in the manuscript, with less complementarity and more substitution under high levels of interbranch conflict. For example, **Table A-17** suggests that when the Senate median and/or filibuster pivot are used as the pivots of interest, the interaction term between *President-Senate Ideological Divergence* and *Divided Government* is negative, but only for the *Both High* category of complement-type appointees. This indicates that interbranch conflict is associated with lower rates of certain types of complementary-type appointees, consistent with ***Hypothesis 1***. Conversely, when the committee chair and/or committee median are used as the pivots of interest, the interaction term between *President-Senate Ideological Divergence* and *Divided Government* is positive, but only for the *Low Fealty/High Ideological Proximity* category of substitute-type appointees, which suggests that interbranch conflict is associated with higher levels of substitution-type appointees, consistent with ***Hypothesis 2***. The analogous results for the multinomial logistic models based on the EFA-type *Fealty* estimates (**Tables A-19** and **A-20**) provide substantively similar conclusions, though no effect is observed when the committee median is the pivot of interest. Overall, however, the results in this **Appendix** provide evidence that the results presented in the manuscript are robust to different empirical and estimation strategies, subject to the aforementioned caveats.

Table A-1: Kernel Regularized Least Squares Model Estimates
(Senate Median as Pivot of Interest; Average Marginal Effects)

	OLS-Based Scores		***EFA-Based Score***	
	Unified Gov't	**Divided Gov't**	**Unified Gov't**	**Divided Gov't**
Fealty	-0.326***	-0.160**	-0.794***	-0.485***
	(0.082)	(0.063)	(0.056)	(0.057)
President-Senate Median Ideological Divergence	0.054	-0.056	0.014	-0.106
	(0.037)	(0.062)	(0.050)	(0.087)
Senate Polarization	-0.013	0.004	0.037	-0.003
	(0.030)	(0.020)	(0.090)	(0.034)
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	-0.133	-0.136	-0.132	-0.128
	(0.124)	(0.105)	(0.102)	(0.116)
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	-0.176	-0.136	-0.205**	-0.140
	(0.129)	(0.105)	(0.103)	(0.115)
Policy Expertise	0.103	-0.070	0.220*	-0.146
	(0.132)	(0.109)	(0.113)	(0.126)
Priority Agency	-0.076***	-0.019	-0.040*	-0.007
	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.022)	(0.020)
Supervisory Position	-0.322**	-0.098	-0.187*	-0.028
	(0.129)	(0.112)	(0.100)	(0.118)
Presidential Approval	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001	0.003
	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Congress	0.002	-0.006	0.001	-0.005
	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.020)	(0.015)
R^2	0.303	0.207	0.757	0.471
Number of Observations	257	301	257	301

Note: The KRLS approach allows for complex interactions between all predictors in the model. The dependent variable is *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence*. The main independent variable, *Fealty*, is the mean value across 1,000 draws from the posterior distribution. Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1

Table A-2: Kernel Regularized Least Squares Model Estimates
(Filibuster Pivot as Pivot of Interest; Average Marginal Effects)

	OLS-Based Scores		***EFA-Based Scores***	
	Unified Gov't	***Divided Gov't***	***Unified Gov't***	***Divided Gov't***
Fealty	-0.326***	-0.166***	-0.801***	-0.495***
	(0.083)	(0.063)	(0.057)	(0.057)
President-Filibuster Pivot Ideological Divergence	0.024*	-0.035	0.019	-0.080
	(0.014)	(0.050)	(0.026)	(0.066)
Senate Polarization	-0.013	0.020	0.051	0.023
	(0.030)	(0.022)	(0.115)	(0.034)
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	-0.130	-0.141	-0.127	-0.131
	(0.125)	(0.105)	(0.104)	(0.116)
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	-0.178	-0.142	-0.208**	-0.142
	(0.130)	(0.106)	(0.105)	(0.115)
Policy Expertise	0.108	-0.081	0.225*	-0.157
	(0.133)	(0.109)	(0.115)	(0.125)
Priority Agency	-0.077***	-0.019	-0.040*	-0.007
	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.022)	(0.020)
Supervisory Position	-0.323**	-0.101	-0.190*	-0.030
	(0.130)	(0.112)	(0.102)	(0.118)
Presidential Approval	0.000	-0.001	-0.000	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Congress	-0.004	-0.003	-0.013	-0.003
	(0.015)	(0.007)	(0.032)	(0.015)
R^2	0.298	0.205	0.749	0.469
Number of Observations	257	301	257	301

Note: The KRLS approach allows for complex interactions between all predictors in the model. The dependent variable is *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence*. The main independent variable, *Fealty*, is the mean value across 1,000 draws from the posterior distribution. Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1

Table A-3: Kernel Regularized Least Squares Model Estimates
(Committee Chair as Pivot of Interest; Average Marginal Effects)

	OLS-Based Scores		***EFA-Based Scores***	
	Unified Gov't	***Divided Gov't***	***Unified Gov't***	***Divided Gov't***
Fealty	-0.499***	-0.151***	-0.857***	-0.482***
	(0.120)	(0.053)	(0.056)	(0.055)
President-Committee Chair Ideological Divergence	0.072	-0.014	0.069	0.007
	(0.073)	(0.031)	(0.071)	(0.047)
Senate Polarization	-0.106	0.014	0.086	0.036
	(0.086)	(0.018)	(0.108)	(0.034)
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	-0.071	-0.122	-0.071	-0.120
	(0.143)	(0.092)	(0.101)	(0.115)
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	-0.199	-0.120	-0.168*	-0.132
	(0.147)	(0.093)	(0.101)	(0.114)
Policy Expertise	0.197	-0.069	0.285***	-0.153
	(0.154)	(0.096)	(0.109)	(0.125)
Priority Agency	-0.114***	-0.020*	-0.045**	-0.013
	(0.026)	(0.012)	(0.021)	(0.019)
Supervisory Position	-0.367**	-0.108	-0.217**	-0.044
	(0.147)	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.118)
Presidential Approval	0.001	-0.001	-0.000	0.000
	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Congress	0.003	-0.003	-0.018	-0.005
	(0.029)	(0.006)	(0.029)	(0.014)
R^2	0.454	0.172	0.794	0.467
Number of Observations	237	298	237	298

