Executive Appointee Reliability under Separated Powers:
Presidential Loyalty Among Leaders of U.S. Federal Agencies

Gary E. Hollibaugh, Jr.†
University of Pittsburgh

and

George A. Krause‡
University of Georgia

Draft (Version 4.4)
May 28, 2021

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* Earlier versions of the paper were presented at the 2021 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, the 2021 Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, the GSPIA Internal Research Presentation Series at the University of Pittsburgh, the Syracuse University American Politics Colloquium, the Vanderbilt University Virtual American Executive Politics Seminar, and the Virtual Political Economy Workshop at BI Norwegian Business School. We thank Alex Acs, Annie Benn, Davide Cipullo, Cody Drolc, Christina Kinane, David Lewis, Kenneth Lowande, Matthew Miles, Yu Ouyang, Collin Paschall, and Ryan Williamson for extremely helpful comments on earlier versions. Krause gratefully acknowledges Anne Joseph O'Connell for her contributions to their joint work constructing a database of U.S. federal agency leadership appointments used in the creation of the bureaucratic leader latent trait measures.

† Associate Professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh, 3802 Wesley W. Posvar Hall, 230 South Bouquet Street, Pittsburgh, PA 15260. gary.hollibaugh@pitt.edu. ***Corresponding Author.***

‡ Alumni Foundation Distinguished Professor of Public Administration, Department of Public Administration and Policy, School of Public and International Affairs, University of Georgia, 280G Baldwin Hall, Athens, GA 30602. gkrause@uga.edu.

Keywords: Reliability of Executive Appointments; U.S. Federal Agency Leadership; Appointee Loyalty; Administrative Uncertainty; Separation of Powers; Ideological Proximity; Fealty

Abstract

A theory of executive appointee reliability is set forth that analyzes two forms of presidential loyalty: (1) an appointee's ideological proximity (*ideological loyalty*), and (2) their fealty to the president *(non-ideological loyalty*). Unconstrained presidents appoint individuals whose ideological proximity and fealty are complementary to one another for purposes of enhancing the reliability of executive appointees. As Senate constraints become more robust, presidents incur greater *ex ante* uncertainty regarding their executive appointment choices since they must rely less on such complementarity, as well as increasingly rely on substituting fealty for ideological proximity. Support for this theory is obtained from a statistical analysis of data on executive leadership appointments between the Reagan and Bush II presidencies. Lower executive appointee reliability transpiring during times of heightened interbranch policy conflict contributes to the inherent difficulties that presidents encounter in obtaining coordinated executive administration, despite their efforts at employing both politicization and centralization strategies.

Word Count: **9,964** (Excluding Title & Abstract Pages; Appendix Content)

In *Federalist* 72 & 76, Alexander Hamilton offers a compelling rationale for effective governance in the American constitutional system that has a dual requirement of clear lines of executive accountability between the president and the polity, as well as between the president and their appointed officials (see also Bertelli and Lynn 2006; Mackenzie 2011). Ensuring these linkages are robust is the normative basis for advocating responsive competence in executive administration (Moe 1985). Because presidents desire coherent administrative governance consistent with their policy objectives, responsive competence is pursued by emphasizing loyalty in their executive appointment choices (Moe 1985). In turn, greater appointee loyalty to the president encourages greater functional specialization by increasing grants of both delegation and discretion to federal agencies (e.g., Bohte and Wood 2004; Epstein and O'Halloran 1999; Huber and Shipan 2002, 2011).

Yet, presidents do not always maximize appointee loyalty for reasons attributable to executive administration, or the result of separation of powers politics. For example, politicians may face limited talent pools to draw upon when selecting executive appointees (Dewan and Myatt 2010). Still, presidents may more highly value managerial skills or policy-specific expertise in executive appointees than loyalty in terms of serving policy objectives (Edwards 2001; Hollibaugh, Horton, and Lewis 2014; Krause and O'Connell 2016, 2019; Lewis 2008; Ouyang, Haglund, and Waterman 2017; Parsneau 2013; Waterman and Ouyang 2020). Presidents are also constrained by the Senate when making appointments for several reasons, including the avoidance of interbranch stalemate (Snyder and Weingast 2000), securing greater budgetary authority from Congress for programmatic priorities (Bertelli and Grose 2011; McCarty 2004), and solving coordination problems within administrative hierarchies (Jo and Rothenberg 2014).

The study offers a novel focus on U.S. federal executive appointment choices by

focusing on the expected reliability of appointments. We define *executive appointee reliability* as the extent to which the ideological proximity (ideological loyalty) of the president to the appointee is complementary to the appointee's fealty to the president (non-ideological loyalty). That is, appointee reliability captures the consistency of an appointee's ideological and non-ideological loyalties to the president. Under this definition, an appointee can be reliable even if they exhibit low levels of both types of loyalties. That is, *reliability* captures the extent to which a president might view an appointee's actions as predictable or certain, and *not* necessarily the extent to which the president might view the appointee as a trustworthy advocate for the president's agenda.

A theory of executive reliability is proposed which maintains that presidents prefer reliable executive appointees—those whose expected ideological proximity and fealty to the president at the time of nomination are consistent—for purposes of reducing administrative uncertainty surrounding appointee responsiveness. Yet, as interbranch conflict increases, the Senate seeks to undermine executive branch governance to reduce the reliability of confirmed appointees and thereby increase administrative uncertainty. Conversely, both institutions are incentivized to enhance appointee reliability in the presence of low interbranch conflict since they exhibit mutual interests for effective administration. The empirical implications of executive reliability theory are evaluated using data on a sample of U.S. federal agency leadership PAS positions over a 22-year period covering the Reagan through Bush II administrations, and the evidence is consistent with our theory. Most notably, complementarity between ideological proximity and fealty to the president is high at low levels of Senate-President ideological policy conflict under both unified and divided partisan control, and declines as ideological conflict expands. This pattern of declining reliability in executive appointments is much more severe under split partisan control compared to when a single party controls both the Senate and the presidency. Increases in

ideological policy conflict are associated with decreases in the probability of a complementary appointee type—and increases in the probability of substitution appointee types whose ideological and non-ideological loyalties to the president are at cross-purposes—under split partisan control of political branches compared to an increase for this appointee type—and decreases in substitution types—under unified partisan control.

The theory and corresponding evidence underscore the challenges presidents face in obtaining responsive competence and coordinated executive administration through the appointments process. Policy conflict manifested through the shared powers of executive appointments reduces reliability in terms of agency responsiveness to U.S. presidents by both lowering complementarities and increasing substitution between ideological proximity and fealty to presidents. More broadly, this study helps explain why presidential efforts to harness the modern administrative state have been mixed, despite presidents embracing strategies relating to politicization and centralization of U.S. federal agencies.

Two Sides of the Same Coin: Ideological Proximity and Fealty Sources of Appointee Loyalty to Presidents

Although presidents seek responsive competence from the U.S. federal bureaucracy to attain their policy and administrative objectives (e.g., Moe 1985), achieving this aim is difficult due to inherent problems associated with executive branch coordination (e.g., Krause 2009; Lowande 2018; Rudalevige 2021). Presidents obviously obtain policy benefits from selecting executive appointees inclined to serve administrative goals. Presidents have two means of gauging agent loyalty from their executive appointment choices: *ideological proximity* and *(non-ideological) fealty*. Ideological proximity constitutes shared policy preferences commonly understood as the extent to which the president and appointee have similar policy positions; that is, it captures the extent to which an appointee would make

independent policy decisions congruent with the president's expressed wishes in the counterfactual scenario where an executive appointee does not serve in a subordinate position to the president. Although ideological proximity is ubiquitous to the study of executive branch politics and policymaking (e.g., Bertelli and Grose 2011; Bonica, Chen, and Johnson 2015; Clinton, et al. 2012; Hollibaugh and Rothenberg 2018), this approach understates agency responsiveness to presidential policy objectives since it overlooks how formal hierarchical structure shapes principal-agent relationships (Jo and Rothenberg 2014; Krause and O'Connell 2016). Ideological proximity can neither ascertain the importance presidents ascribe to loyalty based on prior shared service in government (Pfiffner 2010: 120), nor demonstrated loyal service to presidents from a prior administration (Michaels 1997: 40; Pfiffner 1987: 73-74). Further, ideological proximity does not capture the extent to which appointees are organizationally vested in the success of the president via prior party service (Krause and O'Connell 2019: 533).

Fealty to the president offers an alternative channel for analyzing appointee loyalty distinct from ideological proximity between these actors. Fealty relates to an appointee's proclivity to serve as a 'team player' on behalf of the administration—an inference derived from prior relevant service through elective office, administrative, or party organizational duties (e.g., Krause and O'Connell 2019: 532-533; see also Akerlof and Kranton 2005: 12-13, 28-29; Selznick 1957). Fealty reflects non-ideological agent motivations based on the loyalty an appointee has for a particular president (*personal*); the desire to serve as a 'team member' of an administration (*organizational*), whether it is attributed to sincere behavior as a 'team player' acting in accordance with the organizational identity given their assigned role and function (Akerlof and Kranton 2010; March and Simon 1992; Weber 1914 [1978]: 959), or instead engage in strategic behavior reflecting implicit incentives attributable to career concerns (e.g., Adolph 2013; Hallerberg and Wehner 2012). Regardless of the

motivation, fealty is a critical ingredient for building strong, coherent organizations since employees' willingness to 'buy-in' to broader the organizational mission is critical for effective performance (e.g., Besley and Ghatak 2018). Effective executive branch coordination is facilitated by appointed officials whose motivation to be responsive to democratically elected chief executives is rooted in fealty considerations.

Ideological proximity and fealty each contribute to presidential efforts for obtaining executive branch coordination compatible with their administration's objectives. In short, fealty can serve as a complement to ideological proximity serving to mutually reinforce presidential responsiveness by lowering administrative uncertainty *ex ante* through appointee loyalty. Alternatively, fealty offers presidents a substitute for ideological proximity, though the lack of *ex ante* mutual reinforcement with ideological proximity will lead to higher levels of uncertainty and lower levels of reliability. Although appointee loyalty through both channels offers clear benefits to presidents, it may not always be maximized for two distinct reasons. Presidents may value other traits in executive appointees such as managerial skills or policy-specific (subject matter) expertise that require tradeoffs with loyalty for agency leadership at PAS levels (Krause and O'Connell 2016, 2019), as well as for non-PAS appointments (e.g., Hollibaugh, Horton, and Lewis 2014; Ouyang, Haglund, and Waterman 2017; Parsneau 2013; Waterman and Ouyang 2020). Also, presidents may be constrained by the Senate's vigorous exercise of its constitutional advise and consent powers (e.g., Jo and Rothenberg 2012; McCarty 2004). This study analyzes external Senatorial constraints on executive appointments by advancing a theory explaining how the varying nature of Senate constraints influences presidential capacity for selecting reliable appointees.

Presidential Efforts at Securing Reliable Executive Appointees Within a Separation of Powers System

Although presidents necessarily select appointees exhibiting varying degrees of administrative responsiveness, they prefer reliable appointees offering predictable levels of loyalty or responsiveness once serving in office. As mentioned, appointee reliability captures the degree of uncertainty regarding an appointee's (expected) loyalty to the president. In other words, greater executive appointee reliability translates into greater *consistency* between the relative levels of appointee loyalty derived from ideological and non-ideological sources. Presidents will prefer executive appointees whom they deem as being more reliable (i.e., less uncertain) regarding their responsiveness to their administration's policy objectives. This translates into presidents preferring to choose appointees whose propensity for ideological loyalty (*ideological proximity*) is mutually reinforced by their propensity for non-ideological loyalty (*fealty*).

Administrative uncertainty is reduced *ex ante* from the president's perspective when an appointee's ideological proximity and fealty are complements in evaluating agent loyalty, regardless of the level of either attribute. Presidents thus prefer to reduce administrative uncertainty *ex ante* by selecting appointees whose ideological proximity and fealty mutually reinforce one another since doing so provides a 'fail-safe' when it comes to obtaining reliability, and hence, consistency in executive branch policymaking. This logic is analogous to the advantages accrued from redundancy in organizational systems arising from complementarities enhancing organizational reliability (Streeter 1992: 97-98, 102; see also Bendor 1985; Heimann 1995; Landau 1969). Complementarity between an appointee's ideological proximity and fealty to the president (and administration) yields more stable

and predictable patterns of administrative responsiveness to presidential policy objectives.[1]

For example, consider Christine Varney, tapped by President Clinton to serve as a Federal Trade Commissioner and sworn in to her post in October of 1994. We view her as an example of a highly reliable executive appointee since she exhibited high ideological proximity and high fealty prior to her appointment.[2] Prior to Varney's appointment, she had a long history in Democratic politics in general, and to the Clintons specifically. From 1989 to 1992, she served as General Counsel to the Democratic National Committee, and subsequently served as Chief Counsel to the Clinton/Gore Campaign as well as General Counsel to the 1992 Presidential Inaugural Committee. Additionally, just prior to her appointment as FTC commissioner, she served as President Clinton's Secretary to the Cabinet and was responsible for coordination of major policy issues between the Executive Office of the President and cabinet agencies.[3] Similarly, former National Transportation Safety Board member Christopher A. Hart—appointed during the George H. W. Bush administration—is also a reliable executive appointee since he exhibited low ideological proximity and fealty when he began his term in 1990.[4] Prior to this service, Hart's career had been centered in the private sector, and his NTSB appointment was his first

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[1] Henceforth, *fealty to the president* refers to personal or organizational motivations defined earlier.

[2] Varney's *Fealty* score is at about the 88th percentile of the empirical range of the OLS-based scores and her *Ideological Divergence* score is at about the 25th percentile; thus indicating relatively high fealty and low levels of ideological divergence between herself and President Clinton.

[3] https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/biographies/christine-varney.

[4] Hart's *Fealty* score is tied for the lowest value in the dataset among the OLS-based scores, yet his *Ideological Divergence* score is at about the 99th percentile, indicating low fealty to either former President Bush or the Republican Party, and strong ideological disagreement with President Bush.

government position of any note.[5] Though he would later serve in various capacities in the Clinton, Bush II, and Obama presidencies, he would not rejoin the NTSB until he was nominated by President Obama to serve as Vice Chairman.

