Supplementary Appendix A -- A Digression: The Valuation of Men Colleagues

Although our theory is meant to explain how extant members of a political organization value current and prospective minority group members of that organization, there are clear theoretical and empirical implications for the valuation of majority group members as well. Specifically, as members of the majority group, men Senators engaging in dominant tokenism behavior should increase their valuation for both current and prospective men colleagues as the proportion of women (w) increases. Under retrospective Pareto inferior tokenism and prospective critical mass dual behavior, women Senators increase (decrease) their valuation of current (prospective) men colleagues as w rises. This behavior reflects not only the desire of men Senators to maintain their dominant majority status, but also women Senators to support this aim alongside current men colleagues, yet unwilling to extend such support to prospective men colleagues. That is, women Senators do not wish to engage in a prospective tokenism relationship with prospective men colleagues since to do otherwise reinforces the majority group's dominant status.

[Insert Table SA-1 About Here]

Indeed, the results presented in **Table SA-1** only partially bear out this symmetry. For both men and women Senators, the proportion of women in the party does not affect the probability of contributing to a challenger who is a man. Yet in keeping with the theory, women Senators give significantly less than their men colleagues to men challengers, when a donation is made. Furthermore, the difference increases with the proportion of women in the party. More specifically, a contribution from a Senator who is a man to another man colleague is, on average, 389 dollars larger than the contribution of

a woman when *w* is at its minimum value ($w = 0.05$), but 2157 dollars larger when *w* is at its maximum value ($w = 0.20$).

Also in keeping with the theory, both men and women give significantly more to men incumbents when a donation is made, a result that increases as *w* increases. In other words, both men and women Senators value their men colleagues more highly as they become scarcer. Specifically, men give donations that are, on average, 5602 dollars larger and women give donations that are 7847 dollars larger when men are at their most scarce. Notably, despite the fact that donations from women are larger when they occur, they are significantly *less* likely to give to men as *w* in increases. Although this result is counter to our theoretical expectations, the substantive impact of this difference is small. In fact, when *w* increases from 0.05 to 0.20, the probability of a man receiving a contribution from a woman decreases by only 0.0195, a decrease that represents only 217 fewer donations.

TABLE SA-1: Modeling Colleague Valuations of Men in the U.S. Senate

Variable	Binary Donation Decision		Donation Amount	
	Challenger	Incumbent	Challenger	Incumbent
w	0.8797 (4.524)	2.198 (3.865)	3.464 (3.180)	10.78** (3.518)
w **× Woman Donor**	-0.5090 (2.022)	-8.592** (1.545)	-2.647** (1.159)	1.450 (1.308)
Incumbent's Distance	0.3446** (0.1188)	_____	0.1695** (0.0703)	_____
Open Seat	0.09914 (0.1065)	_____	0.003640 (0.05487)	_____
First Run for Federal Office	-0.4802** (0.09417)	_____	-0.1463** (0.05789)	_____
Other Political Experience	0.2806** (0.06709)	_____	0.1888** (0.05202)	_____
Woman Donor	0.06948 (0.3058)	1.453** (0.2173)	0.4160** (0.1759)	-0.2544 (0.1680)
Party	-0.07378 (0.4594)	0.07454 (0.3803)	0.4563 (0.3292)	1.256** (0.3446)
Ln (Total PAC Contributions)	0.6138** (0.03518)	0.7006** (0.02578)	0.4725** (0.02178)	0.4678** (0.01557)
Same State	0.2186 (0.2204)	0.5697** (0.1024)	-0.2430* (0.1340)	0.3321** (0.07380)
Same Region	-0.1027 (0.06392)	-0.001774 (0.04962)	0.007888 (0.03896)	-0.1091** (0.03772)
Δ*w*	0.004679 (0.02210)	0.01180 (0.02324)	0.0604** (0.01471)	0.05093** (0.02304)
CQ Rating	0.3357** (0.07418)	0.4450** (0.04317)	0.06230* (0.03404)	0.01696 (0.02918)
Competitiveness	0.7840** (0.07942)	0.2065** (0.06406)	0.1349** (0.03670)	0.1529** (0.04264)
Ideological Distance	_____	-0.4135* (0.2346)	_____	-0.1512 (0.1952)
Same Committee	_____	-0.2634* (0.1456)	_____	0.04811 (0.08413)
Recipient's Last Election	_____	-0.01499** (0.003421)	_____	-0.008843** (0.004260)
Presidential Election	_____	-0.005435* (0.003198)	_____	-0.007765** (0.003670)
Recipient's Seat Up	_____	1.0435** (0.06782)	_____	0.3748** (0.06915)
Recipient is Leader	_____	-0.06422 (0.08480)	_____	-0.08235 (0.06995)
Recipient is on Power Committee	_____	-0.2944** (0.05331)	_____	-0.05549 (0.04642)
Constant	-9.177** (0.9594)	-8.870** (0.8805)	1.854** (0.6711)	1.261 (0.8132)
Log Likelihood	-1285	-2287	-863.5	
$\Lambda \sim \chi^2$ (k) Tobit Test	4480** [0.000]	8060** [0.000]	_____	_____
N	3346	11,113	1066	2142

* Indicates statistical significance at the 0.10 level (two-tail). ** indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level (two-tail). Values inside parentheses are robust standard errors cluster-adjusted on donor-recipient dyad. Election cycle fixed effects dummies omitted for space.

TABLE SA-2: Modeling Colleague Valuations of U.S. Women Senators with Year in Term Variable
(Robustness Check for Incumbent Regressions)

Variable	Binary Donation Decision		Donation Amount	
		Incumbent		Incumbent
w		-0.3355 (4.257)		-3.726 (3.177)
w **× Woman Donor**		-8.445** (3.624)		0.5668 (1.456)
Incumbent's Distance		_____		_____
Open Seat		_____		_____
First Run for Federal Office		_____		_____
Other Political Experience		_____		_____
Woman Donor		1.132** (0.5794)		0.2835** (0.1323)
Party		-0.2595 (0.4656)		-0.5485 (0.3476)
Ln (Total PAC Contributions)		1.325** (0.06439)		0.6375** (0.02523)
Same State		0.9793** (0.3110)		0.1343 (0.1849)
Same Region		-0.3759** (0.1927)		-0.004333 (0.1168)
Δ*w*		-0.2342** (0.06883)		0.0706 (0.0606)
CQ Rating		0.6951** (0.2519)		0.1513 (0.2047)
Competitiveness		-0.05792 (0.3830)		0.1129 (0.2814)
Ideological Distance		-6.144** (0.6320)		-3.027** (0.2536)
Same Committee		-0.4215 (0.5505)		0.2160 ()0.1604
Recipient's Last Election		-0.05960** (0.01122)		0.0007636 (0.008211)
Presidential Election		-0.02857** (0.01254)		0.006374 (0.01299)
Recipient is Leader		0.2645 (0.3132)		-0.4373 (0.3415)
Recipient is on Power Committee		-0.7987** (0.2524)		-0.08418 (0.2113)
Year in Term		1.354** (0.2260)		-0.4815** (0.2217)
Constant		-13.98** (1.372)		1.881** (0.9350)
Log Likelihood		-462.7		-526.2
$\Lambda \sim \chi^2$ (k) Tobit Test		3410** [0.000]		_____
N		11,113		2142

* Indicates statistical significance at the 0.10 level (two-tail). ** indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level (two-tail). Values inside parentheses are robust standard errors cluster-adjusted on donor-recipient dyad.