Note: The KRLS approach allows for complex interactions between all predictors in the model. The dependent variable is *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence*. The main independent variable, *Fealty*, is the mean value across 1,000 draws from the posterior distribution. Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1

Table A-4: Kernel Regularized Least Squares Model Estimates
(Committee Median as Pivot of Interest; Average Marginal Effects)

	OLS-Based Scores		***EFA-Based Scores***	
	Unified Gov't	***Divided Gov't***	***Unified Gov't***	***Divided Gov't***
Fealty	-0.447***	-0.155***	-0.828***	-0.473***
	(0.110)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.056)
President-Committee Median Ideological Divergence	-0.033	-0.041	-0.004	-0.006
	(0.059)	(0.040)	(0.052)	(0.060)
Senate Polarization	-0.037	0.011	0.085	0.034
	(0.060)	(0.019)	(0.095)	(0.036)
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	-0.084	-0.114	-0.076	-0.098
	(0.139)	(0.093)	(0.098)	(0.114)
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	-0.215	-0.122	-0.178*	-0.137
	(0.144)	(0.093)	(0.101)	(0.115)
Policy Expertise	0.191	-0.067	0.290***	-0.111
	(0.149)	(0.097)	(0.106)	(0.125)
Priority Agency	-0.104***	-0.020*	-0.038*	-0.012
	(0.023)	(0.012)	(0.020)	(0.019)
Supervisory Position	-0.369**	-0.100	-0.220**	-0.024
	(0.143)	(0.100)	(0.096)	(0.117)
Presidential Approval	0.002	-0.001	-0.001	0.001
	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Congress	-0.014	-0.003	-0.039	-0.008
	(0.020)	(0.006)	(0.027)	(0.015)
R^2	0.440	0.169	0.813	0.468
Number of Observations	237	298	237	298

Note: The KRLS approach allows for complex interactions between all predictors in the model. The dependent variable is *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence*. The main independent variable, *Fealty*, is the mean value across 1,000 draws from the posterior distribution. Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1

Table A-5: Kernel Regularized Least Squares Model Estimates
(Senate Median as Pivot of Interest; Average Marginal Effects)

	OLS-Based Scores		***EFA-Based Scores***	
	Unified Gov't	**Divided Gov't**	**Unified Gov't**	**Divided Gov't**
Fealty	-0.341	-0.170	-0.708	-0.506
	[-0.480; -0.186]	[-0.257; -0.072]	[-1.534; 0.068]	[-0.923; -0.072]
President-Senate Median Ideological Divergence	0.052	-0.050	0.003	-0.100
	[0.009; 0.088]	[-0.152; 0.074]	[-0.059; 0.081]	[-0.296; 0.134]
Senate Polarization	-0.020	0.006	0.026	-0.002
	[-0.061; 0.031]	[-0.019; 0.026]	[-0.062; 0.126]	[-0.039; 0.034]
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	-0.139	-0.112	-0.094	-0.088
	[-0.261; -0.021]	[-0.213; -0.043]	[-0.359; 0.044]	[-0.251; 0.039]
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	-0.148	-0.130	-0.148	-0.128
	[-0.287; -0.042]	[-0.257; 0.000]	[-0.338; 0.004]	[-0.317; 0.048]
Policy Expertise	0.096	-0.058	0.189	-0.155
	[-0.137; 0.333]	[-0.252; 0.119]	[-0.189; 0.554]	[-0.469; 0.169]
Priority Agency	-0.068	-0.021	-0.028	-0.010
	[-0.110; -0.045]	[-0.040; 0.000]	[-0.098; 0.022]	[-0.045; 0.026]
Supervisory Position	-0.289	-0.070	-0.056	-0.005
	[-0.626; 0.007]	[-0.175; 0.022]	[-0.433; 0.127]	[-0.156; 0.109]
Presidential Approval	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.005
	[-0.007; 0.006]	[-0.003; 0.004]	[-0.014; 0.014]	[-0.005; 0.012]
Congress	-0.001	-0.007	-0.001	-0.005
	[-0.014; 0.017]	[-0.015; -0.000]	[-0.029; 0.029]	[-0.019; 0.010]
R^2	0.303	0.207	0.757	0.471
Number of Observations	257	301	257	301

Note: The KRLS approach allows for complex interactions between all predictors in the model. The dependent variable is *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence*. The main independent variable, *Fealty*, is the mean value across 1,000 draws from the posterior distribution. The point estimates listed above are the median marginal effects, and the intervals directly beneath are denoted by the 25th and 75th percentiles of the same.

Table A-6: Kernel Regularized Least Squares Model Estimates
(Filibuster Pivot as Pivot of Interest; Average Marginal Effects)

	OLS-Based Scores		***EFA-Based Scores***	
	Unified Gov't	**Divided Gov't**	**Unified Gov't**	**Divided Gov't**
Fealty	-0.338	-0.180	-0.689	-0.517
	[-0.481; -0.189]	[-0.258; -0.070]	[-1.549; 0.059]	[-0.944; -0.068]
President-Filibuster Pivot Ideological Divergence	0.025	-0.042	0.020	-0.069
	[0.002; 0.040]	[-0.107; 0.059]	[-0.010; 0.051]	[-0.251; 0.088]
Senate Polarization	-0.013	0.016	0.037	0.013
	[-0.053; 0.033]	[-0.009; 0.041]	[-0.059; 0.142]	[-0.026; 0.065]
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	-0.140	-0.114	-0.091	-0.088
	[-0.262; -0.020]	[-0.233; -0.045]	[-0.332; 0.039]	[-0.272; 0.028]
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	-0.147	-0.125	-0.150	-0.128
	[-0.292; -0.041]	[-0.245; -0.010]	[-0.320; 0.001]	[-0.338; 0.058]
Policy Expertise	0.098	-0.069	0.169	-0.157
	[-0.140; 0.347]	[-0.253; 0.108]	[-0.181; 0.528]	[-0.476; 0.152]
Priority Agency	-0.067	-0.021	-0.024	-0.007
	[-0.114; -0.046]	[-0.039; -0.000]	[-0.094; 0.023]	[-0.045; 0.026]
Supervisory Position	-0.283	-0.077	-0.068	-0.012
	[-0.629; 0.012]	[-0.189; 0.016]	[-0.417; 0.127]	[-0.169; 0.102]
Presidential Approval	0.003	0.000	0.002	0.004
	[-0.006; 0.007]	[-0.003; 0.003]	[-0.013; 0.014]	[-0.006; 0.010]
Congress	-0.006	-0.004	-0.014	-0.001
	[-0.016; 0.007]	[-0.012; 0.004]	[-0.040; 0.023]	[-0.020; 0.011]
R2	0.298	0.205	0.749	0.469
Number of Observations	257	301	257	301