In instances when an appointee's ideological proximity and fealty to the president are less mutually reinforcing, or possibly even serve as substitutes for one another, executive administration becomes less predictable, less coordinated, and less coherent. An appointee exhibiting greater fealty at the expense of less ideological proximity to the president translates into reducing the shared policy vision between the president and appointee, while increasing the appointee's willingness to serve as a 'team player' within the presidential organization. If an appointee subsequently becomes dissatisfied with their role or the mission of the presidential administration, it can undermine their willingness to serve in a responsive manner to presidential policy objectives since they do not share the president's policy preferences. Similarly, an appointee exhibiting greater ideological proximity at the cost of lower fealty will only be loyal to presidents when their policy positions are compatible with those of the administration. When an appointee's desired course of policy action diverges from the president's, these appointees are less inclined to exhibit presidential responsiveness since they lack a strong organizational identity to their subordinate role and position within the presidential administration. Notable examples of such appointees according to this definition include a pair of George W. Bush's appointees during the first year of his presidency. Alex Acosta was appointed to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and exhibited high levels of ideological proximity, coupled with low

[5] https://www.ntsb.gov/news/speeches/CHart/Pages/bio_hart.aspx.

levels of fealty at the time of appointment.[6] These characteristics were partly a function of Acosta's thin record of service to the Republican Party in general and George W. Bush in particular at the time of this nomination, having mostly focused on his private sector legal career (though he did clerk for future Supreme Court Justice Samuel A. Alito).[7] The mirror image of the Acosta appointment was the selection of Christine Todd Whitman as EPA administrator in January 2001. Whitman exhibits low levels of ideological proximity with the Bush II administration,[8] coupled with high levels of fealty.[9] This classification was rooted in Whitman's extensive involvement in Republican party politics via national committee service and elective office.[10]

To summarize, substitution between an appointee's ideological proximity and fealty to the president increases administrative uncertainty *ex ante* via appointee loyalty since it reflects cross-cutting (or mixed) incentives facing the bureaucratic agent. A 'reliability engineering' perspective on executive appointments suggests presidents are made worse (better) off in *absolute* terms of obtaining reliable executive administration when ideological proximity and fealty are substitutes (complements), ceteris paribus. Accordingly, presidents

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[6] Acosta's *Fealty* score is tied for the lowest value in the dataset among the OLS-based scores, yet his *Ideological Divergence* score is at about the 8th percentile, indicating extremely low fealty at the time of appointment, but little ideological distance between himself and President Bush.

[7] https://millercenter.org/r-alexander-acosta-2017-2019.

[8] This was to be eventually borne out through her resignation in 2003 (Whitman 2005).

[9] Governor Whitman's *Fealty* scores are at about the 98th percentile of the empirical range of the OLS-based scores and her *Ideological Divergence* score is at about the 79th percentile; collectively, these suggest comparatively high fealty and strong ideological divergence from President Bush.

[10] https://www.nytimes.com/1993/06/09/nyregion/whitman-pursues-family-business.html.

are made *relatively* worse (better) off when ideological proximity and fealty are less (more) complementary with respect to appointment choices.

Presidents will seek complementarity, in terms of ideological proximity and fealty of appointed agency leaders, as a means of minimizing uncertainty (i.e., maximize reliability) involving an agency leader's loyalty to administration objectives. This raises the question—*Why would presidents not always obtain complementarity between ideological proximity and fealty when making executive appointment choices?* The Senate has a clear incentive to undermine the president's capacity for obtaining reliable executive administration from appointed officials as the common agency problem between the political branches becomes more acute. When presidents and the Senate have tangible policy differences and their electoral fortunes are distinct from one another, the Senate will be more inclined to exercise its advice and consent powers in the executive appointment process as a means of reducing appointee reliability to presidential goals. This is because the Senate does not benefit from effective executive administration in either policy or electoral terms when ample partisan and ideological conflict exists between these political branches. As interbranch conflict rises, the Senate has a weaker incentive for allowing presidents to reduce administrative uncertainty *ex ante* by appointing agency officials whose ideological proximity and fealty to the president are treated as complements. Instead, in these cases, the Senate will prefer to 'hardwire' moral hazard into appointments by increasing administrative uncertainty *ex ante*, thus undermining coordinated executive administration.[11]

[11] Although this logic might seem to conflict with that of Gailmard and Patty (2012: 138-166), there are at least two points of departure between the logic in their '*agents for policy advice*' model from the current study. First, Gailmard and Patty (2012: 155) assume some policy decision has to be made, and that maintaining a somewhat certain status quo versus a potentially more uncertain

Interbranch policy conflict has both partisan and ideological components. When both partisan and ideological sources of interbranch policy conflict are modest, presidents can best reduce administrative uncertainty *ex ante* by expanding complementarity—and reducing substitution—between ideological proximity and fealty. Conversely, presidents will incur greater administrative uncertainty *ex ante* in their appointment choices by reducing complementarity and expanding substitution between ideological proximity and fealty as both partisan and ideological interbranch policy conflict becomes more acute. This logic yields the following theoretical proposition:

> ***Executive Reliability Proposition***: *Executive appointment reliability will be decreasing in interbranch conflict between the president and Senate.*

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alternative policy is not an admissible strategy. Second, Gailmard and Patty (2012: 156) assume limits on the extent of the ideological conflict between the president and Congress and that an antagonistic Congress is not willing to pursue bad policy for the purpose of ensuring a loss by the president's party. To the first point, we argue that the presence of a status quo policy is implicit in our logic—and therefore the Gailmard and Patty (2012) story is therefore relevant to endogenous expertise cultivation—as lower levels of reliability implicitly hamper the President's ability to ensure policy moves from the status quo in his or her preferred direction (and sufficiently low levels of reliability might cause the president to prefer remaining at the status quo). Regarding the second point, Jo and Rothenberg (2012) show asymmetric preferences over electoral versus policy concerns can lead to equilibrium outcomes where the president intentionally nominates—and the Senate confirms—nominees who will increase uncertainty in the hopes of securing better overall outcomes; such a possibility is more in line with our specific analysis than that of Gailmard and Patty (2012), whose model focuses on a different problem of executive branch politics.

This proposition implies the Senate's efforts at inducing agency moral hazard for presidents via the appointments process are most acute when *both* substantial partisan and ideological policy conflict exist. That is, greater interbranch partisan and ideological conflict between these political institutions will be associated with potent reductions of complementarity or enhanced substitution effects between ideological proximity and fealty when presidents make executive appointments. This produces the corresponding pair of hypotheses:

> **H1** (***Complementarity Hypothesis***): *Complementarity between president–appointee ideological proximity and appointee fealty* ***declines more rapidly*** *in ideological divergence between the president and Senate under divided partisan control vis-à-vis unified partisan control.*
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> **H2** (***Substitution Hypothesis***): *Substitution between president–appointee ideological proximity and appointee fealty* ***increases more rapidly*** *in ideological divergence between the president and Senate under divided partisan control vis-à-vis unified partisan control.*

H1 and **H2** represent the distinct pathways the Senate can employ to constrain presidential control of the bureaucracy by reducing appointee reliability. Specifically, the Senate can constrain presidents by either reducing mutual reinforcement or increasing tradeoffs involving ideological and non-ideological sources of loyalty. The next section discusses the empirical strategy undertaken to evaluate these hypotheses.

Data and Empirical Strategy

Evaluating these hypotheses is a complicated task, since doing so requires us to operationalize both *Fealty* and *Ideological Proximity* in ways that are empirically robust and theoretically consistent with what was discussed earlier, as well as analyzing the combination of the two to evaluate appointee reliability. Fortunately, recent years have seen the emergence of a cottage industry focused on the development of latent measures of ideological proximity for unelected officials employing alternative scaling procedures (e.g., Bertelli and Grose 2009; Bonica, Chen, and Johnson 2015; Clinton, Bertelli, Grose, Lewis, and Nixon 2012; Nixon 2004). Here, we use Bonica's (2013, 2014) estimates of appointee ideology, hereafter referred to as *CFScores*, as they include estimates of millions of individuals within the same ideological space, including all presidents, key members of the Senate, and the most appointees of any extant data source of ideological positions. *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence* (note the usage of divergence as opposed to proximity, which is due to methodological reasons) is defined as the absolute difference between the *CFScores* of the president and the appointee under analysis.[12]

[12] Understandably, since the subsequent analyses focus on *appointees,* one might be concerned about differences between successful and unsuccessful nominees. We have examined those appointees in our dataset and compared them to unsuccessful nominees to the same set of agencies and positions. First, *t*-tests fail to reject the null of no difference in the mean *CFScore* of successful appointees versus unsuccessful nominees ($p \approx 0.864$) as well as the null of no difference in the mean ideological distance from the President for both sets of individuals ($p \approx 0.704$). Additionally, Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests fail to reject the nulls that the ideological estimates ($p \approx 0.369$) and/or distances ($p \approx 0.527$) are drawn from different underlying distributions between the two groups. As such, while one cannot test for all unobserved differences between the two sets of nominees — as Krause and

Estimating appointee fealty is a different task altogether, and one for which there are few, if any, 'off the shelf' approaches. Arguably the closest approach is that of Krause and O'Connell (2016), who combine observable biographical indicators with a Bayesian Generalized Latent Trait approach to generate estimates of appointee *loyalty* (along with estimates for *managerial competence* and *policy competence*) for 558 U.S. federal leadership positions appointees between the Carter and Bush II presidencies. Subsequently, Krause and O'Connell (2019) showed that, of the six indicators used to estimate *loyalty* in the earlier study, two of them (*Shared Partisan Affiliation* and *Prior Campaign Contributions*) were used to capture shared partisan and/or ideological orientations, and the remaining four (*Prior Partisan–Administrative Service*, *Shared Subnational Executive Service*, *Prior Elective Office Service*, and *Prior Major Party Service: Appointing President's Party*) capture non-ideological sources of loyalty.[13] These latter four indicators are the focus when

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O'Connell (2016) did not estimate *Loyalty* statistics for unconfirmed nominees, and hence, *Fealty* measures for this set of individuals cannot be created—confidence is established as examining the aspects of executive appointee reliability that *can* be measured reveals no significant differences.

[13] *Shared Partisan Affiliation* equals 1 if the appointee shared the same party affiliation as the nominating president, and 0 otherwise. *Prior Campaign Contributions* equals 1 if the appointee gave any monetary campaign contributions meeting the Federal Election Commission reporting limit to the nominating president *prior* to nomination, and 0 otherwise. *Prior Partisan–Administrative Service* equals 1 if a shared partisan affiliation appointee previously served in an appointed (Senate confirmed or not) full-time position in any agency during a preceding administration, and 0 otherwise. *Shared Subnational Executive Service* equals 1 if the appointee served in state government when the nominating president was governor, and 0 otherwise. *Prior Elective Office Service* equals 1 if the appointee had previous elective office experience at either the federal, state, or local levels, and 0 otherwise. *Prior Major Party Service: Appointing President's Party*, which equals 1

generating the *Fealty* estimates.[14] Specifically, the Krause and O'Connell (2016) estimates are taken as a starting point, and we use them to generate *Fealty* estimates in two ways:[15]

1. Regress Krause and O'Connell's (2016) existing *Loyalty* measurements on the four separate *Fealty* indicators identified above; the fitted values from this set of OLS regressions will serve as the *Fealty* estimates going forward;

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if the appointee had any significant experience working for a national party organization (e.g., leadership role in political campaigns, named positions in party organization structure) or running a state party organization for the party of the appointing president, and 0 otherwise.

[14] The Bonica (2013, 2014) *CFscore* measures are employed to capture ideological alignment with the President instead of the Krause and O'Connell (2016, 2019) measures for two main reasons. First, they are more consistently accepted and have been used in previous research as valid measures of appointee ideology (Bonica, Chen, and Johnson 2015; Hollibaugh and Rothenberg 2018). Second, these data are based on a much larger and much richer dataset than the *Shared Preference* indicators, and exhibit convergent validity to other ideological measures (Bonica 2019). This includes Krause and O'Connell (2019: ***Supporting Information*** document, 18-22) demonstrating that their indicators of ideological alignment exhibit strong convergent validity with the *CFscores* for a common sample of leadership executive appointees. The main drawback is that we do not have scores available for all appointees, but the aforementioned reasons justify their selection.

[15] A four-factor Generalized Latent Trait Analysis (GLTA) is estimated using the same factors as Krause and O'Connell (2019), replacing their *Loyalty* trait with separate *Fealty* and *Shared Preference* traits, subsequently using the resulting factor scores for the *Fealty* factor as the estimates, as well as a Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) model where we used the factor loadings from the EFA model described in the main text. However, both models exhibit subpar fit, and so we do not discuss them in the main text (though the conclusions drawn from them are substantively identical to those presented here).

2. Estimate an Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) model on the six *Fealty* and *Shared Preference* indicators and use the resulting factor scores for the *Fealty* factor (if one exists) as the estimates going forward.

The regression-based approach is arguably the one most closely aligned with the existing results from Krause and O'Connell (2016, 2019) as it takes both their existing measurements of *Loyalty* and the identified *Fealty* and *Shared Preference* indicators as given. Using this approach, the existing scores are used as the dependent variable in two sets of regressions. First, the replication code from Krause and O'Connell (2016) is executed to generate the trait estimates *as well as the underlying posterior distributions*.[16,17] Then, for the overall estimates, as well as each of the 1,000 saved posterior draws, the estimated *Loyalty* measure is regressed on the four *Fealty* indicators identified by Krause and O'Connell (2019) and described above (*Prior Partisan–Administrative Service*, *Shared Subnational Executive Service*, *Prior Elective Office Service*, and *Prior Major Party Service: Appointing President's Party*).[18] The mean fitted values from the 1,000 posterior draws for each appointee constitute point estimates in the analyses that follow.[19]

[16] The replication code is found at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/E9UQ0S.

[17] While the results from our replication do not match the original results *exactly*—owing to different machines and Mplus versions—the numerical results are identical to at least three decimal points for almost all recovered statistics, and substantive results are identical.

[18] Missing values are imputed for the *Fealty* and *Shared Preference* indicators (King, et al. 2001).