Note: The KRLS approach allows for complex interactions between all predictors in the model. The dependent variable is *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence*. The main independent variable, *Fealty*, is the mean value across 1,000 draws from the posterior distribution. The point estimates listed above are the median marginal effects, and the intervals directly beneath are denoted by the 25th and 75th percentiles of the same.

Table A-7: Kernel Regularized Least Squares Model Estimates
(Committee Chair as Pivot of Interest; Average Marginal Effects)

	OLS-Based Scores		***EFA-Based Scores***	
	Unified Gov't	**Divided Gov't**	**Unified Gov't**	**Divided Gov't**
Fealty	-0.496	-0.161	-0.765	-0.513
	[-0.824; -0.238]	[-0.228; -0.068]	[-1.658; 0.115]	[-0.942; -0.029]
President-Committee Chair Ideological Divergence	0.051	-0.014	0.027	0.030
	[-0.006; 0.140]	[-0.050; 0.029]	[-0.055; 0.198]	[-0.068; 0.117]
Senate Polarization	-0.078	0.012	0.095	0.024
	[-0.200; 0.018]	[-0.005; 0.028]	[-0.042; 0.204]	[-0.005; 0.069]
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	-0.082	-0.108	-0.033	-0.072
	[-0.264; 0.067]	[-0.196; -0.040]	[-0.231; 0.111]	[-0.238; 0.033]
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	-0.137	-0.104	-0.112	-0.097
	[-0.366; 0.021]	[-0.206; -0.007]	[-0.321; 0.066]	[-0.334; 0.071]
Policy Expertise	0.141	-0.045	0.242	-0.173
	[-0.275; 0.595]	[-0.187; 0.077]	[-0.131; 0.656]	[-0.480; 0.126]
Priority Agency	-0.094	-0.021	-0.029	-0.016
	[-0.188; -0.048]	[-0.032; -0.008]	[-0.096; 0.022]	[-0.045; 0.014]
Supervisory Position	-0.252	-0.088	-0.101	-0.033
	[-0.782; 0.077]	[-0.188; -0.014]	[-0.462; 0.123]	[-0.168; 0.083]
Presidential Approval	0.003	-0.001	0.001	0.002
	[-0.013; 0.016]	[-0.003; 0.002]	[-0.013; 0.014]	[-0.007; 0.008]
Congress	0.001	-0.004	-0.020	-0.005
	[-0.020; 0.027]	[-0.008; 0.003]	[-0.051; 0.021]	[-0.018; 0.008]
R2	0.454	0.172	0.794	0.467
Number of Observations	237	298	237	298

Note: The KRLS approach allows for complex interactions between all predictors in the model. The dependent variable is *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence*. The main independent variable, *Fealty*, is the mean value across 1,000 draws from the posterior distribution. The point estimates listed above are the median marginal effects, and the intervals directly beneath are denoted by the 25th and 75th percentiles of the same.

Table A-8: Kernel Regularized Least Squares Model Estimates
(Committee Median as Pivot of Interest; Average Marginal Effects)

	OLS-Based Scores		***EFA-Based Scores***	
	Unified Gov't	**Divided Gov't**	**Unified Gov't**	**Divided Gov't**
Fealty	-0.445	-0.174	-0.751	-0.502
	[-0.702; -0.227]	[-0.228; -0.088]	[-1.638; 0.110]	[-0.920; -0.030]
President-Committee Median Ideological Divergence	-0.017	-0.047	-0.009	-0.035
	[-0.160; 0.070]	[-0.088; 0.007]	[-0.114; 0.104]	[-0.127; 0.110]
Senate Polarization	-0.036	0.010	0.090	0.021
	[-0.115; 0.044]	[-0.009; 0.027]	[-0.062; 0.209]	[-0.012; 0.064]
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	-0.088	-0.097	-0.045	-0.051
	[-0.263; 0.051]	[-0.185; -0.036]	[-0.299; 0.117]	[-0.245; 0.065]
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	-0.162	-0.104	-0.099	-0.102
	[-0.374; -0.019]	[-0.221; -0.016]	[-0.348; 0.075]	[-0.338; 0.045]
Policy Expertise	0.150	-0.050	0.275	-0.123
	[-0.168; 0.539]	[-0.189; 0.068]	[-0.123; 0.644]	[-0.395; 0.181]
Priority Agency	-0.095	-0.020	-0.033	-0.014
	[-0.142; -0.050]	[-0.034; -0.007]	[-0.091; 0.034]	[-0.039; 0.013]
Supervisory Position	-0.276	-0.089	-0.129	-0.010
	[-0.730; 0.045]	[-0.161; -0.004]	[-0.429; 0.100]	[-0.140; 0.111]
Presidential Approval	0.004	-0.001	-0.001	0.001
	[-0.011; 0.013]	[-0.004; 0.001]	[-0.016; 0.015]	[-0.006; 0.007]
Congress	-0.014	-0.005	-0.035	-0.010
	[-0.051; 0.007]	[-0.010; 0.004]	[-0.088; 0.012]	[-0.024; 0.007]
R2	0.440	0.169	0.813	0.468
Number of Observations	237	298	237	298

Note: The KRLS approach allows for complex interactions between all predictors in the model. The dependent variable is *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence*. The main independent variable, *Fealty*, is the mean value across 1,000 draws from the posterior distribution. The point estimates listed above are the median marginal effects, and the intervals directly beneath are denoted by the 25th and 75th percentiles of the same.