[19] The analyses are also separately replicated for each of the posterior draws and subsequently combined. Results are substantively similar to those presented here (see **Tables A-13** through **A-24** and **Figures A-1** through **A-5** in the ***Appendix***). Notably, the substantive similarity of the results in

Importantly, one limitation of the original Krause and O'Connell (2016, 2019: ***Supporting Information***, 14-17) estimates is that the *Fealty* and *Shared Preference* categories are considered to be mutually exclusive and exhaustive based on analyses of convergent and discriminant validity (Fornell and Larcker 1981). This issue is reconsidered here to allow for a possible indicator tapping into both categories, or some *Loyalty* indicator tapping into neither. To address this matter, an Exploratory Factor Analysis model is estimated using the six *Loyalty* traits. Analysis of the resultant scree plot suggests a two-factor solution is appropriate, with a clear 'elbow' at the second factor (Cattell 1966). Although the six indicators load onto the two separate factors in generally expected ways, some differences arise between the EFA and regression-based approaches. Specifically, the EFA approach suggests *Prior Partisan-Administrative Service* loads onto both dimensions, and *Shared Subnational Executive Service* loads onto neither; beyond these distinctions, however, the recovered categories are largely similar to those in the *ex ante* categories defined by Krause and O'Connell (2019).[20]

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the ***Appendix*** to those presented here obviate some concerns about heteroskedasticity since the standard errors presented therein are based on the empirical distributions of the coefficients from the models fit to each of the posterior draws and do not rely on any parametric assumptions.

[20] It is important to note such discrepancies between EFA and CFA analyses may be attributable to the fact that EFAs, unlike CFAs, do not account for measurement error and cross-correlations among latent concepts that are jointly determined such as managerial competence and policy competence (e.g., Krause and O'Connell [2019, ***Supporting Information***, 35-36]). This is because these methods yield different parameters from a sample within a population (e.g., Snook and Gorsuch 1989; Widaman 1993). As a result, EFA estimates may arrive at different conclusions from CFA estimates since only the latter method can evaluate discriminant validity both within and between latent

Generating the estimates versus determining whether *Fealty* and *Ideological Proximity* act as substitutes, complements, or neither *at the level of the individual appointment* are distinct statistical tasks. Estimating aggregate correlations will not suffice at the individual level. Therefore, we examine whether *Fealty* and *Ideological Proximity* act as substitutes or complements in two ways—first, a series of Kernel Regularized Least Squares models are estimated; second, a series of ordered logistic models is estimated where the dependent variable is constructed based on a decision rule.

The independent variables used in both sets of regressions capture theoretically-relevant constructs as well as other potentially relevant control variables. First, recall the theory denotes the importance of partisan conflict between the president and the Senate. As such, a *Divided Government* binary indicator is included, which equals 1 if the president and Senate Majority Leader are of different parties, and 0 otherwise. Second, the theory predicts the importance of *ideological* conflict between the branches; therefore these effects are analyzed in terms of *President-Senate Median Ideological Divergence*, *President-Filibuster Pivot Ideological Divergence*, *President-Committee Median Ideological Divergence*, and *President-Committee Chair Ideological Divergence*, which is the absolute difference in the DW-NOMINATE scores between the president and the indicated pivot (some observations are missing when *Committee Median* and/or *Committee Chair* were used, since some nominations were sent directly to the floor). *Divided Government* is interacted with whichever measure of president-Senate conflict is employed.

The remaining independent variables include *Senate Polarization* as well as an interaction with *Divided Government*; we also include *Supervisory Position, President-*

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concepts, as well as evaluate construct reliability and nomological validity critical for proper identification of structural measurement models (e.g., Fornell and Larcker 1981).

Aligned Agency, *President-Opposed Agency*, *Priority Agency*, *Presidential Approval*, and *Congress*. *Senate Polarization* is defined as the absolute distance between the ideological estimates for the Democratic and Republican party medians at the time the nomination takes place. *Supervisory Position* is an indicator variable equaling 1 if the position for which the respective appointee was selected is the highest-level official in an agency or subagency and 0 otherwise. *President-Aligned Agency* and *President-Opposed Agency* are based on the agency ideology estimates of Clinton and Lewis (2008). First, agencies are coded as –1 if they are liberal (based on a Bayesian 95% credibility interpretation of Clinton-Lewis agency ideology scores), 0 for moderate agencies based on the same and 1 for conservative agencies. These scores are then multiplied by –1 for Democratic presidents. The resulting scores equal 0 for moderate agencies, –1 if the president is a Republican [Democrat] and the agency is liberal [conservative], and 1 if the president is a Democrat [Republican] and the agency is liberal [conservative]. *President-Aligned Agency* then equals 1 if the resulting score equals 1, and 0 otherwise, and *President-Opposed Agency* equals 1 if the resulting score equals –1, and 0 otherwise. *Priority Agency* is the number of times the State of the Union address (or late January/early February addresses to Congress for presidents in their first year of their first term) mentioned policy issues directly relevant to the agency to which the respective appointee was named in the year of nomination and functions as a measure of agency policy salience.[21] *Presidential Approval* is the percentage of respondents approving of the president's job performance in Gallup polls, taken from national surveys during the month in which the respective appointee was nominated. This

[21] For each policy issue, up to three agencies connected to that issue were coded as relevant. If an issue involved a sub-agency within an agency (e.g., the Army within the Defense Department), both the sub-agency and larger agency are coded.

measure accounts for fluctuations involving the president's public standing transpiring during the course of a presidency. Finally, *Congress* is operationalized as the number of the session of Congress under analysis; e.g., the 105th Congress is given a value of 105. These effects account for unobserved heterogeneity across various Congresses in our sample that is independent of both the ideological and partisan composition of Congress.

Empirical Findings

The first set of analyses evaluates the average relationship between president-appointee ideological divergence (i.e., the inverse of ideological proximity) and fealty using Kernel Regularized Least Squares (KRLS). KRLS is a nonparametric estimation method employing machine learning to allow for nonlinear statistical relationships. This approach avoids imposing functional form *a priori* and produces coefficient estimates systematically varying across a covariate's observed values (Ferwerda, Hainmueller, and Hazlett 2017; Hainmueller and Hazlett 2014). KRLS models yield average marginal covariate effects varying across the parameter space to capture nonlinearities involving relationships.

In the present case, the dependent variables are the estimated *Fealty* scores, and the primary independent variables of interest are *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence* and our various versions of *President-Senate Ideological Divergence*, all of which capture the absolute distance between the President and one of our four aforementioned key Senate actors; separate models are estimated for unified partisan control of the presidency and Senate (*Unified Government*) and divided control (*Divided Government*). Eight sets of analyses are reported, one for each combination of Senate pivot and type of *Fealty* score estimated—four analyses are based on the regression-based *Fealty* estimates recovered

from the original Krause & O'Connell (2016, 2019) model, and the others are based on a two-factor Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA).[22]

We leverage the fact that KRLS models yield marginal effects varying across parameter spaces to examine how the estimated effects of *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence* on appointee *Fealty* might be affected by changes in interbranch ideological and partisan conflict. These results—smoothed using LOESS (Cleveland and Devlin 1988) curves to enhance visual presentation—appear in **Figure 1**.[23,24] To ensure comparability across models and observed empirical ranges of the outcome variable, the Y−axis is rescaled as the number of standard deviations of *Fealty* such changes represent.[25] Positive valued-marginal effect estimates (Y−axis > 0) indicate a positive marginal effect of *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence*, suggesting president-appointee ideological proximity and fealty are substitutes with one another.[26] Conversely, negative valued-marginal effect

[22] While our dependent variables are the mean *Fealty* estimates across all 1,000 posterior draws, all models are also estimated for each of the draws. Results, which are in the ***Appendix*** (**Tables A-13** through **A-24** and **Figures A-1** through **A-5),** are substantively similar compared to those models estimated using the means of the posterior distributions.

[23] All regression estimates are in the **Appendix**.

[24] We report 90% and 95% confidence intervals based on the LOESS smooth.

[25] The X−axis represents the empirical distribution of *President-Senate Ideological Divergence*, conditional on governmental regime type (unified versus divided) and Senate pivot under analysis.

[26] Specifically, a positive marginal effect means that *Fealty* is increasing in *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence*, implying that *Fealty* and *Ideological Proximity/Shared Preferences* (the inverse of which is captured with *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence*) are substitutes, as higher levels of one quantity would correspond to lower levels of the other.

estimates for *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence* (Y−axis < 0) suggest ideological proximity and fealty are complementary since they mutually reinforce each other by either *jointly* rising or falling.[27] The magnitude of these marginal effects are indicative of the relative *aggregate* degree of these substitution and/or complementarity effects.

Figure 1: Estimated Marginal Effects of President-Appointee Ideological Divergence on Fealty (Kernel Regularized Least Squares Approach)



[27] Recall that increasing *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence* is tantamount to reducing the extent of ideological proximity/shared preferences. As such, positive derivatives translate into *Fealty* increases as *Ideological Proximity/Shared Preferences* decrease, implying the two are substitutes. The opposite logic is true for complements.

The KRLS results indicate the strongest complementarities between ideological proximity and fealty occur when ideological conflict between the president and Senate median remains low under both unified and divided partisan control regimes, though the magnitude of the effects depend on the extent of partisan conflict.[28] Under unified government, the relationships between complementarities and interbranch conflict are generally flat, with some minor upticks for higher levels of conflict ($\tau > 60$). Yet, complementarities under divided government reveal greater sensitivity to conflict as the marginal effects generally increase with respect to presidential conflict with all four Senate pivots, though exhibiting a weakening of the relationship for lower levels of conflict, $\tau < 15$). The patterns are directionally similar for both the regression-based and EFA-based measures, albeit are consistently of a reduced magnitude for the former. Although presidents are generally successful in obtaining complementarities between ideological and non-ideological loyalty when making executive appointments in absolute terms (as all predicted marginal effects are negative), the Senate is successful in exercising their formal advise and consent powers by reducing executive appointee reliability insofar that these negative marginal effects become attenuated—and, therefore, the strength of complementarities decrease—though the effect is most pronounced under divided government. These patterns broadly support both the *Complementarity Hypothesis* **(H1)**

[28] However, the results are more pronounced for *Fealty* measures generated from the EFA model (denoted by the dashed lines) versus the regression-based measures (denoted by the solid lines). This may be due to the *Shared Subnational Executive Service* variable not being identified as a *Fealty* variable using the EFA approach. Another possibility is that the differences are due to the relaxed functional form assumptions used to generate the EFA estimates.

and the *Substitution Hypothesis* (**H2)** since interbranch conflict has adverse consequences for executive appointee reliability when both partisan *and* ideological interbranch conflict are present as complementarity becomes less likely and substitution more likely.

However, these analyses—while broadly supportive of both hypotheses—are incapable of distinguishing the decision rule for selecting different *appointee types* and, as such, the *Complementarity Hypothesis* (**H1)** cannot be distinguished from the *Substitution Hypothesis* (**H2**) for *individual* appointments. Therefore, in the next section, we perform a series of ordered logistic regressions to better understand when specific types are more likely to be appointed and how likely such appointments might be.

Granular Analyses of Executive Appointee Reliability via Classification

As mentioned, the preceding analyses are informative for making inferences regarding general patterns under alternative institutional conditions, To address this limitation, and to provide a more granular evaluation of executive appointee reliability, we estimate a series of ordered logistic regressions, with the appointee type as the dependent variable; we classify appointee types in a discrete manner as follows:[29]

- **Complement:** An appointee's value for one attribute (e.g., ideological loyalty) appears in the lower tercile, while the other attribute's (e.g., non-ideological loyalty) value appears in the upper tercile.[30]

[29] Models based on alternative decision rules (i.e., interquartile range and quintile range of estimates) yield results that are substantively similar to those based on terciles of their respective empirical distribution functions (EDFs). These results can be obtained from the authors.

[30] Opposing directions (one above and one below) are employed to denote complements because *lower* [*higher*] levels of *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence* will indicate *higher* [*lower*] levels of

- **<u>Substitute</u>:** An appointee's value for both attributes jointly appear in either the upper or lower tercile.
- **<u>Neither</u>:** An appointee's value for at least one attribute appears in the middle tercile.[31]

Figure 2: Executive Appointee Reliability Decision Rule



This decision rule for evaluating different types of executive appointee reliability is illustrated in **Figure 2**. Adopting this decision rule, the respective posterior mean estimates for *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence* and *Fealty* are employed to classify different types of appointees based on executive reliability such that the outcome

Shared Preferences. As such, if *Fealty* and *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence* move in opposite directions, then *Fealty* and *Ideological Proximity*/*Shared Preferences* should move in tandem. The opposite logic is true when examining whether these characteristics are substitutes.

[31] We classify the observations where both attributes are in the middle tercile as *Neither* largely because it is unclear *a priori* whether they should be substitutes or complements.

variable is coded +1 for a 'complementary' appointee, −1 for a 'substitution' appointee, and 0 for a 'neither' appointee. Dots indicate randomly-generated hypothetical data points.[32]

The core results from ordinal logistic regression models appear in graphical form in **Figure 3** for the regression-based and EFA-based measures of *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence* and *Fealty*.[33] Specifically, we plot the changes in predicted category probabilities when moving from the empirical 25th percentiles of President-Senate ideological divergence (for all four pivots of interest) to the empirical 75th percentiles.[34] The X-axes in the plots are the empirical distributions of *President-Senate Ideological Divergence*, conditional on the type of partisan regime and Senate pivot under analysis; the Y-axes correspond to the predicted differences in probabilities, with the vertical lines

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[32] For the *Fealty* scores using the OLS-based method, this decision rule classifies N = 154 as substitutes, N = 209 as complements, and N = 217 as neither. For the EFA-based method, the results predict N = 82 substitutes, N = 178 complements, and N = 320 as neither.

[33] Lumping together different types of substitutes (e.g., high degree of fealty and low degree of ideological proximity/shared preferences versus the opposite) and different types of complements (e.g., those situations where appointees possess high degrees of both versus low degrees of both) might be substantively problematic. Hence, in the ***Appendix*** the *Substitute* and *Complement* categories are disaggregated and subsequently estimated as a series of multinomial logit models (**Tables A-25** through **A-32**). These results suggest mild differences between the different types of substitutes and complements, but the overall inferences and patterns are similar to the main results.

[34] The predicted probability differences appearing in **Figure 3** are calculated by setting *President−Senate Ideological Divergence* and *Divided Government* at their specified values, setting the other variables to their means, and simulating the predicted probabilities of each category 10000 times. The median estimates are used as the point estimates, and the 2.5th, 5th, 95th, and 97.5th percentiles of the same are used as the 90% and 95% confidence intervals.

denoting 95% confidence intervals and the horizontal dashes corresponding to 90% intervals. Though the magnitudes of the estimates differ based upon measurement approach, they reveal strikingly similar patterns for each appointee type.

Figure 3: Predicted Changes in the Probabilities of Substitutes and Complements



The top row of **Figure 3** provides support for the *Substitution Hypothesis* (**H2**). As interbranch ideological conflict between the president and Senate increases from its empirical 25th percentile value to its 75th percentile value, the estimated probability of observing a substitute appointee type under divided government rises by between 4 and 15 percentage points, depending on the Senate pivot of interest and the procedure used to estimate *Fealty*; importantly, under all specifications, the 90% confidence intervals never

contain zero, and the 95% confidence intervals only contain zero when the committee median is the Senate pivot of interest. Under unified government, the estimated probabilities decrease from between 0.5 and 12 percentage points, though the confidence intervals contain zero for half of the pivot-estimator combinations. Taken together, presidents experiencing interbranch policy conflict with the Senate incur a noticeably lower level of executive appointee reliability when the political branches are split, as opposed to when a single party controls both institutions.[35]

The bottom row in **Figure 3** evaluates the *Complementarity Hypothesis* (**H1**), the results of which offer clear evidence of how interbranch policy conflict shapes executive appointee reliability through complementarities involving *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence* and *Fealty*. The leftmost panel in the bottom row suggests presidents can improve such complementarities under unified government as interbranch ideological policy conflict expands, though the positive conditional marginal effect patterns are inconsistent and subject to high degrees of variance depending on which Senate pivot is used to calculate ideological conflict. Yet, these complementarities fall rather sharply in response to surging interbranch ideological policy conflict in times of divided partisan control. The probability of observing a complementary appointee falls by between 9 and 20 percentage points, depending on which estimation approach is used, and no 90% confidence intervals contain zero (and the only 95% confidence intervals containing zero are for when the relevant committee median is used as the Senate pivot of interest).

These patterns provide compelling evidence in favor of the *Complementarity Hypothesis* (**H1**) since the probability of observing a complementary appointee type is

[35] Interestingly, the results for the *Neither* category are directionally similar to those for the *Substitutes* category and contrary to those for the *Complements* category.

declining at a considerably greater rate under divided partisan control of government vis-à-vis unified control of both institutions. That is, executive appointee reliability is more adversely affected under divided government than unified government in response to comparable variation in ideological policy conflict between the president and Senate.

Figure 4: Predicted Differences in Probabilities of Substitutes and Complements



An alternative view of the ordered logistic results is presented in **Figure 4**, which presents the differences in substitute versus complement probabilities when the ideological divergence between the President and the relevant Senate pivot is at the empirical 75th percentile (conditional on divided government status and pivot type) and subtracts from it the analogous difference when the relevant ideological divergence is at the 25th percentile. This analysis illustrates how the relative prevalence of substitutes versus complements is

affected by both ideological and partisan conflict. Positive values mean substitutes are relatively more common than complements at higher levels of ideological conflict, and negative values indicate the opposite; vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals, and the short horizontal lines mark 90% intervals. As can be seen in the rightmost panel of the figure, substitutes are *always* more common when higher levels of ideological conflict are present under divided government, regardless of Senate pivot choice or how *Fealty* is estimated. Effects range from between 14 and 36 percentage point change in favor of substitutes under divided government, whereas complements are more common under unified government, with a 2 to 46 percentage point change in favor of that appointee type, depending on the pivot and statistical method used, albeit estimated with less precision.

These findings provide additional evidence showing presidents' abilities to make reliable executive appointments are constrained through robust opposition by the Senate. This constraint not only separately impacts the likelihood of complementary and substitute agency leadership appointees with rising ideological policy disagreement under divided government, but also shifts the relative balance of appointees from one favoring complementarities in appointee loyalty to substitution between these attributes.

Discussion

Although the study of political appointments is primarily centered on ensuring both political and bureaucratic accountability (e.g., Bertelli and Lynn 2006; Moe 1985), often through effective efforts at centralization (e.g., Rudalevige 2002) and politicization (e.g., Lewis 2008) to achieve policy influence, presidents face obstacles for ensuring control over administrative governance. Responsive competence is a critical ingredient for effective

coordinated executive action, yet it is also important that presidents experience consistency regarding the policy responsiveness displayed by officials they are charged with appointing.

This study proposed a novel theory predicting when presidents are more (or less) inclined to have reliable agency appointees in their administration. Reliability is defined as the extent to which appointed officials' ideological proximity and fealty to the president exhibit consistency reflected by mutual reinforcement of these loyalty characteristics. This theory of executive appointee reliability posits Senates will undermine the responsiveness of executive administration by not only lowering the complementarity between an appointee's ideological proximity and fealty to the president, but also increasing the substitution between these characteristics. The Senate's efforts at undermining executive branch coordination via the appointment mechanism are most effective when policy and partisan disagreement with the president is most acute.

Empirical support is obtained for this theory based on a sample of 558 U.S. federal agency leadership appointments covering 38 agencies from the Reagan through the Bush II administrations. Although the magnitudes of the observed effects vary across empirical measures, nonparametric statistical analyses uncover substantive declines with respect to complementarities between an appointee's ideological proximity and fealty to the president for the full sample of appointees. Further statistical evidence obtained from ordered logistic models shows the probability of observing a substitution appointee type increases as ideological policy disagreement increases under divided government compared to modestly declining under unified government. Under these same institutional conditions, the probability of observing complementary appointee types falls under divided government while modestly rising under unified government.

The study of executive appointee reliability has broad implications for scholars studying topics ranging from policy delegation to administrative performance. For instance,

how can variations in appointee reliability affect a president's willingness to delegate authority to an agency? The willingness to delegate (or restrictions associated with delegated authority) is typically viewed as declining in an appointee's shared policy preferences consistent with the ally principle (e.g., Bohte and Wood 2004; Epstein and O'Halloran 1999; Huber and Shipan 2002, 2011). Yet presidents may actually prefer to delegate tasks to agencies requiring technical expertise (e.g., Gailmard and Patty 2012) or credible commitments to policymaking (Miller and Whitford 2016) to highly reliable low loyalty (i.e., one possessing both low levels of both ideological and non-ideological loyalty) types of executive appointee whose actions will be less affected by what the president wants compared to appointees exhibiting less consistency between ideological and non-ideological motivations. Relatedly, career officials can benefit from highly reliable appointees of either type, since information costs are reduced by careerists being more certain regarding the political direction (or lack thereof) emanating from political executives (Aberbach and Rockman 2000; Heclo 1977; Resh 2015). Future research on this topic has the potential of enhancing our understanding of how the executive branch can mitigate inherent coordination problems for purposes of achieving administrative coherence through alternative means like the appointments process, as opposed to those emanating from either politicization or centralization strategies.

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Supplementary Online Appendix for "Executive Appointee Reliability under Separated Powers: Presidential Loyalty Among Leaders of U.S. Federal Agencies"

This supplementary online appendix contains additional results and robustness checks not reported in the main text. **Tables A-1** through **A-4** report the average marginal effects from the KRLS models reported in the main text, and **Tables A-5** through **A-8** report the estimated quantiles thereof. Significance stars are presented in **Tables A-1** through **A-4**, though these may be somewhat misleading due to the high degrees of nonlinearity inherent in the KRLS estimation procedure; even if the *average* marginal effect is not significant, there may be regions of the parameter space where significance holds. As such, we encourage the reader to refer to the figures in the main text for the specific results of interest. Nonetheless, the consistent significance of *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence* in all models (that is, the average marginal effect of *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence* on *Fealty* is significant and negative in all models) indicates negative relationships between appointee ideological divergence and fealty, or positive relationships between ideological proximity and fealty, thus implying consistent complementarities, as discussed in the main paper. However, **Figure 1** also shows that these marginal effects are conditional on both partisan and ideological interbranch conflict, which are not picked up in the tables.

Tables A-11 through **A-14** present results aggregated from KRLS models fit on each of the 1,000 posterior estimates of *Fealty*. The presented point estimates are the mean estimates across all models, and the standard errors presented are the empirical standard errors across all models (conditional on divided government status and *Fealty* estimation procedure). With the exception of the EFA results for divided government, the results are quite comparable to those presented in **Tables A-1** through **A-8** and the main paper. This is further supported by the results in **Figures A-1** through **A-4**, which present the marginal effects of *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence* on *Fealty* for each of the 1,000 models. Though the EFA-based results display much more variance than the OLS-based results, the broader trends are still present—complementarities dominate in all models, but the strength of the complementarities decrease much more rapidly (in that the marginal effects increase) as *President-Senate Ideological Divergence* (regardless of which pivot is used to capture Senate preferences) increases under divided government than under unified government. That is, under unified government, the relationship between the marginal effect of *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence* and *President-Senate Ideological Divergence* is fairly stable (though perhaps a bit inconsistent), whereas it is generally positive under divided government. These results support those presented in the main text as well as those in **Tables A-1** through **A-8**.

The ordered logistic results discussed in the main text are presented in **Tables A-9** and **A-10**, and those based on the aggregated results of models presented on each posterior estimate of *Fealty* are presented in **Tables A-15** and **A-16**. As indicated by the shading in the table, the key coefficients are the interaction terms between *President-Senate Ideological Divergence* (depending on which pivot is used) and *Divided Government*. These are negative in *all* models (except for the model in **Table A-10** that is based on the

committee median and uses the mean EFA-based score), which suggests that, under divided government, higher degrees of ideological divergence between the president and the Senate are associated with higher probabilities of substitutive-type appointees (and lower probabilities of complementary types), which is entirely consistent with our main hypotheses. Additionally, **Figure A-5** presents a version of **Figure 4** from the main text that is instead based on the 1,000 models estimated on the individual posterior estimates, and the results are substantively similar compared to those presented in the main text.

Finally, **Tables A-17** through **A-20** relax the underlying ordered assumption of the substitute-complement scale and disaggregate appointee into five different types—high fealty/low ideological proximity, low fealty/high ideological proximity, low fealty/low ideological proximity, high fealty/high ideological proximity, and the baseline of "neither substitute nor complement." While these results show some heterogeneity across appointee types, they are broadly consistent with our ordered logit results, with less complementarity and more substitution under high levels of interbranch conflict. For example, **Table A-17** suggests that when the Senate median and/or filibuster pivot are used as the pivots of interest, the interaction term between *President-Senate Ideological Divergence* and *Divided Government* is negative, but only for the *Both High* category of complement-type appointees. This indicates that interbranch conflict is associated with lower rates of certain types of complementary-type appointees, consistent with ***Hypothesis 1***. Conversely, when the committee chair and/or committee median are used as the pivots of interest, the interaction term between *President-Senate Ideological Divergence* and *Divided Government* is positive, but only for the *Low Fealty/High Ideological Proximity* category of substitute-type appointees, which suggests that interbranch conflict is associated with higher levels of substitution-type appointees, consistent with ***Hypothesis 2***. The analogous results for the

multinomial logistic models based on the EFA-type *Fealty* estimates (**Tables A-19** and **A-20**) provide substantively similar conclusions, though we find no effect when the committee median is the pivot of interest.

Overall, however, the results in this **Appendix** provide evidence that our results in the main text are robust to different empirical and estimation strategies, subject to the aforementioned caveats.

Table A-1: Kernel Regularized Least Squares Model Estimates
(Senate Median as Pivot of Interest; Average Marginal Effects)

	OLS-Based Scores		***EFA-Based Score***	
	Unified Gov't	**Divided Gov't**	**Unified Gov't**	**Divided Gov't**
President-Appointee Ideological Divergence	-0.034***	-0.036***	-0.130***	-0.134***
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.023)	(0.027)
President-Senate Median Ideological Divergence	0.014	0.013	0.021	0.023
	(0.010)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.049)
Senate Polarization	0.008	-0.007	0.018	-0.010
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	-0.006	0.043	-0.007	0.094
	(0.047)	(0.043)	(0.078)	(0.078)
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	0.030	0.011	0.040	0.024
	(0.048)	(0.044)	(0.080)	(0.079)
Priority Agency	-0.007	-0.004	-0.006	-0.001
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Supervisory Position	0.152***	0.179***	0.287***	0.312***
	(0.050)	(0.047)	(0.081)	(0.082)
Presidential Approval	0.002	-0.001	0.002	-0.003
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Congress	-0.001	0.001	-0.002	0.006
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.006)
R^2	0.163	0.141	0.310	0.251
Number of Observations	257	301	257	301

Note: The KRLS approach allows for complex interactions between all predictors in the model. The dependent variable, *Fealty*, is the mean value across 1,000 draws from the posterior distribution. Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1

Table A-2: Kernel Regularized Least Squares Model Estimates
(Filibuster Pivot as Pivot of Interest; Average Marginal Effects)

	OLS-Based Scores		***EFA-Based Scores***	
	Unified Gov't	***Divided Gov't***	***Unified Gov't***	***Divided Gov't***
President-Appointee Ideological Divergence	-0.035***	-0.036***	-0.130***	-0.112***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.023)	(0.022)
President-Filibuster Pivot Ideological Divergence	0.006*	0.002	0.011	-0.004
	(0.004)	(0.019)	(0.007)	(0.032)
Senate Polarization	0.010	-0.011	0.020	-0.013
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.014)

	OLS-Based Scores		***EFA-Based Scores***	
	Unified Gov't	***Divided Gov't***	***Unified Gov't***	***Divided Gov't***
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	-0.005	0.038	-0.006	0.082
	(0.047)	(0.043)	(0.079)	(0.070)
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	0.030	0.011	0.041	0.018
	(0.048)	(0.044)	(0.081)	(0.071)
Priority Agency	-0.007	-0.003	-0.006	-0.000
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.009)
Supervisory Position	0.156***	0.179***	0.291***	0.280***
	(0.050)	(0.047)	(0.082)	(0.075)
Presidential Approval	0.002	-0.001	0.003	-0.003
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Congress	-0.002	0.000	-0.003	0.003
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.004)
R^2	0.161	0.143	0.307	0.220
Number of Observations	257	301	257	301