Table A-9: Ordered Logit Model Estimates
(Senate Median and Filibuster Pivots as Pivots of Interest)

	Senate Median		Filibuster Pivot	
	OLS-Based Scores	**EFA-Based Scores**	**OLS-Based Scores**	**EFA-Based Scores**
President-Senate Median Ideological Divergence	0.462*	0.453*	–	–
	(0.236)	(0.245)		
President-Filibuster Pivot Ideological Divergence	–	–	1.514**	1.525**
			(0.674)	(0.692)
Senate Polarization	-0.646*	-1.246***	-2.706**	-3.347***
	(0.356)	(0.368)	(1.249)	(1.281)
Divided Government	0.011	-0.096	-1.000*	-1.110**
	(0.319)	(0.332)	(0.528)	(0.543)
President-Senate Median Ideological Divergence × Divided Government	-1.434***	-1.385***	–	–
	(0.387)	(0.394)		
President-Filibuster Pivot Ideological Divergence × Divided Government	–	–	-2.273***	-2.254***
			(0.731)	(0.747)
Senate Polarization × Divided Government	0.341	0.579	2.727**	2.990**
	(0.345)	(0.362)	(1.226)	(1.260)
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	-0.031	-0.212	-0.029	-0.213
	(0.204)	(0.215)	(0.204)	(0.215)
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	-0.214	-0.413*	-0.220	-0.419*
	(0.211)	(0.220)	(0.211)	(0.221)
Policy Expertise	-0.403	-0.062	-0.424	-0.085
	(0.260)	(0.274)	(0.260)	(0.274)
Supervisory Position	-0.079	-0.201	-0.083	-0.204
	(0.168)	(0.177)	(0.168)	(0.178)
Priority Agency	-0.091**	-0.108***	-0.092**	-0.109***
	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.037)
Presidential Approval	-0.006	-0.012	-0.008	-0.014
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Congress	0.044***	0.220***	0.017**	0.195***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Cutpoint 1	2.499***	19.571***	-1.080***	16.210***
	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.120)	(0.126)
Cutpoint 2	4.156***	22.305***	0.588***	18.959***
	(0.102)	(0.138)	(0.152)	(0.180)
AIC	1217.451	1079.724	1213.046	1075.692
BIC	1277.992	1140.265	1273.587	1136.233
Log Likelihood	-594.725	-525.862	-592.523	-523.846
Likelihood Ratio Test	24.491**	32.259***	28.895***	36.291***
Likelihood Ratio Test of Significance of *Divided Gov't*	12.827	23.106**	13.866	25.383**
Score Test	11.824	19.816*	13.753	20.867*
Number of Observations	558	558	558	558

Note: Ordered logistic coefficients presented; the dependent variable (*Trait Relationship*) is coded as -1 if *Fealty* and *Shared Preferences* are substitutes, 1 if they are complements, and 0 if they are neither. The Likelihood Ratio Test of the significance of *Divided Government* examines the null hypothesis that *Divided Government* and its interaction terms are zero against the alternative that the additional terms provide significantly more explanatory power. The Score Test examines the null hypothesis that the parallel trends assumptions holds against the alternative that different coefficients are needed for different values of the dependent variable. Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests: $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table A-10: Ordered Logit Model Estimates
(Committee Chair and Committee Median as Pivots of Interest)

	Committee Chair		Committee Median	
	OLS-Based Scores	**EFA-Based Scores**	**OLS-Based Scores**	**EFA-Based Scores**
President-Committee Chair Ideological Divergence	0.303	0.356	–	–
	(0.270)	(0.286)		
President-Committee Median Ideological Divergence	–	–	0.163	0.031
			(0.173)	(0.182)
Senate Polarization	-0.173	-0.960**	0.216	-0.269
	(0.437)	(0.465)	(0.263)	(0.276)
Divided Government	-0.271	-0.417	-0.165	-0.136
	(0.257)	(0.273)	(0.240)	(0.255)
President-Committee Chair Ideological Divergence × Divided Government	-0.827***	-0.894***	–	–
	(0.313)	(0.331)		
President-Committee Median Ideological Divergence × Divided Government	–	–	-0.437*	-0.340
			(0.248)	(0.260)
Senate Polarization × Divided Government	0.338	0.697	0.121	0.247
	(0.437)	(0.466)	(0.276)	(0.292)
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	-0.012	-0.177	-0.083	-0.254
	(0.212)	(0.224)	(0.209)	(0.221)
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	-0.205	-0.403*	-0.233	-0.430*
	(0.217)	(0.227)	(0.216)	(0.228)
Policy Expertise	-0.467*	-0.183	-0.487*	-0.182
	(0.265)	(0.280)	(0.264)	(0.279)
Supervisory Position	0.023	-0.089	0.048	-0.063
	(0.175)	(0.186)	(0.174)	(0.185)
Priority Agency	-0.079**	-0.101***	-0.067*	-0.092**
	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.037)
Presidential Approval	-0.003	-0.008	0.002	-0.004
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Congress	-0.081***	0.118***	-0.116***	0.058***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Cutpoint 1	-10.133***	9.131***	-13.580***	3.351***
	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Cutpoint 2	-8.439***	11.990***	-11.915***	6.161***
	(0.106)	(0.148)	(0.103)	(0.145)
AIC	1159.270	1012.787	1170.862	1023.785
BIC	1219.222	1072.738	1230.814	1083.737
Log Likelihood	-565.635	-492.393	-571.431	-497.892
Likelihood Ratio Test	30.654***	43.822***	19.062*	32.824***
Likelihood Ratio Test of Significance of *Divided Gov't*	20.408**	35.902***	15.842*	31.153***
Score Test	9.506	14.663	11.135	15.683
Number of Observations	535	535	535	535

Note: Ordered logistic coefficients presented; the dependent variable (*Trait Relationship*) is coded as -1 if *Fealty* and *Ideological Proximity*/*Shared Preferences* are substitutes, 1 if they are complements, and 0 if they are neither. The Likelihood Ratio Test of the significance of *Divided Government* examines the null hypothesis that *Divided Government* and its interaction terms are zero against the alternative that the additional terms provide significantly more explanatory power. The Score Test examines the null hypothesis that the parallel trends assumptions holds against the alternative that different coefficients are needed for different values of the dependent variable. Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests: $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table A-11: Kernel Regularized Least Squares Model Estimates
(Senate Median and Filibuster Pivots as Pivots of Interest; Models Estimated on Individual Posterior Estimates)

	SENATE MEDIAN				***FILIBUSTER PIVOT***			
	OLS-Based Scores		***EFA-Based Scores***		***OLS-Based Scores***		***EFA-Based Scores***	
	Unified Gov't	**Divided Gov't**	**Unified Gov't**	**Divided Gov't**	**Unified Gov't**	**Divided Gov't**	**Unified Gov't**	**Divided Gov't**
Fealty	-0.324***	-0.155***	-0.225**	-0.133*	-0.333***	-0.154***	-0.225**	-0.132*
	(0.087)	(0.032)	(0.098)	(0.072)	(0.089)	(0.031)	(0.098)	(0.072)
President-Senate Median Ideological Divergence	0.052***	-0.049***	0.050**	-0.047*	–	–	–	–
	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.024)				
President-Filibuster Pivot Ideological Divergence	–	–	–	–	0.023***	-0.027***	0.024**	-0.028*
					(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.017)
Senate Polarization	-0.012	0.004	-0.007	0.006	-0.015	0.016***	-0.007	0.019**
	(0.025)	(0.002)	(0.027)	(0.006)	(0.032)	(0.004)	(0.033)	(0.008)
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	-0.130***	-0.129***	-0.122***	-0.119***	-0.127***	-0.129***	-0.121***	-0.121***
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.034)	(0.025)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.034)	(0.023)
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	-0.177***	-0.133***	-0.175***	-0.126***	-0.182***	-0.134***	-0.177***	-0.128***
	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.037)	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.015)	(0.037)	(0.024)
Policy Expertise	0.096	-0.027	0.107	-0.028	0.100	-0.034	0.112	-0.035
	(0.077)	(0.058)	(0.084)	(0.061)	(0.079)	(0.055)	(0.085)	(0.060)
Priority Agency	-0.071***	-0.019***	-0.060***	-0.015***	-0.074***	-0.019***	-0.062***	-0.015***
	(0.013)	(0.002)	(0.012)	(0.004)	(0.013)	(0.002)	(0.012)	(0.004)
Supervisory Position	-0.310***	-0.097***	-0.274***	-0.088***	-0.313***	-0.099***	-0.277***	-0.091***
	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.039)	(0.027)	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.040)	(0.025)
Presidential Approval	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001	0.000	0.001	-0.001	0.000	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Congress	0.002	-0.007**	-0.000	-0.007*	-0.004	-0.004*	-0.008	-0.004
	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.010)	(0.003)
R^2	0.273	0.195	0.394	0.252	0.292	0.163	0.399	0.234
Number of Observations	257	301	257	301	257	301	257	301

Note: The KRLS approach allows for complex interactions between all predictors in the model. Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence*. Models are initially estimated on each of 1,000 posterior estimates of *Fealty* and *Policy Expertise* (as these are initially estimated via a series of indicators); the listed coefficients are the mean estimates across all models and the indicated standard errors are the empirical standard deviations thereof. Two-tailed z-tests: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1

Table A-12: Kernel Regularized Least Squares Model Estimates
(Committee Chair and Committee Median as Pivots of Interest; Models Estimated on Individual Posterior Estimates)

	COMMITTEE CHAIR				***COMMITTEE MEDIAN***			
	OLS-Based Scores		***EFA-Based Scores***		***OLS-Based Scores***		***EFA-Based Scores***	
	Unified Gov't	**Divided Gov't**	**Unified Gov't**	**Divided Gov't**	**Unified Gov't**	**Divided Gov't**	**Unified Gov't**	**Divided Gov't**
Fealty	-0.435***	-0.150***	-0.249**	-0.132*	-0.435***	-0.141***	-0.248***	-0.126*
	(0.133)	(0.031)	(0.099)	(0.072)	(0.117)	(0.029)	(0.095)	(0.072)
President-Committee Chair Ideological Divergence	0.056**	-0.012***	0.049*	-0.009	–	–	–	–
	(0.022)	(0.004)	(0.029)	(0.010)				
President-Committee Median Ideological Divergence	–	–	–	–	-0.022	-0.033***	-0.012	-0.028**
					(0.018)	(0.006)	(0.032)	(0.013)
Senate Polarization	-0.053	0.014***	-0.020	0.019*	-0.022	0.009***	-0.001	0.014
	(0.062)	(0.004)	(0.046)	(0.010)	(0.039)	(0.003)	(0.041)	(0.009)
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	-0.099***	-0.120***	-0.090**	-0.114***	-0.095***	-0.104***	-0.086**	-0.100***
	(0.023)	(0.013)	(0.041)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.011)	(0.041)	(0.020)
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	-0.188***	-0.123***	-0.171***	-0.119***	-0.206***	-0.113***	-0.185***	-0.115***
	(0.025)	(0.013)	(0.041)	(0.023)	(0.028)	(0.013)	(0.041)	(0.024)
Policy Expertise	0.127	-0.028	0.133	-0.029	0.137	-0.026	0.142	-0.024
	(0.088)	(0.053)	(0.094)	(0.058)	(0.087)	(0.047)	(0.094)	(0.054)
Priority Agency	-0.089***	-0.020***	-0.067***	-0.017***	-0.090***	-0.018***	-0.069***	-0.017***
	(0.021)	(0.002)	(0.016)	(0.004)	(0.017)	(0.002)	(0.015)	(0.003)
Supervisory Position	-0.346***	-0.107***	-0.307***	-0.099***	-0.350***	-0.096***	-0.314***	-0.087***
	(0.018)	(0.007)	(0.040)	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.006)	(0.041)	(0.022)
Presidential Approval	-0.000	-0.001***	0.000	-0.001	0.001	-0.001***	0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Congress	-0.002	-0.004*	-0.008	-0.004	-0.011	-0.003*	-0.013	-0.004
	(0.010)	(0.002)	(0.012)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.014)	(0.004)
R^2	0.329	0.167	0.442	0.230	0.387	0.132	0.480	0.200
Number of Observations	237	298	237	298	237	298	237	298