Note: The KRLS approach allows for complex interactions between all predictors in the model. The dependent variable, *Fealty*, is the mean value across 1,000 draws from the posterior distribution. Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1

Table A-3: Kernel Regularized Least Squares Model Estimates
(Committee Chair as Pivot of Interest; Average Marginal Effects)

	OLS-Based Scores		***EFA-Based Scores***	
	Unified Gov't	***Divided Gov't***	***Unified Gov't***	***Divided Gov't***
President-Appointee Ideological Divergence	-0.039***	-0.049***	-0.159***	-0.140***
	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.025)	(0.027)
President-Committee Chair Ideological Divergence	0.019**	-0.013	0.042*	-0.017
	(0.009)	(0.017)	(0.023)	(0.028)
Senate Polarization	0.003	-0.014	0.011	-0.017
	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.020)	(0.016)
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	-0.016	0.061	-0.016	0.110
	(0.047)	(0.050)	(0.083)	(0.077)
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	0.042	0.013	0.062	0.018
	(0.048)	(0.050)	(0.085)	(0.077)
Priority Agency	-0.012**	-0.008	-0.013	-0.005
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Supervisory Position	0.133**	0.188***	0.255***	0.289***
	(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.087)	(0.082)
Presidential Approval	0.001	-0.001	0.002	-0.003
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Congress	-0.002	0.000	-0.002	0.005
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.009)	(0.006)
R^2	0.157	0.177	0.331	0.265
Number of Observations	237	298	237	298

Note: The KRLS approach allows for complex interactions between all predictors in the model. The dependent variable, *Fealty*, is the mean value across 1,000 draws from the posterior distribution. Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1

Table A-4: Kernel Regularized Least Squares Model Estimates
(Committee Median as Pivot of Interest; Average Marginal Effects)

	OLS-Based Scores		***EFA-Based Scores***	
	Unified Gov't	***Divided Gov't***	***Unified Gov't***	***Divided Gov't***
President-Appointee Ideological Divergence	-0.038***	-0.039***	-0.167***	-0.118***
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.026)	(0.022)
President-Committee Median Ideological Divergence	0.019	-0.031*	0.032	-0.040
	(0.012)	(0.018)	(0.029)	(0.031)

	OLS-Based Scores		*EFA-Based Scores*	
	Unified Gov't	***Divided Gov't***	***Unified Gov't***	***Divided Gov't***
Senate Polarization	0.005	-0.012	0.016	-0.015
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.021)	(0.014)
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	-0.019	0.050	-0.019	0.095
	(0.046)	(0.043)	(0.084)	(0.070)
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	0.040	0.010	0.062	0.013
	(0.047)	(0.043)	(0.085)	(0.070)
Priority Agency	-0.011*	-0.005	-0.014	-0.002
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.012)	(0.009)
Supervisory Position	0.126**	0.160***	0.250***	0.259***
	(0.050)	(0.047)	(0.087)	(0.075)
Presidential Approval	0.001	-0.001	0.001	-0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Congress	0.000	0.001	0.005	0.005
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.005)
R^2	0.161	0.140	0.354	0.223
Number of Observations	237	298	237	298

Note: The KRLS approach allows for complex interactions between all predictors in the model. The dependent variable, *Fealty*, is the mean value across 1,000 draws from the posterior distribution. Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests:
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1

Table A-5: Kernel Regularized Least Squares Model Estimates
(Senate Median as Pivot of Interest; Average Marginal Effects)

	OLS-Based Scores		*EFA-Based Scores*	
	Unified Gov't	**Divided Gov't**	**Unified Gov't**	**Divided Gov't**
President-Appointee Ideological Divergence	-0.034	-0.037	-0.102	-0.083
	[-0.049; -0.024]	[-0.053; -0.021]	[-0.174; -0.048]	[-0.168; -0.026]
President-Senate Median Ideological Divergence	0.013	0.010	0.014	0.007
	[0.001; 0.025]	[-0.013; 0.031]	[-0.006; 0.040]	[-0.038; 0.063]
Senate Polarization	0.009	-0.005	0.015	-0.003
	[-0.003; 0.021]	[-0.017; 0.005]	[-0.006; 0.040]	[-0.023; 0.013]
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	-0.006	0.041	-0.004	0.061
	[-0.037; 0.022]	[0.014; 0.067]	[-0.075; 0.065]	[0.006; 0.139]
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	0.037	0.001	0.032	0.004
	[0.005; 0.058]	[-0.012; 0.040]	[-0.042; 0.114]	[-0.043; 0.068]
Priority Agency	-0.008	-0.004	-0.004	-0.000
	[-0.014; -0.001]	[-0.010; 0.002]	[-0.018; 0.008]	[-0.011; 0.011]
Supervisory Position	0.142	0.185	0.240	0.231
	[0.101; 0.198]	[0.131; 0.231]	[0.135; 0.362]	[0.126; 0.343]
Presidential Approval	0.002	-0.001	0.002	-0.002
	[-0.001; 0.004]	[-0.002; -0.000]	[-0.002; 0.007]	[-0.005; 0.000]
Congress	-0.001	0.002	0.000	0.002
	[-0.004; 0.002]	[-0.002; 0.005]	[-0.009; 0.007]	[-0.004; 0.012]
R^2	0.166	0.141	0.212	0.155
Number of Observations	257	301	257	301

Note: The KRLS approach allows for complex interactions between all predictors in the model. The dependent variable, *Fealty*, is the mean value across 1,000 draws from the posterior distribution. The point estimates listed above are the median marginal effects, and the intervals directly beneath are denoted by the 25th and 75th percentiles of the same.

Table A-6: Kernel Regularized Least Squares Model Estimates
(Filibuster Pivot as Pivot of Interest; Average Marginal Effects)

	OLS-Based Scores		*EFA-Based Scores*	
	Unified Gov't	**Divided Gov't**	**Unified Gov't**	**Divided Gov't**
President-Appointee Ideological Divergence	-0.035	-0.038	-0.101	-0.084
	[-0.049; -0.024]	[-0.055; -0.021]	[-0.173; -0.047]	[-0.167; -0.027]
President-Filibuster Pivot Ideological Divergence	0.006	-0.001	0.008	-0.002

	OLS-Based Scores		***EFA-Based Scores***	
	Unified Gov't	**Divided Gov't**	**Unified Gov't**	**Divided Gov't**
	[0.001; 0.011]	[-0.024; 0.025]	[-0.001; 0.020]	[-0.047; 0.039]
Senate Polarization	0.009	-0.008	0.016	-0.006
	[-0.001; 0.023]	[-0.022; 0.002]	[-0.005; 0.043]	[-0.030; 0.010]
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	-0.006	0.039	-0.003	0.058
	[-0.035; 0.022]	[0.012; 0.062]	[-0.075; 0.066]	[0.003; 0.136]
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	0.038	0.004	0.033	0.004
	[0.007; 0.058]	[-0.012; 0.040]	[-0.040; 0.115]	[-0.043; 0.068]
Priority Agency	-0.008	-0.004	-0.004	0.000
	[-0.014; -0.000]	[-0.009; 0.002]	[-0.018; 0.008]	[-0.010; 0.011]
Supervisory Position	0.145	0.188	0.244	0.234
	[0.105; 0.202]	[0.135; 0.233]	[0.139; 0.365]	[0.129; 0.344]
Presidential Approval	0.002	-0.001	0.002	-0.002
	[-0.000; 0.005]	[-0.002; -0.000]	[-0.002; 0.008]	[-0.005; 0.000]
Congress	-0.001	0.000	-0.000	0.001
	[-0.005; 0.002]	[-0.003; 0.004]	[-0.011; 0.007]	[-0.004; 0.010]
R2	0.163	0.142	0.208	0.158
Number of Observations	257	301	257	301

Note: The KRLS approach allows for complex interactions between all predictors in the model. The dependent variable, *Fealty*, is the mean value across 1,000 draws from the posterior distribution. The point estimates listed above are the median marginal effects, and the intervals directly beneath are denoted by the 25th and 75th percentiles of the same.

Table A-7: Kernel Regularized Least Squares Model Estimates
(Committee Chair as Pivot of Interest; Average Marginal Effects)

	OLS-Based Scores		***EFA-Based Scores***	
	Unified Gov't	**Divided Gov't**	**Unified Gov't**	**Divided Gov't**
President-Appointee Ideological Divergence	-0.038	-0.048	-0.111	-0.088
	[-0.051; -0.026]	[-0.069; -0.025]	[-0.184; -0.054]	[-0.180; -0.029]
President-Committee Chair Ideological Divergence	0.018	-0.012	0.024	-0.009
	[0.011; 0.026]	[-0.042; 0.013]	[0.004; 0.049]	[-0.055; 0.024]
Senate Polarization	0.005	-0.010	0.010	-0.006
	[-0.006; 0.013]	[-0.028; 0.005]	[-0.011; 0.035]	[-0.031; 0.012]
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	-0.001	0.001	0.000	0.002
	[-0.005; 0.001]	[-0.004; 0.005]	[-0.009; 0.008]	[-0.004; 0.011]
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	0.125	0.187	0.206	0.225
	[0.085; 0.174]	[0.134; 0.236]	[0.104; 0.317]	[0.124; 0.331]
Priority Agency	-0.019	0.054	-0.015	0.074
	[-0.034; -0.001]	[0.023; 0.085]	[-0.079; 0.043]	[0.012; 0.154]
Supervisory Position	0.046	0.006	0.047	0.002
	[0.021; 0.067]	[-0.020; 0.046]	[-0.019; 0.128]	[-0.050; 0.067]
Presidential Approval	-0.012	-0.008	-0.009	-0.002
	[-0.018; -0.006]	[-0.014; -0.001]	[-0.023; 0.002]	[-0.014; 0.009]
Congress	0.001	-0.001	0.001	-0.001
	[-0.001; 0.003]	[-0.003; 0.000]	[-0.003; 0.006]	[-0.005; 0.001]
R2	0.156	0.176	0.212	0.169
Number of Observations	237	298	237	298

Note: The KRLS approach allows for complex interactions between all predictors in the model. The dependent variable, *Fealty*, is the mean value across 1,000 draws from the posterior distribution. The point estimates listed above are the median marginal effects, and the intervals directly beneath are denoted by the 25th and 75th percentiles of the same.

Table A-8: Kernel Regularized Least Squares Model Estimates
(Committee Median as Pivot of Interest; Average Marginal Effects)

	OLS-Based Scores		***EFA-Based Scores***	
	Unified Gov't	**Divided Gov't**	**Unified Gov't**	**Divided Gov't**
President-Appointee Ideological Divergence	-0.040	-0.042	-0.120	-0.083

	OLS-Based Scores		*EFA-Based Scores*	
	Unified Gov't	**Divided Gov't**	**Unified Gov't**	**Divided Gov't**
	[-0.052; -0.027]	[-0.056; -0.024]	[-0.197; -0.058]	[-0.172; -0.027]
President-Committee Median Ideological Divergence	0.019	-0.029	0.019	-0.022
	[0.003; 0.034]	[-0.045; -0.016]	[-0.011; 0.061]	[-0.068; 0.006]
Senate Polarization	0.005	-0.010	0.013	-0.006
	[-0.004; 0.015]	[-0.024; 0.002]	[-0.010; 0.042]	[-0.029; 0.009]
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	-0.022	0.043	-0.017	0.065
	[-0.038; -0.002]	[0.019; 0.073]	[-0.086; 0.045]	[0.012; 0.138]
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	0.045	0.007	0.048	0.001
	[0.018; 0.069]	[-0.021; 0.040]	[-0.023; 0.134]	[-0.050; 0.062]
Priority Agency	-0.012	-0.005	-0.009	-0.001
	[-0.017; -0.005]	[-0.009; -0.001]	[-0.024; 0.003]	[-0.011; 0.008]
Supervisory Position	0.119	0.165	0.204	0.210
	[0.078; 0.173]	[0.120; 0.203]	[0.092; 0.327]	[0.116; 0.309]
Presidential Approval	0.001	-0.001	0.001	-0.001
	[-0.002; 0.003]	[-0.002; -0.000]	[-0.004; 0.005]	[-0.004; 0.000]
Congress	0.001	0.001	0.003	0.002
	[-0.003; 0.004]	[-0.003; 0.005]	[-0.005; 0.012]	[-0.003; 0.011]
R2	0.161	0.140	0.232	0.152
Number of Observations	237	298	237	298

Note: The KRLS approach allows for complex interactions between all predictors in the model. The dependent variable, *Fealty*, is the mean value across 1,000 draws from the posterior distribution. The point estimates listed above are the median marginal effects, and the intervals directly beneath are denoted by the 25th and 75th percentiles of the same.

Table A-9: Ordered Logit Model Estimates
(Senate Median and Filibuster Pivots as Pivots of Interest)

	Senate Median		**Filibuster Pivot**	
	OLS-Based Scores	**EFA-Based Scores**	**OLS-Based Scores**	**EFA-Based Scores**
President-Senate Median Ideological Divergence	0.474**	0.455*	---	---
	(0.236)	(0.245)		
President-Filibuster Pivot Ideological Divergence	---	---	1.519**	1.523**
			(0.674)	(0.692)
Senate Polarization	-0.669*	-1.248***	-2.713**	-3.341***
	(0.355)	(0.367)	(1.249)	(1.280)
Divided Government	-0.025	-0.101	-1.039**	-1.115**
	(0.318)	(0.331)	(0.527)	(0.543)
President-Senate Median Ideological Divergence × Divided Government	-1.469***	-1.389***	---	---
	(0.386)	(0.393)		
President-Filibuster Pivot Ideological Divergence × Divided Government	---	---	-2.287***	-2.252***
			(0.731)	(0.747)
Senate Polarization × Divided Government	0.351	0.581	2.736**	2.986**
	(0.345)	(0.361)	(1.226)	(1.260)
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	-0.044	-0.214	-0.043	-0.216
	(0.204)	(0.214)	(0.204)	(0.215)
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	-0.215	-0.413*	-0.221	-0.419*
	(0.211)	(0.220)	(0.211)	(0.221)
Supervisory Position	-0.066	-0.200	-0.069	-0.203
	(0.167)	(0.177)	(0.167)	(0.178)
Priority Agency	-0.096***	-0.109***	-0.096***	-0.110***
	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.037)
Presidential Approval	-0.006	-0.012	-0.009	-0.014
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Congress	0.040***	0.219***	0.010	0.193***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Cutpoint 1	2.051***	19.455***	-1.882***	16.002***

	Senate Median		Filibuster Pivot	
	OLS-Based Scores	**EFA-Based Scores**	**OLS-Based Scores**	**EFA-Based Scores**
	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.121)	(0.127)
Cutpoint 2	3.703***	22.188***	-0.220	18.750***
	(0.102)	(0.138)	(0.152)	(0.180)
AIC	1217.850	1077.776	1213.696	1073.788
BIC	1274.067	1133.993	1269.912	1130.004
Log Likelihood	-595.925	-525.888	-593.848	-523.894
Likelihood Ratio Test	22.092**	32.208***	26.246***	36.196***
Likelihood Ratio Test of Significance of *Divided Gov't*	9.798	23.003***	10.924	25.287***
Score Test	11.749	16.635	13.609	17.557*
Number of Observations	558	558	558	558

Note: Ordered logistic coefficients presented; the dependent variable (*Trait Relationship*) is coded as -1 if *Fealty* and *Shared Preferences* are substitutes, 1 if they are complements, and 0 if they are neither. The Likelihood Ratio Test of the significance of *Divided Government* examines the null hypothesis that *Divided Government* and its interaction terms are zero against the alternative that the additional terms provide significantly more explanatory power. The Score Test examines the null hypothesis that the parallel trends assumptions holds against the alternative that different coefficients are needed for different values of the dependent variable. Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.

Table A-10: Ordered Logit Model Estimates
(Committee Chair and Committee Median as Pivots of Interest)

	Committee Chair		Committee Median	
	OLS-Based Scores	**EFA-Based Scores**	**OLS-Based Scores**	**EFA-Based Scores**
President-Committee Chair Ideological Divergence	0.298	0.355	---	---
	(0.270)	(0.286)		
President-Committee Median Ideological Divergence	---	---	0.153	0.029
			(0.173)	(0.182)
Senate Polarization	-0.164	-0.957**	0.232	-0.264
	(0.437)	(0.465)	(0.262)	(0.276)
Divided Government	-0.303	-0.431	-0.192	-0.150
	(0.256)	(0.272)	(0.239)	(0.254)
President-Committee Chair Ideological Divergence × Divided Government	-0.829***	-0.894***	---	---
	(0.313)	(0.331)		
President-Committee Median Ideological Divergence × Divided Government	---	---	-0.436*	-0.338
			(0.248)	(0.260)
Senate Polarization × Divided Government	0.328	0.697	0.106	0.246
	(0.437)	(0.466)	(0.276)	(0.291)
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	-0.032	-0.183	-0.103	-0.260
	(0.212)	(0.223)	(0.208)	(0.221)
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	-0.208	-0.403*	-0.235	-0.431*
	(0.217)	(0.227)	(0.216)	(0.228)
Supervisory Position	0.034	-0.086	0.060	-0.060
	(0.175)	(0.186)	(0.174)	(0.185)
Priority Agency	-0.085**	-0.103***	-0.073**	-0.094**
	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.037)
Presidential Approval	-0.003	-0.008	0.001	-0.004
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)

	Committee Chair		Committee Median	
	OLS-Based Scores	**EFA-Based Scores**	**OLS-Based Scores**	**EFA-Based Scores**
Congress	-0.088***	0.114***	-0.126***	0.054***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Cutpoint 1	-11.017***	8.677***	-14.597***	2.889***
	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Cutpoint 2	-9.331***	11.534***	-12.940***	5.697***
	(0.106)	(0.148)	(0.103)	(0.145)
AIC	1160.378	1011.212	1172.259	1022.208
BIC	1216.048	1066.881	1227.928	1077.877
Log Likelihood	-567.189	-492.606	-573.129	-498.104
Likelihood Ratio Test	27.546***	43.397***	15.665	32.401***
Likelihood Ratio Test of Significance of *Divided Gov't*	16.973**	35.435***	12.265	30.730***
Score Test	9.602	12.581	11.073	13.873
Number of Observations	535	535	535	535

Note: Ordered logistic coefficients presented; the dependent variable (*Trait Relationship*) is coded as -1 if *Fealty* and *Ideological Proximity*/*Shared Preferences* are substitutes, 1 if they are complements, and 0 if they are neither. The Likelihood Ratio Test of the significance of *Divided Government* examines the null hypothesis that *Divided Government* and its interaction terms are zero against the alternative that the additional terms provide significantly more explanatory power. The Score Test examines the null hypothesis that the parallel trends assumptions holds against the alternative that different coefficients are needed for different values of the dependent variable. Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.

Table A-11: Kernel Regularized Least Squares Model Estimates
(Senate Median and Filibuster Pivots as Pivots of Interest; Models Estimated on Individual Posterior Estimates)

	SENATE MEDIAN				***FILIBUSTER PIVOT***			
	OLS-Based Scores		***EFA-Based Scores***		***OLS-Based Scores***		***EFA-Based Scores***	
	Unified Gov't	**Divided Gov't**	**Unified Gov't**	**Divided Gov't**	**Unified Gov't**	**Divided Gov't**	**Unified Gov't**	**Divided Gov't**
President-Appointee Ideological Divergence	-0.036*** (0.005)	-0.036*** (0.005)	-0.118* (0.061)	-0.105 (0.070)	-0.036*** (0.005)	-0.037*** (0.005)	-0.118* (0.061)	-0.105 (0.069)
President-Senate Median Ideological Divergence	0.014*** (0.002)	0.014*** (0.003)	0.018 (0.018)	0.013 (0.037)	---	---	---	---
President-Filibuster Pivot Ideological Divergence	---	---	---	---	0.007*** (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)	0.010 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.029)
Senate Polarization	0.008*** (0.001)	-0.007*** (0.001)	0.017 (0.017)	-0.005 (0.012)	0.010*** (0.002)	-0.012*** (0.002)	0.019 (0.017)	-0.011 (0.013)
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	-0.006 (0.004)	0.043*** (0.006)	-0.006 (0.051)	0.075 (0.049)	-0.005 (0.004)	0.038*** (0.005)	-0.005 (0.051)	0.071 (0.048)
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	0.030*** (0.005)	0.011*** (0.003)	0.038 (0.051)	0.017 (0.046)	0.031*** (0.005)	0.012*** (0.003)	0.038 (0.051)	0.016 (0.046)
Priority Agency	-0.008*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.005 (0.010)	0.001 (0.009)	-0.008*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.005 (0.010)	0.001 (0.009)
Supervisory Position	0.156*** (0.022)	0.180*** (0.022)	0.254*** (0.075)	0.243** (0.096)	0.159*** (0.022)	0.182*** (0.023)	0.258*** (0.076)	0.244** (0.095)
Presidential Approval	0.002*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	0.002*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	0.003 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)
Congress	-0.001** (0.001)	0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.004 (0.006)	-0.002*** (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.003 (0.006)	0.003 (0.005)
R^2	0.166	0.141	0.212	0.155	0.163	0.142	0.208	0.158
Number of Observations	257	301	257	301	257	301	257	301

Note: The KRLS approach allows for complex interactions between all predictors in the model. Standard errors in parentheses. Models are initially estimated on each of 1,000 posterior estimates of the dependent variable (as the dependent variable, *Fealty*, is initially estimated via a series of indicators); the listed coefficients are the mean estimates across all models and the indicated standard errors are the empirical standard deviations thereof. Two-tailed z-tests: $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table A-12: Kernel Regularized Least Squares Model Estimates
(Committee Chair and Committee Median as Pivots of Interest; Models Estimated on Individual Posterior Estimates)

	COMMITTEE CHAIR				***COMMITTEE MEDIAN***			
	OLS-Based Scores		***EFA-Based Scores***		***OLS-Based Scores***		***EFA-Based Scores***	
	Unified Gov't	**Divided Gov't**	**Unified Gov't**	**Divided Gov't**	**Unified Gov't**	**Divided Gov't**	**Unified Gov't**	**Divided Gov't**
President-Appointee Ideological Divergence	-0.038***	-0.046***	-0.126**	-0.114	-0.039***	-0.039***	-0.135**	-0.107
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.064)	(0.074)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.067)	(0.070)
President-Committee Chair Ideological Divergence	0.019***	-0.013***	0.028	-0.013	---	---	---	---
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.019)	(0.023)				
President-Committee Median Ideological Divergence	---	---	---	---	0.020***	-0.031***	0.027	-0.031
					(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.026)	(0.031)
Senate Polarization	0.003**	-0.013***	0.012	-0.010	0.005***	-0.012***	0.016	-0.011
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.019)	(0.014)
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	-0.016***	0.059***	-0.016	0.090*	-0.019***	0.050***	-0.018	0.082
	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.051)	(0.054)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.053)	(0.050)
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	0.041***	0.012***	0.055	0.013	0.040***	0.010***	0.055	0.010
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.052)	(0.047)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.054)	(0.044)
Priority Agency	-0.012***	-0.008***	-0.010	-0.003	-0.011***	-0.005***	-0.011	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.011)	(0.008)
Supervisory Position	0.131***	0.182***	0.216***	0.234***	0.128***	0.159***	0.214***	0.219***
	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.073)	(0.087)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.074)	(0.084)
Presidential Approval	0.001***	-0.001***	0.001	-0.002	0.001***	-0.001***	0.001	-0.002
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Congress	-0.002***	0.000	-0.001	0.004	0.000	0.001*	0.003	0.004
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.006)	(0.006)
R^2	0.156	0.176	0.212	0.169	0.161	0.140	0.232	0.152
Number of Observations	237	298	237	298	237	298	237	298

Note: The KRLS approach allows for complex interactions between all predictors in the model. Standard errors in parentheses. Models are initially estimated on each of 1,000 posterior estimates of the dependent variable (as the dependent variable, *Fealty*, is initially estimated via a series of indicators); the listed coefficients are the mean estimates across all models and the indicated standard errors are the empirical standard deviations thereof. Two-tailed z-tests: $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table A-13: Kernel Regularized Least Squares Model Estimates
(Quartiles of Marginal Effects; Senate Median and Filibuster Pivot as Pivots of Interest; Models Estimated on Individual Posterior Estimates)

	SENATE MEDIAN				***FILIBUSTER PIVOT***			
	OLS-Based Scores		***EFA-Based Scores***		***OLS-Based Scores***		***EFA-Based Scores***	
	Unified Gov't	**Divided Gov't**	**Unified Gov't**	**Divided Gov't**	**Unified Gov't**	**Divided Gov't**	**Unified Gov't**	**Divided Gov't**
President-Appointee Ideological Divergence	-0.034 [-0.049; -0.024]	-0.037 [-0.053; -0.021]	-0.102 [-0.174; -0.048]	-0.083 [-0.168; -0.026]	-0.035 [-0.049; -0.024]	-0.038 [-0.055; -0.021]	-0.101 [-0.173; -0.047]	-0.084 [-0.167; -0.027]
President-Senate Median Ideological Divergence	0.013 [0.001; 0.025]	0.010 [-0.013; 0.031]	0.014 [-0.006; 0.040]	0.007 [-0.038; 0.063]	---	---	---	---
President-Filibuster Pivot Ideological Divergence	---	---	---	---	0.006 [0.001; 0.011]	-0.001 [-0.024; 0.025]	0.008 [-0.001; 0.020]	-0.002 [-0.047; 0.039]
Senate Polarization	0.009 [-0.003; 0.021]	-0.005 [-0.017; 0.005]	0.015 [-0.006; 0.040]	-0.003 [-0.023; 0.013]	0.009 [-0.001; 0.023]	-0.008 [-0.022; 0.002]	0.016 [-0.005; 0.043]	-0.006 [-0.030; 0.010]
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	-0.006 [-0.037; 0.022]	0.041 [0.014; 0.067]	-0.004 [-0.075; 0.065]	0.061 [0.006; 0.139]	-0.006 [-0.035; 0.022]	0.039 [0.012; 0.062]	-0.003 [-0.075; 0.066]	0.058 [0.003; 0.136]
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	0.037 [0.005; 0.058]	0.001 [-0.012; 0.040]	0.032 [-0.042; 0.114]	0.004 [-0.043; 0.068]	0.038 [0.007; 0.058]	0.004 [-0.012; 0.040]	0.033 [-0.040; 0.115]	0.004 [-0.043; 0.068]
Priority Agency	-0.008 [-0.014; -0.001]	-0.004 [-0.010; 0.002]	-0.004 [-0.018; 0.008]	-0.000 [-0.011; 0.011]	-0.008 [-0.014; -0.000]	-0.004 [-0.009; 0.002]	-0.004 [-0.018; 0.008]	0.000 [-0.010; 0.011]
Supervisory Position	0.142 [0.101; 0.198]	0.185 [0.131; 0.231]	0.240 [0.135; 0.362]	0.231 [0.126; 0.343]	0.145 [0.105; 0.202]	0.188 [0.135; 0.233]	0.244 [0.139; 0.365]	0.234 [0.129; 0.344]
Presidential Approval	0.002 [-0.001; 0.004]	-0.001 [-0.002; -0.000]	0.002 [-0.002; 0.007]	-0.002 [-0.005; 0.000]	0.002 [-0.000; 0.005]	-0.001 [-0.002; -0.000]	0.002 [-0.002; 0.008]	-0.002 [-0.005; 0.000]
Congress	-0.001 [-0.004; 0.002]	0.002 [-0.002; 0.005]	0.000 [-0.009; 0.007]	0.002 [-0.004; 0.012]	-0.001 [-0.005; 0.002]	0.000 [-0.003; 0.004]	-0.000 [-0.011; 0.007]	0.001 [-0.004; 0.010]
R^2	0.166	0.141	0.212	0.155	0.163	0.142	0.208	0.158
Number of Observations	257	301	257	301	257	301	257	301

Note: The KRLS approach allows for complex interactions between all predictors in the model. The dependent variable, *Fealty*, is the mean value across 1,000 draws from the posterior distribution. The point estimates listed above are the median marginal effects, and the intervals directly beneath are denoted by the 25th and 75th percentiles of the same. Fit statistics are medians.