Note: The KRLS approach allows for complex interactions between all predictors in the model. Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence*. Models are initially estimated on each of 1,000 posterior estimates of *Fealty* and *Policy Expertise* (as these are initially estimated via a series of indicators); the listed coefficients are the mean estimates across all models and the indicated standard errors are the empirical standard deviations thereof. Two-tailed z-tests: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1

Table A-13: Kernel Regularized Least Squares Model Estimates
(Quartiles of Marginal Effects; Senate Median and Filibuster Pivot as Pivots of Interest; Models Estimated on Individual Posterior Estimates)

	SENATE MEDIAN				***FILIBUSTER PIVOT***			
	OLS-Based Scores		***EFA-Based Scores***		***OLS-Based Scores***		***EFA-Based Scores***	
	Unified Gov't	**Divided Gov't**	**Unified Gov't**	**Divided Gov't**	**Unified Gov't**	**Divided Gov't**	**Unified Gov't**	**Divided Gov't**
Fealty	-0.309	-0.153	-0.162	-0.099	-0.314	-0.151	-0.160	-0.099
	[-0.458; -0.182]	[-0.239; -0.066]	[-0.338; -0.054]	[-0.206; -0.030]	[-0.473; -0.182]	[-0.231; -0.070]	[-0.339; -0.051]	[-0.202; -0.033]
President-Senate Median Ideological Divergence	0.047	-0.040	0.043	-0.035	–	–	–	–
	[0.010; 0.085]	[-0.140; 0.062]	[0.003; 0.088]	[-0.149; 0.068]				
President-Filibuster Pivot Ideological Divergence	–	–	–	–	0.022	-0.029	0.022	-0.025
					[0.005; 0.036]	[-0.085; 0.040]	[0.004; 0.038]	[-0.095; 0.045]
Senate Polarization	-0.011	0.005	-0.009	0.005	-0.011	0.013	-0.007	0.013
	[-0.053; 0.031]	[-0.016; 0.022]	[-0.053; 0.035]	[-0.017; 0.026]	[-0.048; 0.028]	[-0.007; 0.034]	[-0.044; 0.032]	[-0.009; 0.039]
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	-0.131	-0.109	-0.115	-0.099	-0.130	-0.110	-0.114	-0.101
	[-0.241; -0.028]	[-0.205; -0.039]	[-0.230; -0.011]	[-0.199; -0.021]	[-0.240; -0.024]	[-0.209; -0.040]	[-0.229; -0.008]	[-0.203; -0.022]
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	-0.149	-0.115	-0.135	-0.098	-0.151	-0.113	-0.137	-0.099
	[-0.285; -0.044]	[-0.237; -0.003]	[-0.277; -0.032]	[-0.230; 0.004]	[-0.293; -0.045]	[-0.229; -0.013]	[-0.282; -0.033]	[-0.226; -0.001]
Policy Expertise	0.067	-0.025	0.075	-0.026	0.070	-0.029	0.078	-0.032
	[-0.103; 0.262]	[-0.165; 0.111]	[-0.105; 0.278]	[-0.178; 0.117]	[-0.108; 0.271]	[-0.158; 0.093]	[-0.106; 0.287]	[-0.175; 0.102]
Priority Agency	-0.062	-0.019	-0.051	-0.016	-0.063	-0.019	-0.051	-0.016
	[-0.095; -0.039]	[-0.035; -0.002]	[-0.083; -0.028]	[-0.031; 0.001]	[-0.100; -0.040]	[-0.034; -0.004]	[-0.086; -0.027]	[-0.030; -0.001]
Supervisory Position	-0.262	-0.073	-0.208	-0.065	-0.259	-0.077	-0.205	-0.074
	[-0.570; -0.014]	[-0.181; 0.011]	[-0.506; 0.005]	[-0.178; 0.026]	[-0.588; -0.004]	[-0.179; -0.001]	[-0.518; 0.010]	[-0.176; 0.016]
Presidential Approval	0.001	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.002	-0.000	0.001	0.000
	[-0.006; 0.005]	[-0.003; 0.003]	[-0.006; 0.005]	[-0.003; 0.004]	[-0.005; 0.006]	[-0.003; 0.002]	[-0.005; 0.007]	[-0.003; 0.003]
Congress	-0.001	-0.007	-0.002	-0.007	-0.006	-0.004	-0.007	-0.004
	[-0.012; 0.013]	[-0.015; 0.001]	[-0.015; 0.012]	[-0.016; 0.002]	[-0.016; 0.006]	[-0.010; 0.003]	[-0.020; 0.005]	[-0.012; 0.004]
R^2	0.273	0.195	0.394	0.252	0.292	0.163	0.399	0.234
Number of Observations	257	301	257	301	257	301	257	301

Note: The KRLS approach allows for complex interactions between all predictors in the model. The dependent variable is *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence*. Models are initially estimated on each of 1,000 posterior estimates of *Fealty* and *Policy Expertise* (as these are initially estimated via a series of indicators). The point estimates listed above are the median marginal effects, and the intervals directly beneath are denoted by the 25th and 75th percentiles of the same. Fit statistics are medians.

Table A-14: Kernel Regularized Least Squares Model Estimates
(Quartiles of Marginal Effects; Committee Chair and Committee Median as Pivots of Interest; Models Estimated on Individual Posterior Estimates)

	COMMITTEE CHAIR				***COMMITTEE MEDIAN***			
	OLS-Based Scores		***EFA-Based Scores***		***OLS-Based Scores***		***EFA-Based Scores***	
	Unified Gov't	**Divided Gov't**	**Unified Gov't**	**Divided Gov't**	**Unified Gov't**	**Divided Gov't**	**Unified Gov't**	**Divided Gov't**
Fealty	-0.390	-0.148	-0.182	-0.096	-0.403	-0.145	-0.185	-0.091
	[-0.617; -0.216]	[-0.230; -0.063]	[-0.375; -0.063]	[-0.202; -0.031]	[-0.629; -0.218]	[-0.206; -0.075]	[-0.379; -0.061]	[-0.189; -0.032]
President-Committee Chair Ideological Divergence	0.040	-0.010	0.037	-0.008	–	–	–	–
	[0.010; 0.083]	[-0.046; 0.027]	[0.005; 0.081]	[-0.050; 0.036]				
President-Committee Median Ideological Divergence	–	–	–	–	-0.009	-0.037	-0.002	-0.034
					[-0.096; 0.052]	[-0.073; 0.006]	[-0.076; 0.057]	[-0.080; 0.020]
Senate Polarization	-0.028	0.011	-0.014	0.013	-0.017	0.007	-0.005	0.009
	[-0.089; 0.024]	[-0.005; 0.029]	[-0.063; 0.034]	[-0.006; 0.036]	[-0.080; 0.044]	[-0.009; 0.023]	[-0.059; 0.055]	[-0.010; 0.030]
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	-0.105	-0.103	-0.085	-0.094	-0.095	-0.086	-0.079	-0.079
	[-0.229; 0.011]	[-0.195; -0.035]	[-0.210; 0.030]	[-0.192; -0.020]	[-0.227; 0.019]	[-0.168; -0.033]	[-0.210; 0.039]	[-0.167; -0.017]
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	-0.150	-0.099	-0.130	-0.089	-0.161	-0.092	-0.137	-0.086
	[-0.335; -0.012]	[-0.209; -0.009]	[-0.296; -0.005]	[-0.213; 0.002]	[-0.356; -0.016]	[-0.194; -0.019]	[-0.316; -0.006]	[-0.198; -0.007]
Policy Expertise	0.087	-0.021	0.095	-0.024	0.097	-0.019	0.104	-0.020
	[-0.127; 0.332]	[-0.139; 0.089]	[-0.107; 0.324]	[-0.159; 0.101]	[-0.117; 0.347]	[-0.111; 0.067]	[-0.102; 0.341]	[-0.129; 0.084]
Priority Agency	-0.072	-0.020	-0.054	-0.018	-0.078	-0.018	-0.059	-0.017
	[-0.126; -0.041]	[-0.033; -0.007]	[-0.096; -0.028]	[-0.031; -0.004]	[-0.126; -0.044]	[-0.029; -0.008]	[-0.099; -0.029]	[-0.029; -0.005]
Supervisory Position	-0.284	-0.087	-0.236	-0.083	-0.289	-0.082	-0.243	-0.074
	[-0.675; 0.027]	[-0.184; -0.014]	[-0.574; 0.020]	[-0.186; 0.004]	[-0.667; 0.009]	[-0.155; -0.014]	[-0.574; 0.006]	[-0.160; 0.006]
Presidential Approval	0.001	-0.001	0.001	-0.000	0.003	-0.001	0.002	-0.001
	[-0.008; 0.008]	[-0.003; 0.002]	[-0.007; 0.008]	[-0.004; 0.002]	[-0.007; 0.010]	[-0.003; 0.001]	[-0.006; 0.009]	[-0.003; 0.002]
Congress	-0.005	-0.004	-0.008	-0.004	-0.011	-0.004	-0.012	-0.004
	[-0.019; 0.011]	[-0.010; 0.002]	[-0.022; 0.007]	[-0.012; 0.003]	[-0.033; 0.007]	[-0.009; 0.003]	[-0.032; 0.005]	[-0.012; 0.003]
R^2	0.329	0.167	0.442	0.230	0.387	0.132	0.480	0.200
Number of Observations	237	298	237	298	237	298	237	298

Note: The KRLS approach allows for complex interactions between all predictors in the model. The dependent variable is *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence*. Models are initially estimated on each of 1,000 posterior estimates of *Fealty* and *Policy Expertise* (as these are initially estimated via a series of indicators). The point estimates listed above are the median marginal effects, and the intervals directly beneath are denoted by the 25th and 75th percentiles of the same. Fit statistics are medians.

Table A-15: Ordered Logit Model Estimates
(Senate Median and Filibuster Pivot as Pivots of Interest; Models Estimated on Individual Posterior Estimates)

	Senate Median		***Filibuster Pivot***	
	OLS-Based Scores	**EFA-Based Scores**	**OLS-Based Scores**	**EFA-Based Scores**
President-Senate Median Ideological Divergence	0.503***	0.384*	–	–
	(0.070)	(0.199)		
President-Filibuster Pivot Ideological Divergence	–	–	1.554***	1.180**
			(0.161)	(0.547)
Senate Polarization	-0.846***	-0.961**	-2.900***	-2.503**
	(0.154)	(0.490)	(0.338)	(1.110)
Divided Government	0.025	-0.042	-0.986***	-0.817*
	(0.049)	(0.244)	(0.101)	(0.417)
President-Senate Median Ideological Divergence × Divided Government	-1.497***	-1.150***	–	–
	(0.073)	(0.362)		
President-Filibuster Pivot Ideological Divergence × Divided Government	–	–	-2.311***	-1.741***
			(0.158)	(0.610)
Senate Polarization × Divided Government	0.427***	0.473	2.835***	2.299**
	(0.114)	(0.302)	(0.311)	(1.012)
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	0.017	-0.029	0.018	-0.031
	(0.040)	(0.171)	(0.039)	(0.171)
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	-0.219***	-0.188	-0.225***	-0.192
	(0.035)	(0.182)	(0.035)	(0.182)
Supervisory Position	-0.109***	-0.204	-0.111***	-0.204
	(0.025)	(0.124)	(0.026)	(0.124)
Policy Expertise	-0.230*	-0.164	-0.247*	-0.176
	(0.139)	(0.196)	(0.140)	(0.195)
Priority Agency	-0.099***	-0.080**	-0.099***	-0.079**
	(0.006)	(0.034)	(0.006)	(0.033)
Presidential Approval	-0.009***	-0.008	-0.010***	-0.009
	(0.001)	(0.007)	(0.001)	(0.007)
Congress	0.091***	0.149	0.056*	0.118
	(0.029)	(0.091)	(0.029)	(0.084)
Cutpoint 1	7.326**	12.868	2.937	9.058
	(2.946)	(9.465)	(2.950)	(8.705)
Cutpoint 2	8.890***	15.482	4.509	11.676
	(2.942)	(9.481)	(2.948)	(8.719)
AIC	1219.252	1107.305	1215.356	1106.214
BIC	1279.793	1167.846	1275.897	1166.755
Log Likelihood	-595.626	-539.652	-593.678	-539.107
Likelihood Ratio Test	21.509**	28.035***	25.404**	29.126***
Likelihood Ratio Test of Significance of *Divided Gov't*	1.546	19.437***	3.281*	21.303***
Number of Observations	558	558	558	558