Table A-14: Kernel Regularized Least Squares Model Estimates
(Quartiles of Marginal Effects; Committee Chair and Committee Median as Pivots of Interest; Models Estimated on Individual Posterior Estimates)

	COMMITTEE CHAIR				***COMMITTEE MEDIAN***			
	OLS-Based Scores		***EFA-Based Scores***		***OLS-Based Scores***		***EFA-Based Scores***	
	Unified Gov't	**Divided Gov't**	**Unified Gov't**	**Divided Gov't**	**Unified Gov't**	**Divided Gov't**	**Unified Gov't**	**Divided Gov't**
President-Appointee Ideological Divergence	-0.038 [-0.051; -0.026]	-0.048 [-0.069; -0.025]	-0.111 [-0.184; -0.054]	-0.088 [-0.180; -0.029]	-0.040 [-0.052; -0.027]	-0.042 [-0.056; -0.024]	-0.120 [-0.197; -0.058]	-0.083 [-0.172; -0.027]
President-Committee Chair Ideological Divergence	0.018 [0.011; 0.026]	-0.012 [-0.042; 0.013]	0.024 [0.004; 0.049]	-0.009 [-0.055; 0.024]	---	---	---	---
President-Committee Median Ideological Divergence	---	---	---	---	0.019 [0.003; 0.034]	-0.029 [-0.045; -0.016]	0.019 [-0.011; 0.061]	-0.022 [-0.068; 0.006]
Senate Polarization	0.005 [-0.006; 0.013]	-0.010 [-0.028; 0.005]	0.010 [-0.011; 0.035]	-0.006 [-0.031; 0.012]	0.005 [-0.004; 0.015]	-0.010 [-0.024; 0.002]	0.013 [-0.010; 0.042]	-0.006 [-0.029; 0.009]
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	-0.019 [-0.034; -0.001]	0.054 [0.023; 0.085]	-0.015 [-0.079; 0.043]	0.074 [0.012; 0.154]	-0.022 [-0.038; -0.002]	0.043 [0.019; 0.073]	-0.017 [-0.086; 0.045]	0.065 [0.012; 0.138]
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	0.046 [0.021; 0.067]	0.006 [-0.020; 0.046]	0.047 [-0.019; 0.128]	0.002 [-0.050; 0.067]	0.045 [0.018; 0.069]	0.007 [-0.021; 0.040]	0.048 [-0.023; 0.134]	0.001 [-0.050; 0.062]
Priority Agency	-0.012 [-0.018; -0.006]	-0.008 [-0.014; -0.001]	-0.009 [-0.023; 0.002]	-0.002 [-0.014; 0.009]	-0.012 [-0.017; -0.005]	-0.005 [-0.009; -0.001]	-0.009 [-0.024; 0.003]	-0.001 [-0.011; 0.008]
Supervisory Position	0.125 [0.085; 0.174]	0.187 [0.134; 0.236]	0.206 [0.104; 0.317]	0.225 [0.124; 0.331]	0.119 [0.078; 0.173]	0.165 [0.120; 0.203]	0.204 [0.092; 0.327]	0.210 [0.116; 0.309]
Presidential Approval	0.001 [-0.001; 0.003]	-0.001 [-0.003; 0.000]	0.001 [-0.003; 0.006]	-0.001 [-0.005; 0.001]	0.001 [-0.002; 0.003]	-0.001 [-0.002; -0.000]	0.001 [-0.004; 0.005]	-0.001 [-0.004; 0.000]
Congress	-0.001 [-0.005; 0.001]	0.001 [-0.004; 0.005]	0.000 [-0.009; 0.008]	0.002 [-0.004; 0.011]	0.001 [-0.003; 0.004]	0.001 [-0.003; 0.005]	0.003 [-0.005; 0.012]	0.002 [-0.003; 0.011]
R^2	0.156	0.176	0.212	0.169	0.161	0.140	0.232	0.152
Number of Observations	237	298	237	298	237	298	237	298

Note: The KRLS approach allows for complex interactions between all predictors in the model. The dependent variable, *Fealty*, is the mean value across 1,000 draws from the posterior distribution. The point estimates listed above are the median marginal effects, and the intervals directly beneath are denoted by the 25th and 75th percentiles of the same. Fit statistics are medians.

Table A-15: Ordered Logit Model Estimates
(Senate Median and Filibuster Pivot as Pivots of Interest; Models Estimated on Individual Posterior Estimates)

	Senate Median		***Filibuster Pivot***	
	OLS-Based Scores	**EFA-Based Scores**	**OLS-Based Scores**	**EFA-Based Scores**
President-Senate Median Ideological Divergence	0.511***	0.389*	---	---
	(0.069)	(0.198)		
President-Filibuster Pivot Ideological Divergence	---	---	1.558***	1.181**
			(0.159)	(0.545)
Senate Polarization	-0.863***	-0.969**	-2.908***	-2.503**
	(0.153)	(0.488)	(0.335)	(1.106)
Divided Government	0.005	-0.056	-1.009***	-0.831**
	(0.048)	(0.242)	(0.098)	(0.414)
President-Senate Median Ideological Divergence × Divided Government	-1.517***	-1.161***	---	---
	(0.071)	(0.360)		
President-Filibuster Pivot Ideological Divergence × Divided Government	---	---	-2.320***	-1.744***
			(0.155)	(0.608)
Senate Polarization × Divided Government	0.435***	0.478	2.844***	2.301**
	(0.113)	(0.301)	(0.307)	(1.009)
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	0.010	-0.033	0.010	-0.035
	(0.038)	(0.170)	(0.037)	(0.170)
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	-0.219***	-0.187	-0.225***	-0.191
	(0.034)	(0.182)	(0.034)	(0.182)
Supervisory Position	-0.102***	-0.201	-0.104***	-0.201
	(0.024)	(0.124)	(0.024)	(0.124)
Priority Agency	-0.102***	-0.082**	-0.102***	-0.081**
	(0.006)	(0.033)	(0.006)	(0.033)
Presidential Approval	-0.009***	-0.008	-0.010***	-0.009
	(0.001)	(0.007)	(0.001)	(0.007)
Congress	0.090***	0.147	0.053*	0.114
	(0.029)	(0.091)	(0.029)	(0.084)
Cutpoint 1	7.121**	12.638	2.514	8.684
	(2.935)	(9.462)	(2.959)	(8.703)
Cutpoint 2	8.682***	15.247	4.082	11.298
	(2.931)	(9.479)	(2.956)	(8.717)
AIC	1218.604	1106.921	1214.835	1105.663
BIC	1274.820	1163.137	1271.051	1161.879
Log Likelihood	-596.302	-540.460	-594.417	-539.831
Likelihood Ratio Test	20.157**	26.419***	23.926**	27.677***
Likelihood Ratio Test of Significance of *Divided Gov't*	1.172	18.758***	2.578	20.705***
Number of Observations	558	558	558	558

Note: Ordered logistic coefficients presented; the dependent variable (*Trait Relationship*) is coded as -1 if *Fealty* and *Ideological Proximity*/*Shared Preferences* are substitutes, 1 if they are complements, and 0 if they are neither. Models are initially estimated on each of 1,000 posterior estimates of the dependent variable (as *Fealty* is initially estimated via a series of indicators); the coefficients and all fit statistics are medians. The Likelihood Ratio Test of the significance of *Divided Government* examines the null hypothesis that *Divided Government* and its interaction terms are zero against the alternative that the additional terms provide significantly more explanatory power. Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed z-tests: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.

Table A-16: Ordered Logit Model Estimates
(Committee Chair and Committee Median as Pivots of Interest; Models Estimated on Individual Posterior Estimates)

	Committee Chair		***Committee Median***	
	OLS-Based Scores	**EFA-Based Scores**	**OLS-Based Scores**	**EFA-Based Scores**
President-Committee Chair Ideological Divergence	0.308***	0.248	---	---
	(0.064)	(0.216)		
President-Committee Median Ideological Divergence	---	---	0.171***	0.068
			(0.034)	(0.140)
Senate Polarization	-0.301	-0.592	0.054	-0.204
	(0.186)	(0.460)	(0.130)	(0.361)
Divided Government	-0.240***	-0.242	-0.109***	-0.070
	(0.064)	(0.201)	(0.036)	(0.190)
President-Committee Chair Ideological Divergence × Divided Government	-0.839***	-0.644**	---	---
	(0.076)	(0.256)		
President-Committee Median Ideological Divergence × Divided Government	---	---	-0.519***	-0.339*
			(0.050)	(0.201)
Senate Polarization × Divided Government	0.374***	0.460	0.147**	0.195
	(0.120)	(0.355)	(0.074)	(0.232)
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	0.023	-0.047	-0.044	-0.100
	(0.039)	(0.176)	(0.040)	(0.175)
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	-0.211***	-0.167	-0.232***	-0.183
	(0.033)	(0.184)	(0.031)	(0.183)
Supervisory Position	-0.016	-0.146	0.008	-0.128
	(0.024)	(0.133)	(0.023)	(0.131)
Priority Agency	-0.090***	-0.070**	-0.080***	-0.064*
	(0.006)	(0.034)	(0.006)	(0.033)
Presidential Approval	-0.005***	-0.006	-0.001	-0.003
	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.006)
Congress	-0.045	0.050	-0.072**	0.021
	(0.029)	(0.079)	(0.028)	(0.079)
Cutpoint 1	-6.552**	2.714	-9.063***	0.022
	(2.918)	(8.299)	(2.908)	(8.269)
Cutpoint 2	-4.965*	5.359	-7.500***	2.645
	(2.918)	(8.308)	(2.907)	(8.273)
AIC	1162.020	1055.236	1172.664	1060.717
BIC	1217.689	1110.906	1228.333	1116.386
Log Likelihood	-568.010	-514.618	-573.332	-517.358
Likelihood Ratio Test	24.459**	30.383***	13.816	24.903**
Likelihood Ratio Test of Significance of *Divided Gov't*	1.019	21.877***	1.418	20.242***
Number of Observations	535	535	535	535

Note: Ordered logistic coefficients presented; the dependent variable (*Trait Relationship*) is coded as -1 if *Fealty* and *Ideological Proximity*/*Shared Preferences* are substitutes, 1 if they are complements, and 0 if they are neither. Models are initially estimated on each of 1,000 posterior estimates of the dependent variable (as *Fealty* is initially estimated via a series of indicators); the coefficients and all fit statistics are medians. The Likelihood Ratio Test of the significance of *Divided Government* examines the null hypothesis that *Divided Government* and its interaction terms are zero against the alternative that the additional terms provide significantly more explanatory power. Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed z-tests: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.

Table A-17: Multinomial Logit Model Estimates
(Senate Median and Filibuster Pivot as Pivot of Interest, OLS Estimates of Fealty Used)

	SENATE MEDIAN				***FILIBUSTER PIVOT***			
	Substitutes		**Complements**		**Substitutes**		**Complements**	
	High Fealty, Low Ideo. Proximity	**Low Fealty, High Ideo. Proximity**	**Both Low**	**Both High**	**High Fealty, Low Ideo. Proximity**	**Low Fealty, High Ideo. Proximity**	**Both Low**	**Both High**
President-Senate Median Ideological Divergence	-0.718	-0.648*	-0.236	0.331	---	---	---	---
	(0.502)	(0.365)	(0.363)	(0.392)				
President-Filibuster Pivot Ideological Divergence	---	---	---	---	-1.864	-1.300	0.070	1.262
					(1.458)	(1.020)	(1.035)	(1.076)
Senate Polarization	1.398*	0.748	0.749	-1.094*	3.664	2.155	0.173	-2.763
	(0.725)	(0.526)	(0.550)	(0.593)	(2.656)	(1.873)	(1.924)	(2.003)
Divided Government	0.539	0.318	0.497	-0.097	1.322	0.627	-0.214	-1.259
	(0.706)	(0.508)	(0.468)	(0.519)	(1.164)	(0.810)	(0.798)	(0.836)
President-Senate Median Ideological Divergence × Divided Government	0.983	0.727	-0.833	-1.784**	---	---	---	---
	(0.812)	(0.587)	(0.570)	(0.707)				
President-Filibuster Pivot Ideological Divergence × Divided Government	---	---	---	---	1.868	1.324	-1.130	-2.349*
					(1.564)	(1.096)	(1.119)	(1.214)
Senate Polarization × Divided Gov't	-1.034	-0.517	-0.525	0.200	-3.523	-2.069	0.170	2.388
	(0.718)	(0.518)	(0.550)	(0.575)	(2.619)	(1.844)	(1.893)	(1.958)
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	0.383	-0.009	-0.171	0.374	0.407	-0.007	-0.150	0.377
	(0.417)	(0.316)	(0.298)	(0.349)	(0.417)	(0.315)	(0.299)	(0.350)
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	-0.350	-0.159	-0.639**	-0.169	-0.351	-0.152	-0.640**	-0.174
	(0.475)	(0.324)	(0.312)	(0.375)	(0.475)	(0.323)	(0.313)	(0.375)
Supervisory Position	0.652*	-0.516*	-0.646**	0.450	0.639*	-0.524*	-0.662**	0.445
	(0.337)	(0.272)	(0.265)	(0.278)	(0.336)	(0.272)	(0.266)	(0.279)
Priority Agency	0.028	0.049	-0.053	-0.109	0.023	0.048	-0.059	-0.111
	(0.075)	(0.048)	(0.054)	(0.070)	(0.074)	(0.048)	(0.054)	(0.071)
Presidential Approval	0.007	0.007	0.008	-0.011	0.004	0.004	0.001	-0.016
	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.016)
Congress	-0.180***	-0.046***	-0.181***	0.213***	-0.125***	-0.006	-0.137***	0.155***
	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Constant	15.848***	3.362***	18.404***	-22.318***	9.579***	-0.982***	14.407***	-15.380***
	(0.051)	(0.034)	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.318)	(0.170)	(0.215)	(0.166)
AIC	1688.064				1683.357			
BIC	1895.633				1890.927			
Log Likelihood	-796.032				-793.679			
Likelihood Ratio Test	74.512***				79.219***			
Number of Observations	558				558			

Note: Multinomial logistic coefficients presented. The dependent variable is coded as "High Fealty, Low Ideological Proximity" if *Fealty* and *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence* are both in the top third of their ranges, "Low Fealty, High Ideological Proximity" if both are in the bottom third of their ranges, "Both Low" if *Fealty* is in the bottom third of its range and *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence* is in the top third of its range, and "Both High" if *Fealty* is in the top third of its range and *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence* is in the bottom third of its range. Observations are coded as *Neither*—the baseline category—otherwise. Values of *Fealty* under analysis are the means of 1,000 posterior draws. Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests: $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table A-18: Multinomial Logit Model Estimates
(Committee Chair and Committee Median as Pivot of Interest, OLS Estimates of Fealty Used)

	COMMITTEE CHAIR				***COMMITTEE MEDIAN***			
	Substitutes		**Complements**		**Substitutes**		**Complements**	
	High Fealty, Low Ideo. Proximity	**Low Fealty, High Ideo. Proximity**	**Both Low**	**Both High**	**High Fealty, Low Ideo. Proximity**	**Low Fealty, High Ideo. Proximity**	**Both Low**	**Both High**
President-Committee Chair Ideological Divergence	0.188	-0.954**	-0.249	-0.140	---	---	---	---
	(0.667)	(0.420)	(0.403)	(0.445)				
President-Committee Median Ideological Divergence	---	---	---	---	-0.064	-0.883***	-0.358	-0.335
					(0.407)	(0.290)	(0.260)	(0.287)
Senate Polarization	0.336	1.492**	1.247*	0.111	0.697	1.268***	1.548***	0.761*
	(1.072)	(0.688)	(0.659)	(0.709)	(0.659)	(0.411)	(0.404)	(0.427)
Divided Government	0.312	0.378	-0.153	-0.386	0.608	0.367	0.035	-0.081
	(0.625)	(0.423)	(0.373)	(0.432)	(0.583)	(0.417)	(0.347)	(0.404)
President-Committee Chair Ideological Divergence × Divided Government	-0.250	1.150**	-0.296	-0.732	---	---	---	---
	(0.745)	(0.482)	(0.467)	(0.560)				
President-Committee Median Ideological Divergence × Divided Government	---	---	---	---	-0.346	1.280***	0.165	-0.013
					(0.568)	(0.397)	(0.370)	(0.444)
Senate Polarization × Divided Gov't	-0.421	-1.291*	-0.614	-0.416	-0.863	-0.786*	-0.557	-0.529
	(1.064)	(0.687)	(0.667)	(0.714)	(0.678)	(0.429)	(0.430)	(0.459)
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	0.654	-0.242	-0.224	0.317	0.661	-0.204	-0.268	0.251
	(0.465)	(0.331)	(0.304)	(0.364)	(0.461)	(0.329)	(0.299)	(0.358)
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	0.055	-0.123	-0.521*	-0.000	0.098	-0.216	-0.592*	-0.072
	(0.516)	(0.331)	(0.316)	(0.385)	(0.520)	(0.336)	(0.315)	(0.382)
Supervisory Position	0.342	-0.498*	-0.516*	0.446	0.359	-0.494*	-0.496*	0.472*
	(0.360)	(0.287)	(0.268)	(0.287)	(0.361)	(0.288)	(0.267)	(0.285)
Priority Agency	-0.033	0.057	-0.048	-0.103	-0.038	0.065	-0.035	-0.091
	(0.085)	(0.049)	(0.054)	(0.072)	(0.083)	(0.050)	(0.053)	(0.071)
Presidential Approval	-0.006	0.003	0.005	-0.009	-0.008	0.008	0.011	-0.002
	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.014)
Congress	-0.056***	-0.042***	-0.291***	0.050***	-0.064***	-0.118***	-0.374***	-0.094***
	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.009)
Constant	3.904***	3.111***	30.140***	-5.829***	4.632***	10.760***	38.353***	8.744***
	(0.052)	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.033)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.021)
AIC	1604.858				1612.422			
BIC	1810.407				1817.971			
Log Likelihood	-754.429				-758.211			
Likelihood Ratio Test	76.023***				68.459**			
Number of Observations	535				535			

Note: Multinomial logistic coefficients presented. The dependent variable is coded as "High Fealty, Low Ideological Proximity" if *Fealty* and *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence* are both in the top third of their ranges, "Low Fealty, High Ideological Proximity" if both are in the bottom third of their ranges, "Both Low" if *Fealty* is in the bottom third of its range and *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence* is in the top third of its range, and "Both High" if *Fealty* is in the top third of its range and *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence* is in the bottom third of its range. Observations are coded as *Neither*—the baseline category—otherwise. Values of *Fealty* under analysis are the means of 1,000 posterior draws. Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests: $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table A-19: Multinomial Logit Model Estimates
(Senate Median and Filibuster Pivot as Pivot of Interest, EFA Estimates of Fealty Used)

	SENATE MEDIAN				***FILIBUSTER PIVOT***			
	Substitutes		**Complements**		**Substitutes**		**Complements**	
	High Fealty, Low Ideo. Proximity	**Low Fealty, High Ideo. Proximity**	**Both Low**	**Both High**	**High Fealty, Low Ideo. Proximity**	**Low Fealty, High Ideo. Proximity**	**Both Low**	**Both High**
President-Senate Median Ideological Divergence	-0.489	-0.157	0.245	0.561	---	---	---	---
	(0.487)	(0.642)	(0.367)	(0.383)				
President-Filibuster Pivot Ideological Divergence	---	---	---	---	-1.441	-0.479	1.080	1.699
					(1.422)	(1.898)	(1.019)	(1.060)
Senate Polarization	0.871	0.372	-1.300**	-1.417**	2.719	1.040	-2.983	-3.546*
	(0.698)	(0.997)	(0.543)	(0.578)	(2.585)	(3.567)	(1.888)	(1.972)
Divided Government	0.299	-0.461	0.098	-0.372	1.047	-0.177	-0.791	-1.594*
	(0.687)	(0.795)	(0.488)	(0.500)	(1.137)	(1.439)	(0.796)	(0.822)
President-Senate Median Ideological Divergence × Divided Government	0.874	0.420	-1.160**	-1.925***	---	---	---	---
	(0.788)	(0.903)	(0.588)	(0.690)				
President-Filibuster Pivot Ideological Divergence × Divided Government	---	---	---	---	1.571	0.785	-1.909*	-2.740**
					(1.526)	(1.965)	(1.113)	(1.202)
Senate Polarization × Divided Gov't	-0.651	0.305	0.671	0.526	-2.705	-0.432	2.558	3.178*
	(0.692)	(1.010)	(0.528)	(0.565)	(2.548)	(3.543)	(1.849)	(1.927)
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	0.471	0.931*	-0.102	0.443	0.489	0.921*	-0.091	0.440
	(0.405)	(0.519)	(0.300)	(0.337)	(0.405)	(0.519)	(0.301)	(0.338)
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	-0.298	0.420	-0.860**	-0.235	-0.300	0.426	-0.866***	-0.244
	(0.463)	(0.544)	(0.335)	(0.367)	(0.463)	(0.544)	(0.336)	(0.368)
Supervisory Position	0.791**	-0.319	-0.586**	0.556**	0.783**	-0.307	-0.588**	0.555**
	(0.327)	(0.407)	(0.284)	(0.271)	(0.327)	(0.408)	(0.284)	(0.271)
Priority Agency	0.004	0.023	-0.169**	-0.130*	0.000	0.026	-0.172**	-0.131*
	(0.072)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.069)	(0.072)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.069)
Presidential Approval	0.005	0.023	-0.005	-0.015	0.004	0.023	-0.009	-0.019
	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.013)	(0.016)
Congress	-0.120***	-0.279***	0.222***	0.197***	-0.082***	-0.277***	0.234***	0.128***
	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Constant	9.421***	25.414***	-23.208***	-20.624***	4.940***	25.017***	-23.671***	-12.471***
	(0.049)	(0.078)	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.313)	(0.482)	(0.157)	(0.178)
AIC	1441.217				1436.675			
BIC	1648.787				1644.244			
Log Likelihood	-672.609				-670.337			
Likelihood Ratio Test	76.294***				80.836***			
Number of Observations	558				558			

Note: Multinomial logistic coefficients presented. The dependent variable is coded as "High Fealty, Low Ideological Proximity" if *Fealty* and *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence* are both in the top third of their ranges, "Low Fealty, High Ideological Proximity" if both are in the bottom third of their ranges, "Both Low" if *Fealty* is in the bottom third of its range and *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence* is in the top third of its range, and "Both High" if *Fealty* is in the top third of its range and *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence* is in the bottom third of its range. Observations are coded as *Neither*—the baseline category—otherwise. Values of *Fealty* under analysis are the means of 1,000 posterior draws. Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests: $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table A-20: Multinomial Logit Model Estimates
(Committee Chair and Committee Median as Pivots of Interest, EFA Estimates of Fealty Used)

	COMMITTEE CHAIR				***COMMITTEE MEDIAN***			
	Substitutes		**Complements**		**Substitutes**		**Complements**	
	High Fealty, Low Ideo. Proximity	**Low Fealty, High Ideo. Proximity**	**Both Low**	**Both High**	**High Fealty, Low Ideo. Proximity**	**Low Fealty, High Ideo. Proximity**	**Both Low**	**Both High**
President-Committee Chair Ideological Divergence	0.497	-0.970	0.420	0.209	---	---	---	---
	(0.651)	(0.666)	(0.405)	(0.429)				
President-Committee Median Ideological Divergence	---	---	---	---	0.180	-0.633	-0.044	-0.053
					(0.393)	(0.464)	(0.263)	(0.274)
Senate Polarization	-0.415	1.833	-1.297**	-0.456	0.027	1.175*	-0.423	0.203
	(1.049)	(1.172)	(0.657)	(0.691)	(0.641)	(0.689)	(0.401)	(0.412)
Divided Government	0.183	0.421	-0.394	-0.618	0.541	0.119	0.055	-0.194
	(0.614)	(0.727)	(0.377)	(0.428)	(0.571)	(0.672)	(0.366)	(0.390)
President- Committee Chair Ideological Divergence	-0.547	1.226*	-0.993**	-1.145**	---	---	---	---
× Divided Government	(0.729)	(0.744)	(0.481)	(0.551)				
President- Committee Median Ideological Divergence	---	---	---	---	-0.710	0.950	-0.430	-0.567
× Divided Government					(0.551)	(0.616)	(0.385)	(0.441)
Senate Polarization × Divided Gov't	0.132	-1.253	0.999	0.097	-0.508	-0.463	0.323	-0.209
	(1.040)	(1.189)	(0.657)	(0.699)	(0.659)	(0.734)	(0.421)	(0.447)
Presidentially-Aligned Agency	0.781*	0.521	-0.066	0.431	0.780*	0.622	-0.145	0.352
	(0.454)	(0.554)	(0.304)	(0.353)	(0.451)	(0.542)	(0.300)	(0.346)
Presidentially-Opposed Agency	0.076	0.364	-0.795**	-0.093	0.144	0.317	-0.794**	-0.140
	(0.504)	(0.559)	(0.339)	(0.377)	(0.509)	(0.559)	(0.338)	(0.374)
Supervisory Position	0.441	-0.430	-0.520*	0.521*	0.455	-0.441	-0.489*	0.551**
	(0.351)	(0.463)	(0.286)	(0.281)	(0.352)	(0.463)	(0.286)	(0.279)
Priority Agency	-0.058	0.046	-0.163**	-0.124*	-0.067	0.046	-0.156**	-0.115*
	(0.084)	(0.070)	(0.066)	(0.070)	(0.082)	(0.069)	(0.066)	(0.070)
Presidential Approval	-0.008	0.016	-0.006	-0.015	-0.012	0.018	-0.001	-0.008
	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.012)	(0.014)
Congress	0.016	-0.268***	0.137***	0.037***	0.040***	-0.315***	0.076***	-0.051***
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.009)
Constant	-3.823***	23.999***	-14.169***	-4.369***	-6.270***	28.961***	-8.370***	4.339***
	(0.052)	(0.058)	(0.032)	(0.036)	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.020)	(0.021)
AIC	1356.942				1366.989			
BIC	1562.491				1572.538			
Log Likelihood	-630.471				-635.494			
Likelihood Ratio Test	77.169***				67.123**			
Number of Observations	535				535			

Note: Multinomial logistic coefficients presented. The dependent variable is coded as "High Fealty, Low Ideological Proximity" if *Fealty* and *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence* are both in the top third of their ranges, "Low Fealty, High Ideological Proximity" if both are in the bottom third of their ranges, "Both Low" if *Fealty* is in the bottom third of its range and *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence* is in the top third of its range, and "Both High" if *Fealty* is in the top third of its range and *President-Appointee Ideological Divergence* is in the bottom third of its range. Observations are coded as *Neither*—the baseline category—otherwise. Values of *Fealty* under analysis are the means of 1,000 posterior draws. Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests: $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$.

Figure A-1: Estimated Marginal Effects of President-Appointee Ideological Divergence on Fealty ***(Kernel Regularized Least Squares Approach, Separate Models Estimated for Each Posterior Draw, Senate Median as Pivot of Interest)***



Figure A-2: Estimated Marginal Effects of President-Appointee Ideological Divergence on Fealty ***(Kernel Regularized Least Squares Approach, Separate Models Estimated for Each Posterior Draw, Filibuster Pivot as Pivot of Interest)***



Figure A-3: Estimated Marginal Effects of President-Appointee Ideological Divergence on Fealty ***(Kernel Regularized Least Squares Approach, Separate Models Estimated for Each Posterior Draw, Committee Chair as Pivot of Interest)***



Figure A-4: Estimated Marginal Effects of President-Appointee Ideological Divergence on Fealty ***(Kernel Regularized Least Squares Approach, Separate Models Estimated for Each Posterior Draw, Committee Median as Pivot of Interest)***



Figure A-5:
Predicted Differences in Probabilities of Substitutes and Complements
(Separate Models Estimated for Each Posterior Draw)