Note: Ordered logistic coefficients presented; the dependent variable (*Trait Relationship*) is coded as -1 if *Fealty* and *Ideological Proximity*/*Shared Preferences* are substitutes, 1 if they are complements, and 0 if they are neither. Models are initially estimated on each of 1,000 posterior estimates of the dependent variable (as *Fealty* is initially estimated via a series of indicators); the coefficients and all fit statistics are medians. The Likelihood Ratio Test of the significance of *Divided Government* examines the null hypothesis that *Divided Government* and its interaction terms are zero against the alternative that the additional terms provide significantly more explanatory power. Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed z-tests: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.

Table A-16: Ordered Logit Model Estimates
(Committee Chair and Committee Median as Pivots of Interest; Models Estimated on Individual Posterior Estimates)

	Committee Chair		***Committee Median***	
	OLS-Based Scores	**EFA-Based Scores**	**OLS-Based Scores**	**EFA-Based Scores**
President-Committee Chair Ideological Divergence	0.311***	0.249	–	–
	(0.064)	(0.217)		
President-Committee Median Ideological Divergence	–	–	0.176***	0.070
			(0.034)	(0.140)
Senate Polarization	-0.303	-0.593	0.048	-0.208
	(0.186)	(0.461)	(0.131)	(0.361)
Divided Government	-0.222***	-0.227	-0.093**	-0.057
	(0.067)	(0.203)	(0.039)	(0.191)
President-Committee Chair Ideological Divergence × Divided Government	-0.839***	-0.643**	–	–
	(0.077)	(0.257)		
President-Committee Median Ideological Divergence × Divided Government	–	–	-0.521***	-0.339*
			(0.051)	(0.202)
Senate Polarization × Divided Government	0.378***	0.460	0.153**	0.197
	(0.121)	(0.355)	(0.075)	(0.232)
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	0.035	-0.040	-0.032	-0.093
	(0.040)	(0.177)	(0.042)	(0.176)
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	-0.210***	-0.168	-0.231***	-0.185
	(0.034)	(0.185)	(0.032)	(0.183)
Supervisory Position	-0.021	-0.148	0.002	-0.130
	(0.025)	(0.133)	(0.025)	(0.131)
Policy Expertise	-0.275*	-0.206	-0.286**	-0.210
	(0.142)	(0.201)	(0.142)	(0.200)
Priority Agency	-0.088***	-0.068**	-0.077***	-0.062*
	(0.006)	(0.034)	(0.006)	(0.033)
Presidential Approval	-0.005***	-0.006	-0.001	-0.003
	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.006)
Congress	-0.041	0.053	-0.067**	0.025
	(0.029)	(0.079)	(0.029)	(0.079)
Cutpoint 1	-6.092**	3.138	-8.525***	0.469
	(2.924)	(8.308)	(2.931)	(8.271)
Cutpoint 2	-4.501	5.788	-6.958**	3.098
	(2.923)	(8.316)	(2.930)	(8.275)
AIC	1162.525	1055.702	1172.968	1060.871
BIC	1222.477	1115.653	1232.920	1120.823
Log Likelihood	-567.263	-513.851	-572.484	-516.436
Likelihood Ratio Test	25.953**	31.918***	15.511	26.748***
Likelihood Ratio Test of Significance of *Divided Gov't*	1.517	22.471***	1.666	21.263***
Number of Observations	535	535	535	535

Note: Ordered logistic coefficients presented; the dependent variable (*Trait Relationship*) is coded as -1 if *Fealty* and *Ideological Proximity*/*Shared Preferences* are substitutes, 1 if they are complements, and 0 if they are neither. Models are initially estimated on each of 1,000 posterior estimates of the dependent variable (as *Fealty* is initially estimated via a series of indicators); the coefficients and all fit statistics are medians. The Likelihood Ratio Test of the significance of *Divided Government* examines the null hypothesis that *Divided Government* and its interaction terms are zero against the alternative that the additional terms provide significantly more explanatory power. Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed z-tests: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.

Figure A-1: Estimated Marginal Effects of President-Appointee Ideological Divergence on Fealty *(Kernel Regularized Least Squares Approach, Separate Models Estimated for Each Posterior Draw, Senate Median as Pivot of Interest)*



Figure A-2: Estimated Marginal Effects of President-Appointee Ideological Divergence on Fealty *(Kernel Regularized Least Squares Approach, Separate Models Estimated for Each Posterior Draw, Filibuster Pivot as Pivot of Interest)*



Figure A-3: Estimated Marginal Effects of President-Appointee Ideological Divergence on Fealty *(Kernel Regularized Least Squares Approach, Separate Models Estimated for Each Posterior Draw, Committee Chair as Pivot of Interest)*



Figure A-4: Estimated Marginal Effects of President-Appointee Ideological Divergence on Fealty *(Kernel Regularized Least Squares Approach, Separate Models Estimated for Each Posterior Draw, Committee Median as Pivot of Interest)*



Figure A-5:
Predicted Differences in Probabilities of Substitutes and Complements
(Separate Models Estimated for Each Posterior Draw)